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Introduction
Every month 1.7 million workers in the US are laid off and an additional 3.3 million
quit their job voluntarily.1 At the same time more than 5.5 million workers are newly
hired every month, accounting for 3.8% of all employees in the US. Constant turnover
is a fundamental feature of labor markets not only in the US but across developed
economies.
At the same time, the causes and consequences of worker mobility and its broader
implications for labor market efficiency and welfare are complex and have been widely
discussed in both the public debate and the academic literature. This thesis contributes
to that discussion in three ways: The first chapter explores the drivers behind the secular
decline in worker mobility in the US since the 1980s and puts forward a new explana-
tion that has been overlooked in the literature so far. I argue that the specialization
of firms and the outsourcing of non-core activities was a key determinant of declining
reallocation rates and had more benign effects in terms of efficiency than conventional
explanations suggest. Turning from secular trends to labor market policies, the second
and third chapter investigate the role of unemployment insurance policies (UI) in shap-
ing labor markets through their effects on job finding and job separation rates. While
the second chapter focuses on the macroeconomic effects of structural reforms to the
German UI system in the mid-2000s, the third chapter explores the merits and welfare
costs of a common European UI scheme. In both chapters, accounting for the differen-
tial impact of UI policies on job finding and separation rates is crucial for assessing the
impact of UI policies on broader economic outcomes such as the unemployment rate
and aggregate welfare.
The importance of understanding labor mobility patterns
Before laying out in more detail the research questions, methodological approaches and
results of these three chapters, it is useful to shed some light on why we should care
about measuring and explaining labor mobility patterns in the first place.
In the public debate, labor mobility often carries a negative connotation, as it is as-
sociated with lower job stability, the loss of firm-specific human capital and not rarely
1Data from the Job Opening and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) in the US for the first half of
2018.
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accompanied by intermittent spells of unemployment. Workers switching jobs at a high
rate can also be an indicator of a malfunctioning matching mechanism where workers
and firms constantly end up in bad matches and thus decide to separate more often.
From that perspective, worker mobility is a sign of poorly functioning and inefficient
labor markets. It could therefore be worthwhile to pursue policies which improve the
initial matching of workers and firms while at the same time reducing the rate at which
workers are hired and fired, e.g. through stricter employment protection.
However, there is a second view on the role of worker mobility with diametrically dif-
ferent policy implications: In that view, labor mobility naturally arises as workers
reallocate from less productive to more productive firms and from jobs they dislike
to jobs that are better suited to their skills and interests. Workers switching jobs is
therefore an indication of a well-functioning labor market in which workers freely move
towards the job in which they can make the most efficient use of their human capital.
Following that reasoning, regulations and policies that preserve job stability but inhibit
the free flow of labor, e.g. through occupational licensing or employment protection,
reduce the efficiency of the labor market which leads to aggregate output and welfare
losses.
Given these contrasting perspectives, it is therefore not straightforward to assess
the macroeconomic impact and the welfare consequences of changing patterns in labor
mobility and cross-country differences. Evaluating the merits of adjusting labor market
policies, such as unemployment benefits, is equally challenging in light of the variety of
contrasting factors that determine the level and evolution of labor market flows. Un-
derstanding the drivers behind labor market mobility patterns is therefore essential in
order to assess the ensuing macroeconomic implications and to draw policy conclusions.
In addition to these conceptual issues, measures of worker and job flows contain valuable
information about the transmission of business cycle shocks as well as policy changes
into the labor market. Regarding business cycle shocks, several studies have used worker
flow rates to disentangle the relative importance of changing unemployment inflow and
outflow rates for unemployment fluctuations.2 These studies find large differences both
in the level of inflow and outflow rates across countries as well as regarding the impor-
tance of both margins for unemployment fluctuations. Jung and Kuhn (2014a) show
that these cross-country differences extend beyond the transmission of business cycle
shocks: They find that the separation rate is more sensitive not only to business cycle
fluctuations but also to changes in UI benefits in countries with low job finding rates.
This evidence suggests that it is crucial to explicitly account for the level, the cyclicality
and the endogenous reaction of worker flow rates to changes in labor market policies
when investigating and assessing the impact of policy changes on the unemployment
rate, aggregate output and welfare.
2Prominent examples are Fujita and Ramey (2009), Elsby et al. (2013) and Jung and Kuhn (2014a).
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Understanding the determinants of labor market mobility and assessing the reaction
of worker flow rates to policy changes is therefore at the very core of this thesis. In
doing that, the thesis contributes to the existing literature along various dimensions:
Empirically, the first chapter presents novel evidence on the secular decline of worker
flow rates in the US, disaggregated by occupations and industries. The second chapter
documents the heterogeneous evolution of worker flow rates across demographic groups
following a major labor market reform in Germany. The last chapter presents a new
measure of high-frequency worker flow rates across European countries that allows to
compute job finding rates by detailed unemployment durations. Based on these empiri-
cal contributions, each of the three chapters presents a structural DSGE-model tailored
to the specific research question and calibrated to match relevant moments in the data.
In the first chapter, the model is used to assess quantitatively the relevance of one par-
ticular mechanism for explaining the secular decline in worker flow rates in the US. In
the second chapter, the model allows to conduct counterfactual policy experiments and
compute the welfare effects of the German labor market reforms for different groups of
employees. In the third chapter, the model is quintessential to compute optimal labor
market policies in different economic environments. The remainder of this introduction
explains in more detail the contributions and the key results separately for each chapter.
CHAPTER ONE investigates the reasons behind the secular decline in a broad set
of worker flow rates in the US since the early 1980s. In contrast to existing studies,
the chapter offers a new explanation for the falling labor mobility: In the past decades,
firms focused increasingly on their core activities and started to outsource tasks, they
do not have a comparative advantage in, to external service providers. That fragmen-
tation of production processes allowed firms to adjust their labor input more flexibly
by procuring more or less external services rather than hiring or firing their own em-
ployees. This, in turn, reduced the need for worker reallocation between firms and thus
attenuated the efficiency losses that arise as workers move from one employer to another
in a frictional labor market.
The chapter presents new empirical evidence from worker and job flow rates by occu-
pation and industry supporting this hypothesis. Using the Current Population Survey,
I find that worker reallocation rates declined significantly more since the 1980s in those
occupations that experienced a particularly strong shift towards the professional and
business services sector (PBS). Similarly, industries that increasingly resorted to service
inputs from the PBS sector, experienced larger declines in job reallocation rates since
the 1990s. In addition they became less responsive to cyclical output fluctuations in
terms of employment growth.
The chapter then proceeds with a structural labor market model which allows to quan-
tify the strength of the proposed outsourcing channel. In addition, the model allows to
assess the aggregate implications of the proposed channel for labor market efficiency. In
the model, firms employ inhouse staff, who are costly to hire and fire, and procure labor
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inputs from external service providers at a price markup, akin to a flexibility premium.
The higher piece rate for external services introduces a trade-off between adjusting in-
house staff at a fixed adjustment cost and procuring labor inputs flexibly from external
providers. If the price markup falls, firms procure more services externally rather than
employing inhouse staff. They also respond to idiosyncratic shocks increasingly by ad-
justing their labor input along the external-services margin rather than hiring or firing
workers. In a counterfactual experiment, I decrease the price markup for external ser-
vices to match the rise of externally procured services since the 1980s in the data. The
resulting fall in worker reallocation rates explains 29% of the corresponding decline in
the data. Furthermore, allocative efficiency in the labor market increases as labor inputs
are allocated more smoothly across firms. As a consequence output increases by 0.3%.
This result is in stark contrast to existing studies which attribute the falling realloca-
tion rates to regulatory barriers which increasingly impede worker mobility. According
to that view, declining reallocation rates are a symptom of the labor market becoming
more sclerotic which reduces allocative efficiency and output. The first chapter of this
thesis contrasts this conventional view with a more benign interpretation: Declining
worker flow rates arise as a by-product of more efficient production processes that allow
to reallocate labor inputs smoothly without workers having to switch employers.
While the first chapter focuses on the drivers of reallocation and job stability in
the labor market, the remaining two chapters investigate the effect of unemployment
insurance schemes on aggregate labor market outcomes through their impact on labor
market flows.
CHAPTER TWO is joint work with Philip Jung and Moritz Kuhn and studies the
effect of the German Hartz reforms on labor market flow rates. The Hartz reforms
were a comprehensive reform package that was implemented in the mid-2000s and re-
organized the German UI system. In particular, long-term UI benefits were decoupled
from previous wages and merged with social welfare assistance which effectively reduced
UI benefits drastically for long-term employed, high-wage workers. In a first step, we
compute monthly job separation and job finding rates using administrative micro data
provided by the German federal employment agency.3 We find empirically that lower
separation rates explain 76% of the aggregate decline in unemployment rates that fol-
lowed the reforms. Accordingly, higher job finding rates played only a moderate role
in the German “labor market miracle” since 2005. Furthermore, the fall in separation
rates is particularly pronounced among those employees who were most affected by the
UI benefit reduction, i.e. employees with high employment duration and wages. We
causally link these empirical findings to the cut in long-term UI benefits in a labor mar-
ket search model with heterogeneous workers and aggregate fluctuations. Calibrating
the model to match the level and cyclicality of worker flow rates before the reform, we
3Panel of integrated employment histories (SIAB)
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find that the UI benefit cuts can rationalize the subsequent evolution of job finding and
job separation rates. The model also matches the differential behavior of job separa-
tion rates for workers with high versus low employment duration. In a counterfactual
experiment, we show that unemployment rates would be 50% higher today without the
reforms.
Although the reforms were effective in reducing the unemployment rate, the associated
welfare effects are less clear-cut: In particular high-wage employees in stable jobs were
increasingly afraid to become long-term unemployed after the reforms as they faced
substantially lower benefits once their short-term benefits expired. We show, both in
the model and in the data, that these employees were more willing to forgo wage in-
creases after the reforms in order to stay employed as a result of this “scaring effect”.
Without compensation or transfers, high-wage employees in stable jobs therefore expe-
rienced substantial welfare losses of 0.64% in terms of consumption equivalent variation
due to the reforms.
Although the overall impact of the reforms on unemployment and output is very pos-
itive, the heterogeneous welfare effects call for a more intensive debate about the dis-
tribution of the aggregate gains of the reforms and the compensation of those worker
most severely affected by the UI benefit cuts.
CHAPTER THREE investigates the merits and costs of replacing the current na-
tional UI policies in the European Union with an optimally chosen UI scheme at the
European level. It relates to the public and academic debate of implementing a com-
mon UI policy in the EU as an automatic fiscal stabilizer that allows member states to
insure against asymmetric shocks. Although it is relatively undisputed that a common
UI benefit policy can facilitate risk-sharing across European countries, it is not clear
whether a common UI policy is a suitable tool for that purpose: UI policies critically
affect the hiring decisions of firms, the job search behavior of unemployed and the in-
surance of idiosyncratic labor market risk. Thus, they have a profound impact on labor
market outcomes. Not tailoring these policies to country-specific institutions and other
labor market characteristics can therefore fundamentally distort the labor market and
lead to first-order welfare losses, potentially offsetting the gains of macroeconomic sta-
bilization. The aim of the chapter is to quantify these welfare losses.
As chapter two highlights, a structural cross-country analysis of the impact of UI bene-
fits on labor market outcomes requires high-frequency data on the level and cyclicality
of current labor market flow rates. However, existing data sources are either not avail-
able at a high frequency, cover only short time periods or are not comparable across a
wider set of countries. In order to fill that gap, I present a new measure of quarterly
job finding and job separation rates going back to 1998 for 27 European countries. The
measure uses detailed data on unemployment stocks by unemployment duration from
the EU Labor Force Survey to compute quarterly transition rates between employment
and unemployment. In a first step, I decompose the relative contribution of both rates
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in explaining business cycle fluctuations of the unemployment rate. I find that the job
separation margin plays a sizable role in explaining unemployment fluctuations over
time in most European economies. In addition to average flow rates, the new measure
also allows to compute job finding rates by detailed unemployment duration brackets.
I find that job finding rates significantly depend on unemployment duration in 15 out
of the 27 countries - mostly negatively. Especially in the largest European economies
(Germany, Spain, France, UK) long-term unemployed are significantly less likely to find
a job than short-term unemployed.
Motivated by the empirical evidence, I then present a labor market search model with
risk averse workers which features endogenous separations and duration dependence
in both job finding rates and UI benefits. In a first step, the model is calibrated to
match the level and cyclicality of worker flow rates observed in the data, given the
labor market policies currently in place. That allows to back out the structural policy-
invariant parameters for each of the countries. Given these country-specific parameters,
I then compute in a second step optimal UI policies at the national level. Optimality
in the model implies that the UI benefit scheme maximizes welfare by balancing the
moral hazard costs of reduced search incentives for unemployed with the consumption
smoothing gains of unemployment insurance. In a third step, I compute the optimal
federal UI policy that a European planer would choose if she could only set a single
UI policy which is applicable in all countries. In stark contrast to the UI schemes cur-
rently in place, I find that the optimal benefit profile is increasing in unemployment
duration, both for optimal country-specific as well as for the optimal federal UI policy.
The welfare gains of replacing the sub-optimal UI schemes currently in place with opti-
mal country-specific policies are large (2.96% of consumption). Compared to that, the
welfare losses of moving in a second step from country-specific optimal policies to an
optimal union-wide policy are small (-0.22%). The unemployment rate falls across all
European countries. These results imply that welfare would rise substantially if the cur-
rent UI schemes which are less generous towards long-term unemployed were replaced
by optimally increasing UI benefit profiles - both in the case of country-specific policies
as well as for a common UI policy determined at the European level.
In order to illustrate the importance of duration dependence for the optimal design of
UI policies, I redo the model exercise without duration dependence and only one level
of UI benefits. The results differ dramatically: The welfare gains of optimal national
policies are much smaller than in the baseline calibration with duration dependence
(0.72%). At the same time, the welfare losses of adopting a common UI benefit scheme
instead of tailoring UI schemes to country-specific characteristics are much larger than
in the baseline case (-1.48%). On average, the unemployment rate in the EU increases
if benefits are chosen optimally.
Two lessons can be learned from these policy experiments: First, duration dependence
in both job finding rates and UI benefits is a key feature of European labor markets and
should be taken into account when designing optimal UI benefit policies. Second, labor
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market institutions and preferences differ substantially across European countries. Not
tailoring UI benefit policies to country-specific characteristics can therefore lead to large
welfare losses. That is particularly the case, if duration dependence is not accounted
for.
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Chapter 1
The specialization of firms and the secular
decline in worker reallocation in the U.S.
1. Introduction
Since the early 1980s the US labor market has become less dynamic along various di-
mensions: Workers move into and out of unemployment less often and they are less
likely to switch jobs. The rate at which jobs are created and destroyed has fallen, as
has the geographic mobility of workers. These secular patterns have sparked a lively
debate on what caused the declining dynamism of the labor market and its implica-
tions for the US economy: According to one view declining reallocation rates imply that
employees do not move towards more productive matches as rapidly as they used to.
That diminishes allocative efficiency, thereby reducing aggregate productivity. On the
other hand, more stable worker-firm relationships might only be a sign that the value
of existing worker-firm matches has increased, for example through more job-specific
training or a better matching of workers and firms in the first place. Whether the de-
cline in reallocation rates has a positive or negative impact on aggregate productivity
and more importantly whether there is space for policy interventions therefore depends
crucially on the economic drivers behind these trends.
While existing studies have focused either on the legislative impediments to hiring and
firing (Davis and Haltiwanger (2014), Autor et al. (2007)) or technological advances
that raise the value of existing matches (Cairo (2013), Fujita (2015)), this study puts
forward a different explanation that has been overlooked in the literature so far: Since
the 1980s firms in the US have increasingly outsourced tasks in which they do not have
a comparative advantage to external service providers. The ensuing fragmentation in
production processes allowed firms to adjust their labor input in response to idiosyn-
cratic shocks by cutting or expanding externally procured services rather than hiring
or firing employees. The possibility to adjust labor inputs flexibly through external
services reduced the need for worker reallocation across firms which is reflected in lower
aggregate worker flow rates in the US.
In exploring that channel, the paper has two main contribution: First, I present empir-
ical evidence suggesting that there is indeed a meaningful link between the secular fall
in labor market turnover and the well-documented rise in the ‘professional and business
services’ sector (PBS) since the 1980s. In particular, I use detailed data on worker and
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job flows by occupations and industries as well as data on the input-output structure
of the US economy to establish three new stylized facts:
1. Worker reallocation rates declined more in occupations which experienced a larger
shift towards PBS-industries.
2. Job reallocation rates declined more in those industries which experienced a more
pronounced rise of external services as a share of gross output.
3. Within industries, a higher utilization of external services is associated with a
falling labor elasticity with respect to gross output fluctuations.
The second part investigates the importance of this channel quantitatively in a heteroge-
neous labor market model with labor adjustment frictions and assesses the implications
of rising PBS-utilization for allocative efficiency in the labor market. An exogenous
decrease in the price of external services that matches the rise of PBS-utilization in
the data can explain 29% of the fall in worker reallocation rates in the data which is
unexplained by observable characteristics. Allocative efficiency increases by 0.3 per-
cent of GDP which corresponds to 6.6% of the overall “efficiency gap” caused by the
labor adjustment frictions. The paper therefore offers a more benign interpretation of
the secular decline in worker reallocation rates than existing explanations: Almost one
third of the decline is driven by a reduced need for worker reallocation as firms shifted
from inhouse provision to more fragmented, yet specialized, production processes.
The empirical part starts off by documenting the aggregate dynamics of both trends
for different measures and investigating obvious candidates that could be driving the
decline in worker flow rates: I find that shifts in the composition of the labor force and
the industry- and occupation structure can explain only one half of the fall in worker
flow rates since the 1980s. Furthermore, I find that workers in the PBS-sector are
more likely to be hired or fired, even after controlling for worker characteristics and
occupation. A purely mechanical shift of employees who used to work inhouse to the
PBS-sector would therefore imply higher worker reallocation rates over time.
To explore the link between the two trends further, I compute worker separation rates
into and from unemployment by occupation from the Current Population Survey (CPS)
from 1980-2016, as well as the share of each occupation working in the PBS-sector over
time. The trends are significantly negatively correlated: Occupations which larger shifts
towards the PBS-sector experienced more pronounced declines in worker flow rates. A
similar exercise with PBS-utilization across industries reveals the same pattern: Indus-
tries which increasingly procured intermediate inputs from the PBS-sector experienced
larger declines in job creation and job destruction rates1 since 1992.
These two tests show that average levels of worker and job flows are linked with the
rising importance of the PBS-sector across occupations and industries. A different im-
plication of the suggested outsourcing channel is that firms which use PBS-services
intensively respond less in terms of hiring and firing to business cycle fluctuations. To
test this hypothesis, I first compute labor elasticities with respect to gross output fluc-
tuations by detailed industries for 9-year moving time windows. In a second stage, I
1Data based on the Business Employment Dynamics data base.
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regress these elasticities on the average PBS-utilization in the respective 9-year window,
controlling for year- and industry fixed effects. I find that a higher PBS-utilization is
associated with a lower labor elasticity with respect to gross-output fluctuations.
Motivated by this evidence, I build a structural model to explore in a first step qualita-
tively how changes in the market for PBS-services can affect worker reallocation rates
and to quantify in a second step how much of the aggregate decline in worker real-
location rates can be explained by the increased procurement of external services. In
addition, the model allows to compute the efficiency losses caused by labor adjustment
frictions and assess how these efficiency losses are affected by a more affordable out-
sourcing option.
In the model, firms face a trade-off between either employing inhouse staff subject to
non-convex labor adjustment costs or alternatively procuring these services as an in-
termediate input from external providers at a marginally higher piece rate. As that
“flexibility premium” declines, firms outsource more services to external providers that
formerly used to be procured inhouse. Firms not only hold a larger buffer stock of exter-
nal services in their portfolio of production inputs, but are also more likely to respond
to idiosyncratic shocks by cutting or expanding external services rather than hiring
or firing workers. In turn, the elasticity of employment with respect to idiosyncratic
firm shocks falls. This is in line with Decker et al. (2014) who find that the decline in
firm-level volatility in the US is not due to smaller shocks which firms face but rather
a smaller reaction of firms to these shocks. The model is calibrated to match the flow
rates of different occupation groups and the PBS-employment share in the early 1980s.
Reducing the “flexibility premium” for external services exogenously to exactly match
the quantitative rise of the PBS-sector observed in the data, the model predicts a fall in
worker reallocation by 4.5% which explains 14% of the decline in aggregate reallocation
rates. As approximately 50% of the aggregate decline in labor market flows in the data
is due to a mechanical shift in the labor force composition towards older and more
educated workers, which is not modeled in this paper, this number is a lower bound.
Controlling for these compositional shifts, the rising PBS-utilization in the model can
account for 29% of the flow rate decline in the data which is not explained by observable
characteristics.
Finally, the model allows to compare the baseline calibration featuring labor adjustment
costs with a frictionless economy in which labor can be adjusted flexibly. The labor
adjustment friction inhibits the flow of workers from unproductive to more productive
firms which causes efficiency losses amounting to 4.5% of GDP compared to the flexible
benchmark. Cheaper external services allow firms to adjust their labor input more flex-
ibly without hiring or firing inhouse staff. That raises allocative efficiency by 0.3% of
GDP, which accounts for 6.6% of the overall efficiency gap. Given that the employment
share of the additional PBS-services is only 7%, this is a remarkable increase.
While the model treats the increase in the PBS-share in a reduced form by impos-
ing an exogenous rise in the competitiveness of PBS-firms relative to final good firms,
this paper also investigates the drivers behind the surge of PBS-services. In particular,
the paper addresses the question whether increased competition in the PBS-sector has
supported the wide-spread utilization of external services. I find that in contrast to the
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rest of the US economy, the PBS-sector has experienced marked declines in profit shares
which is in line with evidence that the PBS-sector is one of the few sectors where price
markups have fallen since the 1980s (Loecker and Eeckhout (2017)). That suggests that
an increased competition in the PBS-sector putting downward-pressure on prices may
be an important driver for the rising utilization of external services by final-goods firms
since the 1980s.
Related literature. Empirically, this paper builds upon a large literature docu-
menting the secular decline in job creation and job destruction rates as well as worker
flow rates in the US since the 1980s (Davis and Haltiwanger (2014), Decker et al. (2014),
Hyatt and Spletzer (2013), Molloy et al. (2016), Cairo and Cajner (2013)). It is also
related to studies which document declining rates of geographical mobility both within
and between states (Molloy et al. (2013), Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl (2017)). In
addition to the empirical literature, there are several structural explanations for the
declining labor market mobility: These explanations have focused mainly on stricter
employment protection legislation (Autor et al. (2006), Autor et al. (2007)), higher
on-the-job training costs (Cairo (2013)) and higher skill depreciation in unemployment
that incentivizes employees to accept lower wages in exchange for more employment
stability (Fujita (2015)).
Another strand of literature investigates the secular rise of professional and business
services. Most notably Berlingieri (2014) documents a shift in the input-output struc-
ture showing that a substantial fraction of the newly created service jobs were formerly
produced inhouse in manufacturing firms. Other studies largely focus on the rise of
employment services, a sub-category of the PBS-sector (Autor (2003)), or alternative
working arrangements (Dey et al. (2010), Katz and Krueger (2017)), whereas this study
takes a broader perspective including all business services that are used as intermediate
inputs for production. In addition, there is a literature showing that offshoring reduces
employment volatility in domestic labor markets (Bergin et al. (2009), Bergin et al.
(2011), Zlate (2016)). However, this literature focuses on business cycles rather than
on long-run trends and it is more related to the impact of offshoring rather than do-
mestic outsourcing.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 contains the empirical evidence on
the secular trends in worker and job reallocation rates and the rising importance of
the PBS-sector. It presents the correlation between these trends across occupations
and industries and the effect of a higher PBS-share on labor elasticities with respect
to gross output fluctuations. Section 3 presents a simple stylized model to illustrate
how declining price markups for external services affect the hiring and firing elasticity
of firms with respect to idiosyncratic shocks. Section 4 presents the structural model
and the quantitative exercise. Section 5 presents empirical evidence on declining profit
shares in the PBS-sector as a potential source of the increased demand for PBS-services.
Section 6 concludes.
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2. Empirical evidence
This paper investigates how the shift of production processes from inhouse employment
to external procurement affected the hiring and firing decisions of firms, and in turn
aggregate labor reallocation rates. This section therefore starts by documenting the
secular decline in worker and job reallocation rates on the one hand and the secular
increase in the utilization of external services as a production input on the other hand.
It then moves on to investigate the link between the two trends using detailed data on
worker flows, job flows and the procurement of PBS-services across occupations and
industries to establish three novel stylized facts:
1. Worker reallocation rates declined more in occupations which experienced a larger
shift towards PBS-industries.
2. Job reallocation rates declined more in those industries which experienced a more
pronounced rise of external services as a share of gross output.
3. Within industries, a higher utilization of external services is associated with a
falling labor elasticity with respect to fluctuations in gross output.
These facts do not allow for a causal interpretation. However, they do support the
main hypothesis of this paper, that the increase in domestic outsourcing and the declin-
ing labor market dynamism are linked through the firms’ changing labor adjustment
strategy in the face of an easier access to external services.
2.1 Data
Worker reallocation rates
The worker flow series are constructed using the basic monthly files of the Current
Population Survey (CPS) between 1980 and 2016. The main advantage of the CPS
compared to other surveys is the fact that it tracks individuals for 4 months in a row,
which allows to compute worker transition rates at a high frequency.2 That reduces the
time aggregation bias, which arises as within-period transitions cannot be measured
(e.g. from employment to unemployment and back). Furthermore, the CPS allows to
construct time-consistent occupation and industry codes.3
Using the CPS, I construct occupation- and industry-specific monthly transition rates
from 1980 to 2016 between employment, unemployment and non-employment. As per-
sons in non-employment are by definition not searching actively for new jobs, transitions
to and from non-employment are not considered in the benchmark scenario.4 The CPS
also allows to identify direct job-to-job transitions of workers from 1994 onwards. How-
ever, they will not be considered in the reallocation measure for two reasons: First,
2Individuals are actually tracked longer: They are first interviewed every month for 4 consecutive
months, then exit the sample for 4 months and are then interviewed again for 4 months.
3The monthly files are obtained from the IPUMS-data which constructed time-consistent measures
for occupations and industries for different base years. The measures used here are for the base year
1990.
4Appendix A contains the empirical results for transitions including non-employment which are
qualitatively similar, although less pronounced quantitatively.
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the time span for which a secular decline has been documented starts in the early
1980s, some studies even point to the late 1970s (Cairo and Cajner (2013)). Including
job-to-job moves would therefore not allow to construct consistent data series for the
entire time period of interest. Secondly, job-to-job moves are often the result of workers
climbing the career ladder (e.g. Topel and Ward (1992)) and therefore arguably less
directly related to the idiosyncratic productivity of an individual firm at a given point
in time compared to separations into or hires from unemployment. Worker separations
and hires are therefore defined as:
piEU =
EUt−1,t
Et−1
(1.1)
piUE =
UEt−1,t
Et
(1.2)
The hiring rate considered here should not be confused with the job-finding rate from
unemployment. It represents the share of new hires from unemployment among all
employees in a given period. That is closer to the main interest of this paper which
investigates how turnover in the labor force evolved rather than the likelihood with
which unemployed find new jobs.
Alternatively, one could focus on worker transitions between two jobs that are inter-
rupted by only short intermittent unemployment spells of up to one month (“EUE”-
transitions). Arguably, this would be a more direct measure for reallocation that is
neither induced by career moves (such as job-to-job moves) nor distorted by EU- or
UE-transitions that are followed or preceded by long unemployment spells. However,
that reduces the number of observations in the data substantially which becomes prob-
lematic when computing reallocation rates by occupation or industry. Appendix A
shows that the aggregate picture for EUE-transitions is similar to the time series of
separation and hiring rates.
Job reallocation rates
Instead of looking at individual worker transitions, labor market dynamism can be cap-
tured through the lens of the firm by measuring the flow of jobs between firms. In order
to do that, this paper uses the Business Employment Dynamics data set (BDM) which
reports quarterly statistics on job gains and job losses by detailed industries from 1992
onwards. The BDM defines job gains (job losses) as the sum of all jobs created (lost)
at expanding (contracting) firms, including firm births (deaths). In addition, the BDM
reports firm expansions and contractions which is the same as job gains and losses, but
excludes jobs created and destroyed by newly established and dying firms respectively.
In either case, these measures only account for net gains and net losses at the firm level,
disregarding replacement hires or other within-firm job turnover that does not affect
the overall size of the firm. That is the main difference to the worker-based measures
described in the previous section. Quarterly job flow rates are then obtained by divid-
ing the number of job gains or losses in a given quarter by the beginning-of-quarter
employment stock.
14
Professional and business service sector
Since the 1970s the US economy has experienced a steady and well-documented shift
towards the service sector, both in terms of employment as well as in terms of value
added. A closer look into the evolution of the input-output structure of the US econ-
omy reveals that this increase was to a large extent driven by services that are used
as intermediate inputs to other sectors rather than for final consumption (Berlingieri
(2014)). The NAICS-industry classification allows to identify these intermediate service
inputs relatively clearly as the ‘Professional and Business Services’ sector (PBS): More
than 85% of gross output produced in this sector is used as an intermediate input for
other sectors. They consist of a broad range of sub-industries, summarized in Table 1.1.
It should be noted that these industries comprise a broad range of activities, ranging
from high-skill professional jobs (e.g. legal services, computer systems design, scientific
research) to tasks that require less skills or formal training (waste management, security
and janitorial services).
To highlight the rising importance of the PBS-sector in the aggregate economy over
time, the share of the PBS-sector relative to all sectors is reported for three statistics:
(1) Value-added, (2) the value of all intermediate inputs used and (3) employment. The
first two statistics can be directly obtained from the input-output (IO) tables provided
by the BEA for every year since 1963. The employment share of the PBS-sector is
computed using the CPS, taking yearly averages.5
Table 1.1: PBS-industries
Legal services Management of companies and enterprises
Accounting, tax, bookkeeping and payroll services Employment services
Architectural, engineering, and related services Business support services
Specialized design services Travel arrangements and reservation services
Computer systems design and related services Investigation and security services
Management, scientific and technical consulting services Services to buildings and dwellings
Scientific research and development services Landscaping services
Advertising and related services Other administrative and support services
Other professional, scientific and technical services Waste management and remediation services
2.2 Aggregate trends
Table 1.2 summarizes the time trends for worker flows, job flows and PBS-shares as
defined above. The first two columns show the averages in the first 5 years of the re-
spective sample (job reallocation measures are available only from 1992 onwards) and
the third column contains the averages in the last 5 years of the sample (2012-2016).
5The most detailed level for which the IO-tables are available at the BEA on a yearly basis distin-
guishes 65 industries from 1963-1996 and 71 industries from 1997 onwards. Crosswalks between these
two BEA-codings for the IO-tables and between the BEA-codings and the CPS-industry codes are
available upon request.
15
The last column highlights that all measures of worker and job flows experienced marked
declines: The baseline measures for worker reallocation fell by more than 30%. Even
job flows - despite the later reference period starting in 1992 - decreased by more than
20%.
At the same time, the PBS-sector has grown rapidly: The employment share more than
doubled since the early 1980s from 5.5% to more than 12% and the share of value-added
produced in the PBS-sector increased by 83%. While 10.6% of all intermediate inputs
were produced by PBS-firms in the early 1980s, their share doubled, now accounting
for more than a fifth of all intermediate inputs used. The disproportionately large share
among intermediate inputs (compared to employment or value added) directly arises
from the nature of the PBS-sector’s business model: PBS-firms almost exclusively pro-
duce services that are used as intermediate inputs by other firms rather than for final
consumption.
Table 1.2: Summary statistics: Worker and job flows, PBS-shares
1980-84 1992-96 2012-16 ∆ (in %)
Worker flows EU 1.9 1.2 -34.5
UE 2.1 1.4 -30.8
EU+EN 5.4 4.2 -21.3
UE+NE 5.2 4.1 -21.5
EUE 0.7 0.5 -29.4
EUE+ENE 1.9 1.5 -18.9
Job flows job gains 8.1 6.3 -22.4
job losses 7.4 5.8 -22.0
firm expansions 6.3 5.1 -19.1
firm contractions 5.9 4.7 -19.7
PBS shares value added 6.5 11.9 83.1
intermediates 10.6 21.2 100.9
employment 5.5 12.3 125.5
Notes: Average worker and job flow rates as well as the average size of the PBS-sector in percent for the
respective first 5 years of the sample and the last 5 years of the sample. The last column displays the
relative change between these two periods in percent. Worker flow rates: Yearly averages of monthly
rates. Job flow rates: Yearly averages of quarterly rates.
In order to consolidate the different worker and job flow rates into singular mea-
sures, worker reallocation is from now on defined as the average of the separation rate
into and the hiring rate from unemployment (“EU+UE”) in a given year. Similarly,
the average of job gains and job losses relative to employment serves as the benchmark
job flow measure (“JG+JL”). The mean of total separations and hires (“SEP+HIR”)
as well as the mean of firm expansion and contraction rates (“FE+FC”) are computed
as robustness checks in the same way. Figure 1.1(a) illustrates the pronounced decline
in these benchmark worker and job flow rates. The monthly worker flow rate from the
CPS (“EU+UE”, blue solid line) has been aggregated to a quarterly frequency in order
to make it comparable to the job flow rate (“JG+JL”, black dashed line). In contrast to
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that, figure 1.1(b) shows the remarkable rise of the PBS-sector relative to employment
(blue solid line), total value added (black dashed line) and intermediate inputs (red
dash-dotted line).
Figure 1.1: Aggregate changes over time
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3
4
5
6
7
8
in
 %
1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016
(b) PBS shares
5
10
15
20
25
in
 %
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
year
Notes: Left panel: Blue solid line shows the mean of separation rate to unemployment (EU) and
the hiring rate from unemployment (UE) 1980-2016 based on monthly transition rates in the CPS,
aggregated to quarterly frequency. The black-dashed line displays the mean of all job gains and job
losses relative to total employment from 1992-2016 obtained from the BDM (quarterly rates). Right
panel: PBS-shares of aggregate employment (blue solid), value added (black dashed) and intermediate
inputs (red dash-dotted).
2.3 Compositional shifts as explanation for aggregate dynamics
The rate with which employees move into and out of unemployment and the rate with
which firms create and destroy jobs depends to a large extent on observable character-
istics, such as age and education on the worker side or establishment size and industry
on the firm side. Before delving into possible economic explanations for either of the
trends shown in table 1.2, it is therefore necessary to investigate how much of the ag-
gregate changes can be explained mechanically by shifts in the composition of workers
and firms over time. In order to do that, this section documents (1) the importance
of a changing labor force composition for aggregate worker flows and (2) the marginal
effect of working in the PBS-sector on workers’ transition probabilities.
Role of changing labor force composition
Young workers with low education typically move between employment and unemploy-
ment more frequently than their older and more educated peers. One potential expla-
nation for the secular decline in labor market dynamics is therefore the demographic
shift towards an older and more educated labor force, which mechanically increases the
share of workers with low transition probabilities, thus reducing aggregate reallocation.
But how much of the declining worker reallocation rates can be explained by this com-
positional shift in the labor force?
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Previous studies have already investigated this question: Cairo and Cajner (2013) for
example find that shifts in the age and educational distribution explain more than 70%
of the decline in worker reallocation. I replicate their result with the worker reallocation
measures (EU- and UE-rates) outlined above with a slightly different reference period
and find an even larger effect.
However, this approach neglects that there were sizable changes in the composition
of occupations and industries as well. Especially the rise of sectors in which worker
turnover is higher on average, works against the compositional shift in worker demo-
graphics. In order to account for both trends, I regress workers’ transition probabilities
on a set of demographic controls (age, age-squared, education, race, gender) as well as
dummies for the time-consistent occupation and industry codes in every year separately.
I then conduct two counterfactual experiments: First, I fix the means of the explana-
tory variables at their respective levels in the early 1980s and vary only the regression
coefficients (including the constant) over the years. The resulting predictions show how
separation and hiring rates would have evolved, had the demographic composition and
occupational and industry structure remained unchanged since the 1980s. Second, I
fix the regression coefficients at their 1980s level and vary only the means of all right-
hand side variables over time. The resulting time series show how reallocation rates
would have evolved if only the demographic, occupational and industrial composition
had changed.
Table 1.3 displays the results of both experiments together with the benchmark
prediction, i.e. the actual flow rate averages as in table 1.2. Taken separately, each
counterfactual experiment can explain approximately two thirds of the secular decline
in worker flow rates.6 Both experiments then allow to compute the contribution of
compositional shifts towards the overall decline in the respective flow rate: in the first
experiment as a residual, in the second experiment directly (see last column). Compo-
sitional shifts account for 35-69% (43-66%) of the overall decline in separation (hiring)
rates. Taking the average of the lower and upper bound, the mean contribution of
changing demographics and changing occupation and industry compositions is slightly
above 50%. That is clearly less than the 70% which arise if only demographic shifts
regarding age and education are considered. A substantial fraction of the downward
trend in worker mobility therefore remains unexplained by observable characteristics.
6The contributions do not add up to 100 because of interaction effects that do not enter in the
regression.
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Table 1.3: Composition effects
1980-84 2012-16 ∆ contribution compos. effect
EU benchmark 1.9 1.2 -36.6 100.0 -
only vary coefficients 1.9 1.5 -23.7 64.9 35.1
only vary composition 1.9 1.4 -25.3 69.3 69.3
average contribution - - - - 52.2
UE benchmark 2.0 1.4 -30.5 100.0 -
only vary coefficients 2.0 1.6 -17.5 57.3 42.7
only vary composition 2.0 1.6 -20.1 65.9 65.9
average contribution - - - - 54.3
Notes: Counterfactual EU- and UE-transition rates with a constant demographic, industrial and occu-
pational composition (second row) and if only composition changes (third row). Column 1 and 2 show
average rates at the beginning and end of the sample. Column 3 shows relative change in %. Column
4 shows the respective contribution of each counterfactual towards the overall decline in EU- and UE-
rates. The last column takes the residual in the second row to obtain the contribution of compositional
shifts. “Average contribution” denotes the mean between row 2 and 3 in the last column.
Role of shift towards PBS-sector
This paper investigates the link between falling worker reallocation rates and the rise of
domestic outsourcing over time. One potential explanation for this link could be that
the PBS-sector generally exhibits lower worker reallocation rates on average than other
industries. If workers who would have been employed in non-PBS firms in the 1980s
now work in the PBS-sector, then the aggregate worker reallocation rate would have
decreased mechanically as a result of this cross-industry shift.
Evidently, employees in the PBS-sector might differ dramatically from workers in non-
PBS firms regarding their demographic characteristics as well as the occupations they
work in. Merely looking at the average reallocation rate in the PBS-sector and com-
paring it to the non-PBS sectors would therefore neglect potentially large selection
effects. In order to accommodate that concern, I redo the same year-by-year regres-
sion of worker flow rates on observable characteristics as in the previous section, now
including a dummy variable for PBS-industries rather than detailed industry controls.
The resulting coefficients on the PBS-dummy variable illustrates the marginal effect of
working in a PBS-firm compared to a non-PBS firm, after controlling for age, education,
race, gender and occupation.
Figure 1.2 shows the coefficient of the PBS-dummy over time for separation and hir-
ing rates. The gray-shaded area marks the 95%-confidence interval. The coefficient is
always significantly positive, indicating that everything else equal, employees in PBS-
firms actually face higher reallocation rates compared to their peers in non-PBS firms.
A purely mechanical shift of employees towards the PBS-sector therefore works against
falling worker flow rates. Doing a simple counterfactual exercise as in the previous sec-
tion illustrates that result: If the PBS-sector had not grown as a share of employment
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over time, then worker flow rates would have fallen by approximately two percentage
points more than observed in the data.
Figure 1.2: Coefficient βPBS: 1980-2016
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Notes: Marginal effects of working in the PBS-sector on separation and hiring rates from 1980-2016
after controlling for observable characteristics (age, education, race, gender, occupation).
2.4 Labor market dynamism and outsourcing
Given the secular trends in labor market dynamism and external service provision, the
question arises whether these trends are related empirically - apart from the time di-
mension. A natural starting point for that is to explore the heterogeneity of occupations
and industries regarding both, the declining dynamism in the labor market as well as
the increased utilization of external services. The rationale behind this approach is
to investigate whether workers and firms which were more affected by the increased
utilization of external services also experienced larger declines in the rate at which em-
ployees and jobs are reallocated between firms.
Worker reallocation rates and PBS-shares
Assuming that jobs differ in the degree to which they can be outsourced to external
service providers, one would expect that different types of jobs were differentially af-
fected by the increased utilization of external services. Taking occupations as a proxy
for different job types, this section therefore takes a closer look at occupation-specific
worker reallocation rates and the share of each occupation working in the PBS-sector
over time. I resort to the CPS which allows to define 44 time-consistent occupations7
and to identify whether an employee is working in a PBS- or a non-PBS firm. As in the
aggregate time series, worker reallocation rates are defined as the mean between the sep-
aration rate into unemployment and the hiring rate from unemployment (“EU+UE”).
7The CPS-IPUMS data provides time-consistent occupation classifications for various points in
time. This paper relies on the 1990-classification as a baseline.
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I then compute the average fraction employed in PBS-industries as well as the mean
reallocation rates in the first 5 years of the sample (1980-1984) and the last 5 years
(2012-2016). I then compute the relative changes in percent for both the reallocation
rates and the PBS-shares between these periods for each occupation. As PBS-shares are
very low in many occupations in the 1980s, using the initial PBS-share as the denomi-
nator yields exorbitantly large percentage changes. In the benchmark, relative changes
are therefore computed using as the denominator the weighted average of period t and
t+ 1:8
∆x =
xt+1 − xt
1
2(xt+1 + xt)
(1.3)
Figure 1.3 shows the change in the share of employees working in PBS-industries for
every occupation (horizontal axis) and the change in the reallocation rates of that
occupation (vertical axis). The left panel uses the benchmark rate “EU+UE” as a
measure for worker reallocation and the left panel includes separations to and hires from
non-employment in the worker reallocation measure, thus comprising all separations and
hires (“SEP+HIR”). For both measures two things stand out: First, there is substantial
variation across occupations along both dimensions. That means that occupations not
only vary in the level of reallocation and outsourcing shares but also in the extent to
which reallocation rates and the share working in the PBS-sector have changed over
time. Second, these changes are negatively correlated, indicating that those occupations
which were most affected by outsourcing from non-PBS to PBS-firms in relative terms
also experienced the largest declines in reallocation rates. Appendix B shows that these
results are robust for different time windows as comparison and if personnel supply
services are excluded from PBS-industries.
Figure 1.3: Reallocation rate changes and outsourcing (by occupation)
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Notes: Correlation of change in worker-based reallocation measures (CPS) and change in share of
employees working in PBS-industries between 1980-84 and 2012-16 across occupations. N = 44. Left
panel: Mean of separation rate to unemployment (EU) and hiring rate from unemployment (UE). Right
panel: Mean of all separations (SEP) and hires (HIR). Relative changes computed as xt+1−xt1
2 (xt+1+xt)
.
8The appendix B shows that the results are robust to using conventional percent changes instead.
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In order to illustrate the magnitude of these differences, I group occupations with
above and with below median increases in PBS-shares and compute the time series of
the benchmark reallocation rate (“EU+UE”) for these two groups separately. Figure
1.4 shows that both level and trend are substantially different for the two groups.
Throughout the sample, occupations which experienced above-median growth in their
PBS-share (black dashed line) had higher reallocation rates than occupations which
were less affected by the secular shift towards the PBS-sector (blue solid line). How-
ever, this gap narrows over time (see figure 1.4(a)): While worker flow rates fell by only
20% in the group hardly affected by increased outsourcing to PBS-firms (blue solid
line), flow rates declined by more than 40% in those occupations which experienced a
larger shift towards the PBS-sector. Figure 1.4(b) illustrates these differential trends
by normalizing both time series to their respective levels in the early 1980s.
Figure 1.4: Reallocation rates grouped by changes in PBS-share
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Notes: Worker reallocation rate in occupations with below-median growth in the employment share of
PBS (blue solid line) and above-median growth (black dashed line) from 1980-2016 in levels (left panel)
and normalized to average level in 1980-1984 (right panel). The worker reallocation rate is measured
as the mean of separation rate to unemployment (EU) and hiring rate from unemployment (UE).
Job reallocation rates across industries
If there is indeed a link between the rise of outsourcing and declining labor market
dynamics, then this should not only show up in worker reallocation rates but also in
the rate at which jobs are reallocated between firms. This section therefore investigates
whether industries that have seen larger increases in the utilization of external services
also experienced more pronounced declines in the rate at which jobs are created and
destroyed within these industries. In order to do that, I merge quarterly data on job
flows within industries from 1992-2016 from the Business Employment Dynamics data
base (BDM) with the annual input-output tables provided by the BEA.9 That allows
9The crosswalk between the two data sets is based on the 3-digit NAICS-2007 codes and is available
upon request.
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to connect measures of job reallocation with the usage of external services across 56
industries over time. As in the aggregate data series, I define two different job reallo-
cation measures: The average of job gains and losses (“JG+JL”) and the average of
firm expansions and contractions (“FE+FC”) relative to overall employment in a given
industry and quarter. The utilization of external services is defined as the fraction of
intermediate inputs procured from PBS-providers relative to gross output of an indus-
try in a given year.10
Similar to the analysis of worker reallocation rates, I compute the average job real-
location rates and the average PBS-input shares for the first five years of the sample
(1992-1996) and the last five years of the sample (2012-2016). Figure 1.5 correlates
the relative changes in reallocation rates (vertical axes) with the relative changes in
PBS-shares (horizontal axes)11.
There is a significant negative correlation across industries between the extent to which
intermediate PBS-inputs increased as a share of gross output and the decline in job
reallocation rates.12 Table 1.4 shows that this correlation remains significant after con-
trolling for the initial level of job reallocation rates and PBS-input shares.
Figure 1.5: Job reallocation rate changes and outsourcing (by industry)
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Notes: Correlation of change in job reallocation rates (BDM) and change in PBS-utilization between
1992-96 and 2012-16 across industries. The horizontal axis refers to the relative percentage change in
job reallocation measures (left panel: job gains and losses, right panel: job gains/losses in expand-
ing/contracting firms only). The vertical axis refers to the relative percentage change in the share
of intermediate inputs from PBS-firms as a fraction of gross output. Relative changes computed as
xt+1−xt
1
2 (xt+1+xt)
. N = 56.
10In order to work with quarterly data series regarding the job reallocation measures, it is assumed
that the share of PBS-inputs is constant within a year.
11As in the section on worker reallocation rates, relative changes are computed using a weighted
average of reallocation rates and PBS-levels in t and t+ 1 in the denominator.
12Appendix C shows that these results are robust to different time periods of comparison, different
change measures and excluding outliers.
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Table 1.4: Change job reallocation rates vs. change PBS inputs (across industries)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆JG+JL ∆JG+JL ∆FE+FC ∆FE+FC
∆PBS -0.0960** -0.0988** -0.0673** -0.0626**
(0.0443) (0.0491) (0.0261) (0.0288)
Initial level rate -0.816 15.01
(45.45) (33.99)
Initial fraction PBS -12.98 10.42
(72.99) (43.07)
Constant -26.29*** -25.27*** -23.12*** -24.86***
(2.361) (7.277) (1.394) (4.317)
Observations 56 56 56 56
R-squared 0.080 0.081 0.110 0.113
Pre 1992-1996 1992-1996 1992-1996 1992-1996
Post 2012-2016 2012-2016 2012-2016 2012-2016
Notes: The table shows coefficients from regressing the change in job reallocation measures across
industries on the change in PBS-shares from 1992-96 to 2012-16. JG + JL defines job reallocation
as the average of quarterly job gains and job losses relative to employment. FE + FC defines job
reallocation equivalently, taking into account only job gains in expanding firms and job losses in
contracting firms. PBS-shares are defined as the share of PBS inputs as a fraction of gross output in
an industry. Relative changes are computed as xt+1−xt1
2 (xt+1+xt)
.
Labor elasticity with respect to business cycle
The previous two sections showed a positive association across occupations and indus-
tries between increased outsourcing and reduced worker and job reallocation. Both
approaches support the hypothesis that firms’ labor adjustment choices became less
responsive with respect to idiosyncratic firm-level shocks as external services prolifer-
ated, thus reducing the average level of reallocation within an industry or occupation.
However, if there was indeed a link between the increased use of PBS-services and the
hiring and firing decisions of firms, then this should not only hold for firms’ responses
to firm-level shocks but also for their responses to aggregate shocks.
Ideally, one would empirically test whether firms with larger PBS-input shares have
responded less in terms of hiring and firing to aggregate or sector-level shocks. Lacking
access to detailed data on individual firms, this section resorts to industry-level data on
PBS-input shares and job gains and losses over time to test the following hypothesis:
An increased utilization of PBS-inputs in an industry is associated with a falling labor
elasticity with respect to gross output fluctuations over time.
Obtaining a time series for the explanatory variable (PBS-input shares) is straight
forward: As in the previous section, PBS-utilization in a given industry is defined as the
share of PBS-inputs in gross output based on the IO-tables from the BEA. Constructing
a time series for the dependent variable - the labor elasticity with respect to gross
output fluctuations - is more challenging: Labor elasticities are typically computed by
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regressing percent changes in labor on percent changes in the respective explanatory
variable - in this case gross output. That yields an average elasticity within the time
period on which the regression is based. In order to obtain a time series of labor
elasticities for each industry rather than a single number, I construct moving time
windows (9 years in the benchmark)13 akin to a simple moving average. The labor
elasticity in year t is then defined as the elasticity of labor growth with respect to gross
output growth t,i estimated in the 9-year window around year t:
∆Li,t+τ = consti,t + i,t∆yi,t+τ + ui,t+τ for τ ∈ [−4, 4] (1.4)
Labor growth ∆Li,t+τ is thereby computed as the difference between job gains and job
losses relative to total employment in a given quarter which is then aggregated to an
annual growth rate.14 With these industry-specific time series of labor elasticities at
hand, the main regression is then given by:
ˆi,t = α + βPBSPBSi,t + λi + δt + vi,j (1.5)
Here, ˆi,t denotes the labor elasticity estimated on the 9-year time window around t in
the first stage and PBSi,t is the average share of PBS-inputs in the 9-year time window
around t. λi and δt denote industry- and year fixed effects respectively.
Table 1.5 presents the results from the main regression. The coefficients deserve some
discussion: Without controlling for industry-fixed effects, the coefficient on PBS uti-
lization is significantly positive (columns 1 and 2). When industry-fixed effects are
included, the coefficient turns negative. One explanation for that sign switch is that in
the cross-section of industries the labor elasticity with respect to gross output fluctua-
tions is positively correlated with the utilization of external services. Some industries
simply have a more variable labor demand which means that they are more likely to
adjust their labor input in response to shocks and they are more likely to use external
services as these can be scaled up or down flexibly. Once these industry-fixed effects
are controlled for, the coefficient turns significantly negative (columns 3 and 4): Within
industries, a larger share of intermediate PBS-inputs as a share of gross output is asso-
ciated with a lower labor elasticity with respect to gross output fluctuations. Appendix
D shows that these estimates are robust to different window sizes and to using firm
expansions and contractions rather than job gains and losses for the computation of
labor growth rates.
13The results are robust to other window sizes. See appendix D.
14As in the previous section an alternative labor growth rate is computed using firm expansions and
contractions rather than job gains and losses. To be consistent, PBS-shares are also computed as the
moving average of annual PBS-shares in a 9-year window around period t.
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Table 1.5: Labor elasticity vs. PBS-shares
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS YE FE FE+YE
PBS-share 0.667*** 0.652** -1.285*** -1.551***
(0.252) (0.254) (0.464) (0.476)
Constant 0.351*** 0.365*** 0.515*** 0.534***
(0.0232) (0.0434) (0.0393) (0.0438)
Observations 896 896 896 896
R-squared 0.008 0.016 0.009 0.036
Industry FE NO NO YES YES
Year FE NO YES NO YES
window size 9 9 9 9
Number of industries 56 56
Notes: Regression of industry-specific labor elasticities with respect to gross output on the average
share of PBS-inputs as a fraction of gross output. Labor elasticities are estimated in a first stage
by regressing separately for each industry quarterly net job growth on gross output in 9-year moving
windows. Net job growth is defined as difference between job gains and job losses in a quarter. Average
PBS-shares are computed equivalently for the same 9-year windows.
Although these empirical results do not allow for a causal interpretation, they sug-
gest that there is a tight link between the proliferation of externally procured service
inputs and firms becoming less responsive to idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks in
terms of hiring and firing. In what follows, I build a structural model consistent with
the presented empirical evidence and evaluate quantitatively (i) to what extent in-
creased outsourcing opportunities account for the observed decline in worker and job
reallocation rates and (ii) how the increase in outsourcing affected allocative efficiency
in the labor market.
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3. Stylized Model
Before laying out the full model, it is helpful to investigate in a simple set-up how the
possibility to outsource labor affects the hiring and firing decision of firms in the face
of fixed labor adjustment costs.
Consider a one-period model in which a firm produces output with a decreasing returns
to scale production function and labor input L. It faces an idiosyncratic productivity
shock x and has to pay a wage w which it takes as given. The firm enters the period
with a stock of employees L¯ which is taken as fixed in this example. After learning the
realization of x the firm can adjust its labor input by either hiring and firing employees
at a fixed cost κ or by procuring additional labor input from external providers paying
a flexibility premium over the wage χ. The main purpose of this section is to show how
labor adjustment decisions change qualitatively as χ decreases which makes external
services cheaper for final-goods firms.
Note first, that without any labor adjustment costs the firm would not use any external
services due to the price markup χ. Instead it would choose its own staff flexibly by
maximizing:
max
L∗
{x(L∗)ρ − wL∗} (1.6)
The first order condition (FOC) yields the optimal labor choice L∗ = (ρx
w
)
1
1−ρ . Accord-
ingly, one can define x¯ = w
ρ
L¯1−ρ as the productivity level at which the optimal labor
choice coincides with the existing labor stock L¯ with which the firm enters the period.
The labor choice for the flexible case is illustrated by the blue-dotted line in figure
1.6(a).
In the case with fixed labor adjustment costs, the firm’s optimization problem becomes:
max
L∗
{
x(L∗)ρ − wL∗ − κ1L∗ 6=L¯
}
(1.7)
The non-convex fixed cost creates an inaction region around x¯ in which the gains from
adjusting inhouse labor do not outweigh the adjustment cost κ and the firm keeps the
employment level at L¯ (light-shaded area in figure 1.6(a)). If the firm does adjust,
the fixed costs are sunk and the firm chooses the same employment level as in the
flexible scenario without acquiring any external services. Therefore the black-solid line
depicting the labor input with adjustment costs coincides with the blue-dotted line
in figure 1.6(a) outside of the inaction region. The range of the inaction region is
determined by two threshold productivity levels {x˜1, x˜2}. At the lower threshold x˜1
the firm is indifferent between firing inhouse staff at fixed cost κ and keeping its staff
unchanged at L¯.15 Note that for low productivity realizations between x˜1 and x¯ the firm
is willing to reduce its labor input and therefore does not acquire additional external
services (S∗ = 0). Hence, the total labor input (black-solid line) coincides with the
amount of inhouse staff (red-dashed line) for productivity levels lower than x¯.
15For the special case of ρ = 12 the lower threshold can be calculated analytically as x˜1 =
2
(
w
√
L¯−√κw
)
.
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For small positive shocks x ∈ [x¯, x˜2], the firm expands its labor input by procuring
external services at the marginal cost w+χ instead of hiring more inhouse staff at fixed
cost κ. The total labor input (black-solid line) therefore exceeds the amount of inhouse
labor (red-dashed line) in figure 1.6(a) but falls short of the labor choice in the flexible
case due to the markup χ:
S∗outs + L¯ =
(
ρx
w + χ
) 1
1−ρ
< L∗flex =
(
ρx
w
) 1
1−ρ
(1.8)
Here the dark-shaded area denotes the amount of external services acquired. However,
each unit of external services is marginally more expensive than an inhouse employee.
For x-realizations large enough, it is more profitable to incur the fixed cost and hire
more employees instead of procuring additional external services at the higher piece
rate w + χ. This point is determined by the second threshold x˜2:
x˜2 =
 κ+ χL¯(
ρ
ρ
1−ρ − ρ 11−ρ
) (
w
−ρ
1−ρ − (w + χ) −ρ1−ρ
)

1−ρ
(1.9)
Figure 1.6: Labor input choices with adjustment costs
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Now what happens if external services become more feasible due to a lower price
markup χ? In this static model, a decrease in the markup χ has two effects: First, at
the intensive margin the firm will choose a larger amount of external services for a given
level of x, thus bringing the total labor input closer to the flexible adjustment scenario
(the left-hand side in equation 1.8 increases as χ goes down). Second, at the extensive
margin, the threshold productivity level x˜2 at which it becomes more profitable to hire
additional workers at the fixed cost κ instead of procuring external services moves up
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(as long as the adjustment cost κ is large enough).16 The inaction region in which the
firm does not adjust its workforce therefore widens. Figure 1.6(b) illustrates these two
effects. The dark-shaded area denotes the extended inaction region for the lower χ with
the new upper threshold x˜′2.
Of course, this illustrative example abstracts from any dynamic consideration in par-
ticular the optimal choice of L¯ before the shock is realized. Also prices are fixed and
there is only one type of labor. The next section therefore introduces a dynamic general
equilibrium model. However, the intuition built in the static example also applies in
the richer framework.
4. Model
The purpose of the model is twofold: First, it allows to evaluate quantitatively how
much of the aggregate decline in reallocation rates since the 1980s can be explained
by lower costs of purchasing service inputs for production from external providers and
the resulting increase in outsourcing. Second, the model can be used to compare the
baseline economy with labor adjustment frictions to a fully flexible economy (as in the
stylized model) without adjustment costs. In particular, one can investigate how the
“efficiency gap” between the flexible case and the baseline version evolves if prices for
external services decline, thus making flexible labor adjustment cheaper for final-good
firms. Finally, I can decompose how much of the ensuing efficiency gain is due to re-
duced labor adjustment costs and how much is due to higher allocative efficiency.
In the policy experiment, it is assumed that the rising demand for outsourced services
is triggered by an exogenous decrease in the price markup for these services. Section 5
will provide empirical evidence that price markups have indeed fallen in the PBS-sector
since the 1980s - in stark contrast to most other sectors.
4.1 Model setup
In the model, there are two types of firms and two types of labor input: Final-good
firms use production line workers P and administrative services S to produce the fi-
nal good according to a Cobb-Douglas production function with decreasing returns to
scale. Production line workers are employed directly at the firm. The administrative
service input can either be produced inhouse by employing administrative workers AI ,
or obtained as an intermediate input SO from external service providers. The total
output of final-good firm i is therefore given by:
Fi,t = xi,tPαi,t(AIi,t + SOi,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
Si,t
)β (1.10)
The production function implies that administrative inhouse staff and external services
are perfect substitutes. The latter are produced by a continuum of external service
16For the special case of ρ = 12 this can be shown analytically by taking the derivative of equation
1.9 with respect to χ: This derivative is negative as long as χ <
√
κw
L¯
.
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providers j which produce intermediate services with the same linear production func-
tion as inhouse employees:
Sj,t = Aj,t (1.11)
External service providers have to pay a variable cost χ for each unit of services they
produce. This exogenous cost component stands in as a proxy for the transaction
costs of procuring external services and integrating them with services provided by in-
house employees. The market for external services is perfectly competitive such that
the price of one unit of externally procured service is the equilibrium wage and the
variable cost accruing to the external provider: wA + χ. An alternative approach to
introduce a higher marginal cost of services produced by external providers would be
to treat χ as an endogenous price markup charged by service firms. That would require
heterogeneous service input goods that are combined through a CES-aggregator to an
intermediate input good. As the marginal cost wedge is treated as exogenous here,
thus ruling out any feedback effects, I use the computationally more feasible reduced
form of linear transaction costs rather than introducing explicit price markups through
a CES-aggregator.
Final-good firms face idiosyncratic productivity shocks, xi,t, that are independent
across firms and follow an AR-1 process:
xi,t = ρxxi,t−1 + xi,t (1.12)
The innovations xi,t are log-normally distributed with mean zero and variance σx re-
spectively. There is no aggregate risk.
At the beginning of the period each firm learns its idiosyncratic shock. Taking wages
{wP , wA} as given, final-good firm i chooses optimally the amount of production line
workers Pi,t, administrative workers employed inhouse AIi,t and administrative services
bought from external providers SOi,t. Final-good firms face worker type-specific fixed
costs κP and κA when adjusting the amount of production line workers or administra-
tive employees. Production line workers can only be employed inhouse and therefore
the firm can only adjust their amount through hiring and firing at fixed cost κP . In
contrast to that, the final-good firm can avoid the fixed cost of adjusting its stock of
administrative employees by decreasing or increasing the amount of services it procures
from external providers at the marginal cost wA + χ. The marginal cost component χ
therefore introduces a trade-off between hiring and firing administrative staff employed
inhouse or adjusting the amount of services procured from external providers.
Final-good firms cannot sell intermediate services themselves (SOi,t ≥ 0).17 The
17Without that constraint, final-good firms which receive negative productivity shocks would utilize
their redundant administrative workers to sell intermediate service inputs to other final-good firms.
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final-good firm’s value function is therefore given by:
VF (Pi,t−1, AIi,t−1, xi,t) = Fi,t − wPPi,t − wAAIi,t − (wA + χ)SOi,t (1.13)
−κP1Pi,t 6=Pi,t−1 (1.14)
−κA1AIi,t 6=AIi,t−1 (1.15)
+E
{ 1
1 + rVF (Pi,t, A
I
i,t, xi,t+1)
}
(1.16)
External services can be adjusted flexibly in every period and are therefore not a state
variable. Hence, they are chosen optimally as a function of the amount of inhouse
employees:
S∗i,t =
(
βxi,t(P ∗i,t)α
wA + χ
) 1
1−β
− AI∗i,t (1.17)
The first term on the right-hand side is the total amount of service inputs demanded
by firm i at time t.
The model is closed by assuming a fixed supply of labor for both types, where the share
of production line workers in the economy is λ ∈ (0, 1) and the total amount of workers
is normalized to 1. The two wages are then pinned down by
λ =
∑
i
ωIi P
∗
i (1.18)
1− λ = ∑
i
ωIi (AI∗i + SO∗i ) (1.19)
Here, ωIi denotes the weights of final good firms in the joint distribution of the stochastic
states xi.
Worker reallocation
Due to the decreasing returns to scale technology in the final-goods sector (α+ β < 1),
there will be a stationary distribution of final-good firms with heterogeneous labor
choices. Reallocation arises endogenously as final-good firms move between different
idiosyncratic states and adjust the amount of employees. There is no matching friction
and therefore workers move directly from firms with negative productivity shocks to
firms with positive productivity shocks without going through unemployment. The
aggregate reallocation rates in the final goods sector are therefore given by:
piP =
1
2∑i ωIi P I∗i
∑
i
∑
i′
ωIi pii,i′|P ∗i′ − P ∗i | (1.20)
piA =
1
2∑i ωIiAI∗i
∑
i
∑
i′
ωIi pii,i′|A∗i′ − A∗i | (1.21)
The reallocation is given by the sum of individual adjustment decisions of all firms
weighted with their respective weights ωIi and the stochastic transition probabilities
pii,i′ . Note that in the stationary distribution each transiting worker is counted twice -
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as a separation in the previous firm and as a hire in the new firm. The absolute sum
of labor adjustments therefore has to be divided by two.
In contrast to the final-goods sector, service firms do not face idiosyncratic shocks
and have a linear production function. Hence, there is no scope for endogenous real-
location. In order to match aggregate reallocation rates in the data, there will be a
fraction piS of service firms exiting the market in every period which are replaced by new
service firms. That triggers exogenous reallocation of workers in the service sector. As
there are no aggregate shocks, wages and the aggregate amount of worker reallocation
are constant over time. The following analysis therefore concerns the steady state in
the economy rather than the reaction to aggregate shocks.
Mechanics of the model
Before laying out the calibration, it is helpful to reconsider how the final-good firm
reacts to idiosyncratic TFP-shocks compared with the simple example in the stylized
model. The case for production line workers is equivalent to the benchmark scenario in
the stylized model: Adjusting the amount of these employees comes at a fixed adjust-
ment cost κP . That creates an inaction region in which shocks are sufficiently small
that the firm refrains from paying κP and holds on to its production staff from last
period.
For administrative workers the basic mechanism from the stylized model holds as well.
However, the dynamic setting implies that the firm might choose to always procure
a positive amount of administrative services externally. The rationale for procuring a
“buffer stock” of external services stems from the asymmetry outlined in the stylized
model: The firm can always buy more external services but cannot utilize its overca-
pacity of service workers in case of negative shocks to sell their services as intermediate
input to other firms. Through buying a certain amount of services externally the firm
hedges against negative shocks as it provides the opportunity to cut down on adminis-
trative labor input in case of negative shocks without having to pay the fixed adjustment
costs.
Nonetheless, this additional feature does not alter the main intuition from the stylized
static model: The possibility to outsource administrative service inputs to external
providers makes it more profitable for firms to respond to positive (negative) TFP-
shocks by procuring more (less) external services rather than hiring (firing) inhouse
staff. Administrative workers employed with final-good firms are therefore shielded
from idiosyncratic shocks and reallocate less often between firms.
4.2 Calibration
The model is calibrated to match the quarterly dynamics of the labor market between
1980 and 1984 as a benchmark. The calibration is based on worker flows rather than
job flows because they allow to distinguish between occupations as a proxy for different
tasks within a firm.18 That can be used to map the two worker types in the model to
18Also, the CPS worker flows are available for the entire time period from 1980-2016, rather than
just the period 1992-2016
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different occupations in the data: Production line workers represent those occupations
which experienced a below-median increase in the share of employees working in the
PBS-sector and administrative workers are those that saw an above-median increase.
The weight λ, denoting the share of worker type P in the model, is therefore set to
39.5%, the share of employees in the CPS working in occupations with below-median
increases in outsourcing. The labor type specific adjustment costs κP and κA are then
used to target the respective occupation-specific worker reallocation rates of the two
groups in the early 1980s. The worker reallocation rate is defined as the baseline
“EU+UE” measure, which comprises the average of monthly separations into and hires
from unemployment. These rates are then aggregated to quarterly frequencies.
Note, that there is no unemployment in the model. However, the quarterly frequency
in the model implies that most transitions going through unemployment would actually
happen within periods and therefore not show up as unemployed. Assuming that only
a small fraction of employees stay unemployed for more than three months (or are hired
after being unemployed for more than three months), the “EU+UE” measure in the
data corresponds to the reallocation rate in the model sufficiently well.
The stochastic process is calibrated to match the moments of physical TFP estimates
from firm-level data in Foster et al. (2008): The variance of idiosyncratic shocks σx is
chosen to match the cross-sectional dispersion of physical TFP (0.26 in logs) and ρx
is pinned down by the annual persistence of firm-level TFP shocks. The exogenous
reallocation rate in the PBS-sector piS is set to the worker flow rate of service workers
in the PBS-sector (7.2%).
The interest rate is set to target an annual interest rate of 4%. The curvature of the
decreasing returns to scale production function (α+β) is taken from Basu and Fernald
(1997) who estimate the overall curvature to be 0.83. The last free parameter is χ
which is pinned down by the share of service workers that works in the PBS-industry
as a fraction of all service workers which was 3.3% in the early 1980s. In equilibrium
this implies a markup over the wages of service workers of 8.3%.
To test the model fit, I compute the cross-sectional dispersion of firm growth rates and
the volatility of employment over time as computed in table 2 of Davis et al. (2010).
While firm level volatility is slightly below the volatility reported in Davis et al. (2010)
based on firm-level data in the LBD, the dispersion of firm growth rates is slightly
higher than in the data. However, the model predictions are still fairly close to the
data.
4.3 Policy experiment: lower price markup for external services
How much of the decline in worker reallocation rates since the 1980s can be explained
by a shift in the production processes away from employing workers inhouse towards
procuring services flexibly from external providers? And how does that alter allocative
efficiency in the labor market? In order to tackle this question, I consider the following
experiment: I decrease the marginal transaction cost χ in the model to mimic the rise
of the PBS-sector in terms of employment shares since the 1980s. It is then possible
to assess how worker reallocation rates change as firms procure more external services
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Table 1.6: Calibration
parameter value target value (data) value (model)
r 0.010 annual interest rate 0.04
α+ β 0.830 Basu, Fernald (1997)
α 0.290 wPwA − 1 -0.028 -0.030
λ 0.395 PP+A 0.395
χ 0.020 AO
AI+AO 0.033 0.033
κA 0.011 piFa, reall. service empl. (inhouse) 0.069 0.066
κP 0.133 piFp, reall. production employees 0.042 0.041
piS 0.072 piSa, reall. service empl. (PBS sector) 0.072
σx 0.240 st. dev. TFP (Foster et. al, 2008) 0.260 0.260
ρx 0.946 persistence TFP shocks (Foster et. al, 2008) 0.800 0.800
dispersion firm growth (Davis et. al, 2010) 0.617 0.687
volatility firm growth (Davis et. al, 2010) 0.479 0.432
due to the exogenous fall in the price markup χ.19 The model also allows to compare
aggregate output to a benchmark economy in which firms can adjust labor costlessly
and compute how the resulting efficiency gap changes as χ decreases.
Declining worker reallocation
Table 1.7 summarizes the results on labor adjustment and worker reallocation rates in
the model. The price markup for external services χ
wA
has to fall by more than half
from 8.3% to 3.5% to generate the observed increase in the share of outsourced service
activities of more than 220% (column 1 and 4). The cheaper access to flexible service
inputs reduces the share of firms who hire or fire employees in a given period by half
from 7.7% to 3.6%. Consequently, the volatility of firm-level growth falls from 43.2%
to 40.7%.
In terms of worker reallocation rates, the hiring and firing rates of administrative in-
house employees falls by 7.7% explaining close to one fifth of the 41%-drop in the data.
The flow rate of production line workers does not change, indicating that there is no
spillover from the reduced reallocation of their inhouse administrative colleagues. In
total, the falling reallocation of inhouse employees pushes down the aggregate flow rate
in the economy by 4.5% (last column), explaining 13.5% of the 33%-decline observed
in the data.
It should be noted however, that the corresponding rates in the data refer to the un-
19Assuming that all of the rise in PBS-industries is due to an exogenous change in transaction
costs might seem like a strong assumption. However, this paper is not trying to answer what caused
the increase in external service provision but rather focuses on how the rise of the PBS-sector affected
worker reallocation by shifting the firm’s reaction to idiosyncratic shocks from hiring and firing towards
cutting and expanding external service inputs.
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adjusted flow rates which do not control for shifts in the composition of workers, oc-
cupations and industries. As outlined in section 2.3, these compositional shifts alone
account for approximately 53% of the overall decline in worker reallocation rates. The
model does not account for these shifts and therefore delivers a lower bound. Compar-
ing the change in flow rates generated by the model to the unexplained component of
the aggregate flow rate decline in the data (-15.4%), the model is able to explain 28.9%
of the observed empirical decline since the 1980s.
Table 1.7: Model vs. data (in %)
χ
wA
adj.firms σvol
AO
AI+AO piA piP pia piagg
Data 1980-84 3.3 6.9 4.2 6.9 5.8
2012-16 10.6 4.0 3.5 4.1 3.9
∆ in % 224.3 -41.2 -14.8 -40.0 -33.0
∆ in % (unexpl.) - - - - -15.4
Model 1980-84 8.3 7.7 43.2 3.3 6.6 4.1 6.6 5.7
2012-16 3.5 3.6 40.7 10.8 6.1 4.1 6.2 5.4
∆ in % -58.3 -53.0 -5.9 231.3 -7.7 0.0 -6.1 -4.5
Contribution (total) - - - 103.1 18.7 0.0 15.2 13.5
Contribution (unexpl. comp.) - - - - - - - 28.9
Notes: Empirical moments in the data (upper panel), in the model (central panel) and the contribution
of the model in explaining the change over time in the data (lower panel). All numbers in percent.The
last row in the upper and lower panel controls for compositional shifts as reported in section 2.3
(unexplained component is 48% of the fall in the reallocation rate). First column shows price markup
over wages of administrative workers. Column 2 is the share of firms that adjust their labor stock.
Column 3 is the volatility of firm growth rates. Column 4 is the share of administrative workers
employed in PBS-firms. Last 4 columns show quarterly reallocation rates by worker type.
Effect on aggregate efficiency
Labor adjustment frictions impede the smooth reallocation of employees from less pro-
ductive firms to more productive firms. They therefore trigger aggregate efficiency
losses compared to a benchmark in which labor can move flexibly at no cost between
companies. How large is this efficiency loss and how does it change as outsourcing to
external service providers gets cheaper? The structural model outlined above allows to
answer both questions.
To do that, I compare the value-added in the baseline calibration with non-convex
adjustment costs κA and κP to a flexible benchmark economy in which firms can ad-
just both types of labor costlessly (keeping all other parameters constant). This flexible
benchmark corresponds to the blue dotted line in figure 1.6 in the stylized model. Given
that they can hire and fire their own staff at no cost, firms are not willing to pay the
flexibility premium χ for external services and therefore the PBS-sector does not exist
in this flexible benchmark.
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In order to compare these two cases in terms of allocative efficiency, two aspects re-
garding the accounting in the model should be kept in mind: First, labor supply in the
model is normalized to one and capital is absent. Hence, differences in aggregate value-
added (GDP) can only arise from different allocations of labor input across firms with
different idiosyncratic productivities. Value-added therefore serves as a direct measure
of allocative efficiency throughout this section. In that respect, the flexible scenario
without adjustment costs yields the optimal allocation of labor across firms given their
idiosyncratic productivities and therefore serves as the benchmark.
Second, the adjustment costs which firms pay in the baseline calibration, are a part of
GDP but are treated as waste. Accounting-wise they therefore resemble depreciation,
marking the gap between net domestic product (NDP) and GDP. The flexibility pre-
mium χ on the other hand, is treated as profit which accrues to the service-sector firms.
It is assumed that these service firms are owned by all workers in the economy, who
receive dividend payments in every period. The transaction costs χ therefore enters
both NDP and GDP.
This accounting framework implies the following identity:
GDPflex = λwP + (1− λ)wA + χ
∑
i
SO∗i︸ ︷︷ ︸
NDP
+ κP
∑
i
wi1∆Pi 6=0 + κA
∑
i
wi1∆Ai 6=0︸ ︷︷ ︸
adj.costs
+ ∆AEG
The first two terms on the right-hand side (NDP + adjustment costs) constitute
total GDP in the baseline scenario with adjustment frictions. The “allocative efficiency
gap” ∆AEG is then defined as the residual between GDP in the flexible benchmark and
GDP in the scenario with adjustment costs.
Table 1.8 shows the three right-hand side terms relative to GDPflex. The first column
refers to the baseline calibration for the early 1980s and the second column displays
the results for the policy experiment with a reduced price markup as described in the
previous section. The efficiency loss ∆AEG due to a sub-optimal labor allocation across
firms in the face of non-convex adjustment costs amounts to 4.51% of GDP in the base-
line calibration. On top of that, the direct cost of hiring and firing workers reduces net
output (NDP) further by 0.52%. The actual output available for final consumption is
therefore 5.02% lower than without labor adjustment frictions.
This gap shrinks by 0.36 percentage points as external services become more affordable,
thus enabling final-good firms to adjust their labor input more flexibly without having
to hire or fire employees. The reduced need for costly reallocation directly increases
output net of adjustment costs by 0.06 percentage points. Yet, the bulk of the net out-
put gains (0.3 percentage points) arises from the indirect effect of a more efficient labor
allocation across firms: The allocative efficiency gap falls from 4.5% to 4.2% which is
quite substantial, given the small size of the PBS-sector in terms of employment. In
relative terms, the increased utilization of external services due to lower prices reduces
36
the allocative efficiency gap by 6.6%.
Figure 1.7 illustrates how the efficiency losses shrink due to the direct and the indirect
effect. Evidently, efficiency gains do not arise mechanically as less resources are wasted
on adjustment costs, but because the cheaper technology to reallocate labor inputs
without hiring or firing leads to a more efficient labor allocation across firms.
Table 1.8: Efficiency loss in the model
1980-84 2012-16 ∆ in ppt.
GDP (flexible) 100.00 100.00 -
NDP 94.98 95.34 0.36
adjustment costs 0.52 0.45 -0.06
allocative efficiency gap 4.51 4.20 -0.30
Notes: GDP and GDP components relative to the flexible benchmark (top row). First column shows
baseline calibration, second shows model predictions after reduction in price markup χ. “Allocative
ineffiency” is obtained as residual between GDPflex and GDP in the baseline (NDP + adjustment
costs).
Figure 1.7: Allocative efficiency gap with high and low χ
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Notes: Adjustment costs and allocative efficiency gap as computed in table 1.8
5. Markups and profits in the PBS-sector
In the model the rise of PBS-services results from an exogenous decrease in the “flexi-
bility premium” which final-good firms have to pay on external services. However, the
model remains agnostic about the possible sources of this change. This section there-
fore sheds some light on potential drivers of this structural shift. As mentioned earlier,
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one way to interpret the reduced-form premium in the model is to view it as a price
markup over marginal costs in the PBS-sector stemming from imperfect competition
among service providing firms. One reason for a lower premium on intermediate service
inputs is therefore a more intense competition among PBS-firms which reduces price
markups, thus making these services more feasible for final-good firms. At the same
time that would imply that profit shares in the PBS-sector have decreased since the
1980s.
Indeed, there is evidence on the aggregate level for both phenomena - lower price
markups and lower profit shares in the PBS-sector. Figure 1.8 shows the share of gross
surplus (profits plus capital expenditures) and the net surplus (profits) as a share of
value added for the US economy as a whole (black-dashed line) and for the PBS-sector
(blue-solid line) over time. In contrast to the aggregate economy, the surplus share in
the PBS-sector has decreased since the late 1980s from 40% to 33%, indicating that
profits in the PBS-sector have decreased.20 Furthermore, there is direct evidence on
falling price markups in the PBS-sector: Estimating price markups from firm-level data
in the US, Loecker and Eeckhout (2017) document a secular increase of price markups
in the US economy as a whole. At the same time, they also find that the PBS-industry
is one of the few sectors in which price markups over marginal costs have actually fallen
considerably since the 1980s.
Falling price markups and declining profit shares indicate that a more competitive envi-
ronment has contributed to the rise of the PBS-sector, thereby transforming the way in
which final-goods firms procure intermediate services as an input for their production.
Figure 1.8: Profit shares of value added
(a) Gross surplus share 1970-2015
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Notes: Left panel: Gross operating surplus (profit plus capital expenditures) as share of value added
for total economy (black-dashed line) and the PBS-sector (blue-solid line). Right panel: Net operating
surplus (profit) as share of value added. Based on OECD data.
20Data on capital stocks and expenditures is only available from 1998 onwards, therefore profit shares
cannot be computed before 1998.
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6. Concluding Remarks
Since the 1980s, the US economy has experienced two secular trends: A fall in the
dynamism of its labor market by almost one third and a twofold increase in the share
of professional and business services in terms of employment and value-added. This pa-
per explores whether these trends are related empirically, suggests a structural channel
through which a rising PBS-share affects worker reallocation rates and quantifies the
potential contribution of this channel to the overall fall in reallocation rates.
The paper finds that the intensity of both trends varies substantially across occupations
and that they are negatively correlated: Those occupations which saw the largest shift
towards the PBS-sector also experienced larger declines in worker reallocation rates. Ad-
ditionally, the PBS-sector experienced falling profit shares and declining price markups
since the 1980s in contrast to the rest of the US economy. That suggests that external
services have become more affordable for final-goods firms as the PBS-sector became
more competitive relative to the inhouse provision of these service inputs. Nonetheless,
the heterogeneity of rising PBS-shares across occupations and industries suggests that
not all jobs were affected by this shift in the production structure in the same way:
While some jobs are more likely to be outsourced as external services become cheaper,
other tasks remain in the realm of inhouse production.
I therefore build a structural model that mirrors this heterogeneity of tasks by incorpo-
rating two different labor types that are subject to non-convex adjustment costs, one
of which can be outsourced to external providers. An exogenous decline in the markup
charged by service providers alters the trade-off which final-good firms face between
hiring inhouse staff and external procurement: The lower “flexibility premium” allows
firms to hold a larger buffer stock of external services which they can adjust flexibly
in reaction to idiosyncratic shocks. That reduces the necessity to hire or fire inhouse
employees as shocks materialize, thus reducing the aggregate amount of worker reallo-
cation.
Quantitatively, this channel can account for 29% of the aggregate fall in reallocation
rates since the early 1980s which is unexplained by shifts in the demographic, occupa-
tional and industrial composition of the US. The cheaper access to a more flexible labor
adjustment option renders the labor allocation more efficient and reduces the efficiency
losses caused by labor market frictions by 6.6%.
The paper adds to a broad literature on the declining dynamism of the US labor
market and offers a new perspective on possible causes of this trend: Besides regulatory
changes and technological advances, the shift in the production structure of firms from
inhouse production to external procurement plays an important role in explaining why
firms’ hiring and firing decisions have become less responsive to idiosyncratic shocks.
The slightly higher aggregate productivity in the model implies that the declining dy-
namism in the US labor market is less problematic for the efficiency and productivity
of the US economy than approaches focusing on stricter regulation or employment pro-
tection would suggest. Whereas this paper mainly concentrated on trends in worker
reallocation, it is worthwhile to investigate what a shift in the production structure
towards more external service provision implies for other secular trends such as the de-
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clining start-up rate and the increased wage inequality especially between firms. These
are interesting topics to be addressed in future research.
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Appendices
A Alternative worker reallocation measures
This section documents the main results for four alternative measure of worker reallo-
cation rates:
pialtsep =
EUt,t+1 + ENt,t+1
Et
(1.22)
pialthir =
UEt−1,t +NEt−1,t
Et
(1.23)
piEUE =
EUEt,t+2
Et
(1.24)
piENE =
EUEt,t+2 + ENEt,t+2
Et
(1.25)
The first two rates add transitions into and from non-employment to the benchmark
separation and hiring rates. The latter two rates comprise transitions between two
employment spells that are interrupted by short (at most one month) unemployment
or non-employment spells. Note, that the last measure does contain both intermittent
unemployment as well as non-employment spells.
As figure 1.9 shows, the separation and the hiring rate (equations 1.22 and 1.23) fall
by 21% which is less than in the baseline and flatten out in the late 1990s. The less
pronounced decline is mainly due to relatively stable EN- and NE-transition rates com-
pared to EU- and UE-rates particularly until the mid-1990s. They then start increasing,
thereby counteracting the continuing fall in the separations to and hires from unem-
ployment.
Figure 1.10 displays the reallocation rates through unemployment and non-employment
considering a 3-month window. The aggregate picture is similar to the benchmark with
EUE-rates falling by 29% (benchmark EU-rate: -34%) and with ENE-rates falling by
19% (benchmark separations to U/N in top left panel: -21%).
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Figure 1.9: Worker reallocation rates (including non-employment)
(a) separations to U/N
4
4.
5
5
5.
5
in
 %
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
year
(b) hires from U/N
4
4.
5
5
5.
5
in
 %
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
year
Notes: Yearly averages of monthly transition rates for alternative worker reallocation measures from
1980-2016. Figure shows total separations into and hires from unemployment and non-employment
Black-dashed lines display HP-filtered trends (λ = 100).
Figure 1.10: Worker reallocation rates (intermittent non-employment spells)
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Notes: Yearly averages of monthly transition rates for alternative worker reallocation measures from
1980-2016. Left panel denotes transitions employment-unemployment-employment (EUE) transitions
in a 3-month periods. Right panel shows the same series, including also transitions going through
non-employment (EUE and ENE). Black-dashed lines display HP-filtered trends (λ = 100).
B Robustness of correlation occupational worker flows vs. PBS-share
change
This section shows that the correlations in figures 1.3 and 1.4 are robust to different
empirical specifications. Figures 1.11 and 1.12 use 10-year instead of 5-year windows
to compute relative differences (1980-89 and 2007-2016). Figure 1.13 and figure 1.14
compute the relative change of the PBS-share over time as PBSt+1−PBSt
PBSt
instead of using
the weighted average of PBSt and PBSt+1 in the denominator.
Figures 1.15 and 1.16 show the benchmark statistics when personnel supply services
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are excluded from the PBS-sector. Excluding personnel supply services attenuates
the results but still there is a more pronounced decline in worker flow rates in those
occupations that experienced a large shift towards the PBS sector.
Figure 1.11: Reallocation rate changes and outsourcing (different window size)
(a) EU+UE
−
10
0
−
50
0
50
Ch
an
ge
 re
al
lo
ca
tio
n 
ra
te
 (in
 %
)
−200 −100 0 100 200
Change PBS share (in %)
corr = −.323
(b) SEP+HIR
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Notes: Correlation of change in worker-based reallocation measures (CPS) and change in share of
employees working in PBS-industries between 1980-89 and 2007-16 across occupations. N = 44. Left
panel: Mean of separation rate to unemployment (EU) and hiring rate from unemployment (UE).
Right panel: Mean of all separations (SEP) and hires (HIR). Relative change in PBS-share computed
as PBSt+1−PBSt1
2 (PBSt+1+PBSt)
where PBS denotes the average share of each occupation working in the PBS-
sector. Changes in reallocation rate are computed as pit+1−pit1
2 (pit+1+pit)
.
Figure 1.12: Reallocation rates grouped by changes in PBS-share (different window
size)
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Notes: Worker reallocation rate in occupations with below-median growth in the employment share
of PBS (blue solid line) and above-median growth (black dashed line) from 1980-2016 in levels (left
panel) and normalized to average level in 1980-1989 (right panel). The worker reallocation rate is
measured as the mean of separation rate to unemployment (EU) and hiring rate from unemployment
(UE). Changes in the PBS-share are computed as PBSt+1−PBSt1
2 (PBSt+1+PBSt)
.
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Figure 1.13: Reallocation rate changes and outsourcing (alternative change measure)
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(b) SEP+HIR
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Notes: Correlation of change in worker-based reallocation measures (CPS) and change in share of
employees working in PBS-industries between 1980-89 and 2012-16 across occupations. N = 44. Left
panel: Mean of separation rate to unemployment (EU) and hiring rate from unemployment (UE).
Right panel: Mean of all separations (SEP) and hires (HIR). Relative change in PBS-share computed
as PBSt+1−PBStPBSt where PBS denotes the average share of each occupation working in the PBS-sector.
Changes in reallocation rate are computed as pit+1−pit1
2 (pit+1+pit)
.
Figure 1.14: Reallocation rates grouped by changes in PBS-share (alternative change
measure)
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Notes: Worker reallocation rate in occupations with below-median growth in the employment share
of PBS (blue solid line) and above-median growth (black dashed line) from 1980-2016 in levels (left
panel) and normalized to average level in 1980-1984 (right panel). The worker reallocation rate is
measured as the mean of separation rate to unemployment (EU) and hiring rate from unemployment
(UE). Changes in the PBS-share are computed as PBSt+1−PBStPBSt .
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Figure 1.15: Reallocation rate changes and outsourcing (by occupation, PBS without
temp. workers)
(a) EU+UE
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(b) SEP+HIR
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Notes: Correlation of change in worker-based reallocation measures (CPS) and change in share of
employees working in PBS-industries between 1980-84 and 2012-16 across occupations. N = 44. Left
panel: Mean of separation rate to unemployment (EU) and hiring rate from unemployment (UE).
Right panel: Mean of all separations (SEP) and hires (HIR). Relative change in PBS-share computed
as PBSt+1−PBSt1
2 (PBSt+1+PBSt)
where PBS denotes the average share of each occupation working in the PBS-
sector. PBS-sector excludes personnel supply services.
Figure 1.16: Reallocation rates grouped by changes in PBS-share (PBS without temp.
workers)
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Notes: Worker reallocation rate in occupations with below-median growth in the employment share
of PBS (blue solid line) and above-median growth (black dashed line) from 1980-2016 in levels (left
panel) and normalized to average level in 1980-1984 (right panel). The worker reallocation rate is
measured as the mean of separation rate to unemployment (EU) and hiring rate from unemployment
(UE). PBS-sector excludes personell supply services. Changes in the PBS-share are computed as
PBSt+1−PBSt
1
2 (PBSt+1+PBSt)
.
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C Robustness of correlation sectoral job flow rates vs. PBS-share change
This section documents that the correlations shown in figure 1.5 are robust to different
empirical specifications. Figure 1.17 shows that changing the window size of the periods
of comparison from five to two years does not alter the correlation between changes in
PBS utilization and the change in job reallocation at the industry level. Figure 1.18
shows the correlation for a different change measure of the job reallocation rates (using
the level in the 1990s in the denominator instead of the weighted average). Finally,
figure 1.19 removes the industry “Funds, trusts, and other financial vehicles” from
the sample as it displays an extraordinarily large increase in its job reallocation rate.
Removing this outlier industry does change the slope but not the overall correlation
between changing job reallocation rates and changing PBS-utilization.
Figure 1.17: Job reallocation rate changes and outsourcing (1992-93 vs. 2014-16)
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Notes: Correlation of change in job reallocation rates (BDM) and change in PBS-utilization between
1992-94 and 2014-16 across industries. The horizontal axis refers to the relative percentage change in
job reallocation measures (left panel: job gains and losses, right panel: job gains/losses in expand-
ing/contracting firms only). The vertical axis refers to the relative percentage change in the share
of intermediate inputs from PBS-firms as a fraction of gross output. Relative changes computed as
xt+1−xt
1
2 (xt+1+xt)
. N = 56.
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Figure 1.18: Job reallocation rate changes and outsourcing (alternative change measure)
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Notes: Correlation of change in job reallocation rates (BDM) and change in PBS-utilization between
1992-96 and 2012-16 across industries. The horizontal axis refers to the relative percentage change in
job reallocation measures (left panel: job gains and losses, right panel: job gains/losses in expand-
ing/contracting firms only). The vertical axis refers to the relative percentage change in the share
of intermediate inputs from PBS-firms as a fraction of gross output. Relative changes computed as
xt+1−xt
xt
. N = 56.
Figure 1.19: Job reallocation rate changes and outsourcing (outlier correction)
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Notes: Correlation of change in job reallocation rates (BDM) and change in PBS-utilization between
1992-96 and 2012-16 across industries. The horizontal axis refers to the relative percentage change in
job reallocation measures (left panel: job gains and losses, right panel: job gains/losses in expand-
ing/contracting firms only). The vertical axis refers to the relative percentage change in the share
of intermediate inputs from PBS-firms as a fraction of gross output. Relative changes computed as
xt+1−xt
1
2 (xt+1+xt)
. N = 55.
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D Robustness of labor elasticity regression on PBS-share changes
Table 1.9 shows that the coefficients reported in table 1.5 are robust to a shorter window
size of seven years (instead of nine years). Table 1.10 shows that these estimates are
robust to using firm expansions and contractions rather than job gains and losses for
the computation of quarterly labor growth rates.
Table 1.9: Labor elasticity vs. PBS-shares (window size: 7 years)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS YE FE FE+YE
PBS-share 0.489* 0.413 -0.885* -1.517***
(0.264) (0.257) (0.537) (0.517)
Constant 0.339*** 0.160*** 0.454*** 0.304***
(0.0244) (0.0466) (0.0456) (0.0502)
Observations 1,008 1,008 1,008 1,008
R-squared 0.003 0.082 0.003 0.146
Country FE NO NO YES YES
Year FE NO YES NO YES
window size 7 7 7 7
Number of industries 56 56
Notes: Regression of industry-specific labor elasticities with respect to gross output on the average
share of PBS-inputs as a fraction of gross output. Labor elasticities are estimated in a first stage
by regressing separately for each industry quarterly net job growth on gross output in 7-year moving
windows. Net job growth is defined as difference between job gains and job losses in a quarter. Average
PBS-shares are computed equivalently for the same 7-year windows.
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Table 1.10: Labor elasticity vs. PBS-shares (Firm expansions and contractions)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS YE FE FE+YE
PBS-share 0.387* 0.355 -0.816** -1.183***
(0.226) (0.227) (0.395) (0.401)
Constant 0.324*** 0.327*** 0.424*** 0.445***
(0.0208) (0.0389) (0.0335) (0.0369)
Observations 896 896 896 896
R-squared 0.003 0.017 0.005 0.054
Country FE NO NO YES YES
Year FE NO YES NO YES
window size 9 9 9 9
Number of industries 56 56
Notes: Regression of industry-specific labor elasticities with respect to gross output on the average
share of PBS-inputs as a fraction of gross output. Labor elasticities are estimated in a first stage
by regressing separately for each industry quarterly net job growth on gross output in 9-year moving
windows. Net job growth is defined as difference between firm expansions and firm contractions in a
quarter. Average PBS-shares are computed equivalently for the same 9-year windows.
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Chapter 2
What hides behind the German labor
market miracle? Unemployment insurance
reforms and labor market dynamics
1. Introduction
A key question in labor market research is how the unemployment insurance (UI) system
affects unemployment rates and labor market dynamics. We revisit this old question
and provide new answers based on an analysis of one of the largest UI reforms in
industrialized countries in recent decades: the German Hartz reforms. Economists
have extensively studied how changes in the UI system affect job finding rates of the
unemployed (unemployment outflows) either through their incentive effects on workers
to search for new jobs (Katz and Meyer (1990) and Schmieder and Von Wachter (2016))
or through their incentive effects on firms to post new vacancies (Millard and Mortensen
(1997), Krause and Uhlig (2012)).1 In this paper, we scrutinize the existing focus on job
finding rates and draw attention to separation rates into unemployment (unemployment
inflows). While the link between separation rates and the UI system is known in theory,
little is known about its quantitative importance (Tuit and van Ours (2010)). The goal
of this paper is to fill this void.
The Hartz reforms in Germany took place in the mid-2000s. At the heart of the
reform was a change in the UI system that abolished long-term, wage-dependent un-
employment benefits. We document based on social security microdata that 76% of
the changes in German unemployment rates after the reform resulted from changes in
separation rates and that changes in job finding rates only account for the remainder.
We provide a first link between the UI reform and changes in labor market dynamics
by documenting that the heterogeneity in the reform-induced reductions in benefit eli-
gibility is also mirrored in the reduction in separation rates across workers. We find the
1The existing literature on job search incentives builds on theoretical grounds on the large literature
studying the (optimal) design of UI systems. This literature focuses on the trade-off between providing
insurance and the cost of additional unemployment due to reduced search effort (Baily (1978), Shavell
and Weiss (1979a), Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997a), and Chetty (2006)). Recently, there has been
renewed interest in quantifying the incentive effects for firms’ vacancy postings in relation to changes in
UI benefits during the Great Recession in the United States (Hagedorn et al. (2016), Chodorow-Reich
and Karabarbounis (2016)).
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largest reduction for long-term employed, high-wage workers. In a second step, we ex-
plain and causally link our empirical findings to the UI reforms using economic theory.
Our results explain two key aspects of the German labor market miracle: notoriously
high unemployment rates that are cut in half within less than a decade and a small
increase in unemployment during the financial crisis. Theory and empirics jointly point
to the important role of changes in separation rates as an adjustment channel after
changes in the UI system.
Alternative narratives told so far about the Hartz reforms and the German labor
market miracle have looked at job finding rates as the key margin of adjustment, either
by highlighting changes in search effort (Krebs and Scheffel (2013)), changes in match-
ing efficiency (Launov and Wälde (2013), Hertweck and Sigrist (2015) and Klinger and
Weber (2016)), or changes in vacancy posting behavior (Krause and Uhlig (2012)). All
of these narratives explain the decline in unemployment by an increase in outflows from
unemployment. Our findings provide an upper bound for the contribution of these
explanations. Understanding the relative importance of different adjustment channels
after a UI reform is not merely of academic interest to better understand the workings
of the labor market, but also implies very different welfare effects for different sub-
groups of workers in the labor force. We show that the current reform has resulted in
substantial welfare losses for the large group of long-term employed, high-wage workers.
Our narrative can therefore provide one potential explanation for the widespread dis-
content with the reforms among the German electorate despite the massive reduction
in unemployment rates.
For our empirical analysis, we rely on social security microdata of individual employ-
ment histories in West Germany from the employment panel of integrated employment
histories (SIAB). We construct worker-flow rates for one decade before and after the
Hartz reforms and find that separation rates declined by 28% after the reform, while
job finding rates increased by only 13%. As a consequence, changes in separation rates
account for 76% of the German labor market miracle. We demonstrate that this stylized
fact is robust to a wide range of sensitivity checks and is also found using alternative
data sources. The average decline in separation rates hides a lot of heterogeneity. We
exploit the institutional setting that cuts in the generosity of benefits brought about
by the reform were staggered by age, employment duration, and wages. We find cor-
respondingly, in line with a causal effect of the reform, that after grouping workers by
age, employment duration, and wages, it was the long-term employed, high-wage work-
ers who reduced separation rates by up to 60%, while low-wage, short-term employed
workers show a comparatively modest decline of 20% in their separation rates after the
reform. In a recent study, Jäger et al. (2018) explore a staggered extension of UI benefit
durations by age on older male workers in Austria. In line with our findings, they also
find large increases in separation rates due to increased benefit generosity.
In our theoretical analysis, we develop a labor market search model with worker
heterogeneity, aggregate fluctuations, and endogenous separation decisions to establish
a causal link from the UI reform to changes in labor market dynamics. Workers in
the model differ in their employment status, skills, job duration, wages, and UI benefit
eligibility. Worker skills increase with job duration. An individually efficient bargaining
protocol over wages and separation decisions then implies that high-skill workers are
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also high-wage workers in stable jobs. Our model incorporates key institutional features
of Germany’s UI benefit eligibility rules with respect to the dependence on employment
duration and wages as in Krause and Uhlig (2012).2 We allow a UI reform to affect labor
market dynamics via three channels: workers’ incentives to search and accept job offers,
firms’ incentives to post vacancies, and the decision of workers and firms to separate.
We calibrate the model to the pre-reform period and introduce the Hartz reform by
abolishing long-term wage-dependent benefits. After the reform, the model matches
closely the observed time series for average separation and job finding rates. To tighten
the causal link from the UI reform to observed changes in labor market dynamics, we
explore a range of additional model predictions linked to the UI reform. First, we
study the heterogeneous effects of the reform on labor market participants and show
that the model matches the heterogeneous responses closely. In the model, as in the
data, the long-term employed, high-wage workers are most adversely affected. Second,
we perform counterfactual simulations of the German labor market in the absence of
the reform. We find that the reform also explains a second aspect of Germany’s labor
market miracle, namely, the good performance during the financial crisis when other
labor markets experienced skyrocketing unemployment rates. In the absence of the
reform, our model predicts that German unemployment rates would have skyrocketed
as well during the financial crisis of 2008 and would have been 50% higher today. We
also show that the German unemployment rate would have, without the reform, closely
tracked the labor market experience of Germany’s close neighbor, Austria, supporting
the validity of our quantitative predictions. Third, we provide empirical evidence that
workers traded off wages against job stability to avoid separations into unemployment,
in line with the theoretical mechanism. In a final step, we use the model to explore the
welfare consequences of the UI reform. We find that the long-term employed, high-wage
workers experienced large welfare losses in the absence of any government compensation.
In the model, a UI reform affects workers’ search incentives, firms’ incentives to
post vacancies, and separation decisions. A crucial question is how to discipline the
relative importance of these three different adjustment channels. In theory, there is a
tight link between aggregate labor market fluctuations from productivity fluctuations
and the responsiveness to changes in UI benefits (Costain and Reiter (2008)). Through
the lens of the model, productivity changes and benefit changes both directly affect the
value of employment relative to the outside option and are like two sides of the same
coin. We therefore calibrate the model to be consistent with business-cycle moments
for separation rates and job finding rates before the Hartz reforms. In this way, we tie
our hands regarding the responsiveness of labor market flows to the UI reform. For the
responsiveness of workers’ search behavior, we target existing estimates on the elasticity
of the search intensity to changes in UI benefits from the empirical literature.3 Our
2We share several modeling choices with Krause and Uhlig (2012), but differ in focus. Their findings
and calibration strategy focus on changes in job finding rates through effects on vacancy postings
rendering separation rates effectively exogenous in their quantitative analysis. Their model also does
not include aggregate fluctuation to impose discipline on the elasticity of separation and job finding
rates, which we exploit for the calibration as described below.
3A broad empirical consensus has emerged suggesting that this effect is modest. Typical estimates
find that granting one additional month of UI benefits leads to 0.15 more months of unemployment
(Chetty (2006), Schmieder and Von Wachter (2016)).
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calibration only targets unconditional moments of worker-flow rates, but matches well
the time series of labor market flows before the reform, thereby providing support for
the model mechanism. After the reform, the model still matches the time series of
labor market flow rates very closely, lending support to the independently calibrated
elasticities. Matching both the time series and cross-sectional heterogeneity of changes
in separation rates offers important evidence in favor of a causal link from the UI reform
to the observed changes in labor market dynamics.
We use the calibrated model to ask the counterfactual question: what would have
happened to the German labor market absent the Hartz reforms? The counterfactual
simulations provide striking results. German unemployment rates would not have fallen
over time, would have skyrocketed during the financial crisis as in most other industri-
alized countries, and would today be 50% higher than observed. This counterfactual
simulation also provides a way to decompose changes in unemployment between 2004
and 2014, from the trough of a recession to a long-lasting boom. We find that busi-
ness cycle dynamics account for at most 10% of the decline in unemployment rates,
leaving most of the changes to the structural reform. We validate our counterfactual
analysis relying on ideas inspired by the literature using control groups to identify and
quantify the causal effects of policy interventions. In the spirit of such an approach, we
consider Austria, Germany’s close neighbor, as our control group that did not reform
its UI system. Comparing counterfactual unemployment rates for Germany and Aus-
tria, we again obtain results that are striking. Absent the reform, our model predicts
that the German and Austrian unemployment rate would have evolved in lockstep over
the two decades under consideration. In the case of the reform, unemployment rates
diverge strongly after the implementation of the reform providing further evidence for
the causal impact of the UI reform on labor market dynamics. A final prediction of
the theoretical model we explore is that, in the model, workers trade off wages against
job stability in response to the reform. In particular, high-wage workers are willing to
accept wage cuts in exchange for lower separation rates. In the data, we find evidence
that such a trade-off took place.
In a final step, we use our microfounded framework to quantify the welfare effects
from the reform for different labor market participants. We consider welfare effects
abstracting from compensating transfers that the government could finance due to the
lower spending on UI benefits after the reform. Put differently, we quantify how a
transfer system needs to be designed to receive the support of the electorate. This
question is key when it comes to the political feasibility of UI reforms. We find that
losses amount to 2.11% in terms of consumption equivalent variation for the recipients
of unemployment assistance benefits. Unemployment assistance benefits represent the
long-term wage-dependent benefits that have been abolished by the reform so that the
large welfare losses for workers in this group ought to be expected. Probably, these
losses also explain the widespread grandfathering rules and hardship regulation that
accompanied the reform and that were targeted to this group. Among the employed,
we find the largest welfare losses among the long-term employed, high-wage workers. We
find that their consumption equivalent variation to forgo the reform amounts to 0.64%.
Long-term employed workers account for almost two-thirds of the German labor market
and the fact that their separation rates are the lowest among the employed might suggest
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that these workers are very detached from any changes in the UI system. Yet, we show
that this is not the case and that in hindsight their large welfare costs might explain
the widespread discontent among the electorate with the reform.
Two potentially important policy implications for labor market and social security
reforms arise from our findings. The first relates to UI reform proposals in other Eu-
ropean countries taking the Hartz reforms as a role model. Regarding the political
feasibility of such reforms, our findings imply that appropriate compensation schemes
have to be designed to avoid discontent in large parts of the electorate, as in the Ger-
man case among the long-term employed, high-wage workers. Our model suggests that
a quantitatively important role for changes in separation rates in line with findings in
Elsby et al. (2013) and therefore welfare costs among the employed ought to be expected
in most European countries. By contrast, UI reforms in the United States will likely
show the largest reaction in job finding rates. The theoretical justification for this con-
jecture comes from the cross-country analysis in Jung and Kuhn (2014b). Second, the
strong reaction of separation rates after changes in nonemployment benefits suggests
that similar reactions should also be expected and taken into account when evaluating
other social security reforms such as early retirement programs or disability insurance
programs that are widely discussed in Germany and elsewhere.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: we next provide a short descrip-
tion of the Hartz reforms. In Section 2, we describe our data and present the empirical
results. We describe the labor market search model in Section 3. Section 4 shows the
model results and discusses the counterfactual analysis. Before we conclude in Section
5, we discuss alternative explanations for the German labor market miracle in light of
our empirical results.
1.1 The Hartz reforms
In 2002 the German government entrusted an expert commission consisting of vari-
ous representatives from business, unions, and academia with the task of working out
reforms for the German labor market. The chairman was Peter Hartz, at that time
director of human resources at Volkswagen. The subsequent reforms are commonly
referred to as Hartz reforms.4 The main focus of the reforms was to restructure the
federal employment agency and to enhance the matching process of unemployed work-
ers to jobs. The ensuing reforms were enacted in four separate legislative packages
commonly referred to as Hartz I to Hartz IV between 2003 and 2005.5 They consisted
of comprehensive measures to promote and challenge the unemployed — ranging from
subsidies for self-employment to the restructuring of the unemployment benefit system
and a tighter supervision of benefit recipients.6 We provide further details in Appendix
A.
In the next section, we provide empirical evidence that points toward a causal
mechanism associated with the fourth step of the reform package (Hartz IV). In that
step, the former three-tier system of unemployment benefits, unemployment assistance,
4The official title of the commission was the Commission for Modern Labor Market Services.
5The official title of the acts were First, Second, Third and Fourth Act for Modern Labor Market
Services.
6Steffen (2008) provides a detailed chronicle of the German social security system.
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and subsistence benefits was transformed into a two-tier system of unemployment and
subsistence benefits. The reform constituted a substantial overhaul of the German
unemployment insurance system and implied a drastic cut in benefits for long-term
employed workers who, before the reform, were eligible for long-term, wage-dependent
unemployment assistance. In addition to lower subsistence benefits, these benefits,
unlike unemployment assistance, were asset-tested and the thresholds for asset-testing
were tightened (and extended to the household level). We will focus on exploring the
causal link from the unemployment insurance system to labor market dynamics and
the unemployment rate in our structural model below.
2. Data and empirical results
This section introduces the microdata we use to analyze changes in unemployment
rates and labor market flows. We demonstrate that the microdata matches the macroe-
conomic trends and explain how we adjust for administrative changes that otherwise
impede a consistent measurement over time. In the second part, we present empirical
results on changes in labor market flows and document large heterogeneity in these
changes.
2.1 Data
Our main data source is the microdata on individual employment histories from the
employment panel of integrated employment histories (SIAB) provided by the Institute
for Employment Research (IAB) for the period 1975 to 2014.7 The SIAB is a 2%
representative sample of administrative data on all workers who are subject to social
security contributions and on all unemployed workers in Germany. It excludes self-
employed and civil servants, thus covering approximately 80% of Germany’s labor force.
Apart from its large size (1.8 million individuals) and its long panel dimension (up to
40 years), one further advantage of the administrative data is that they are virtually
free of measurement error for the variables of interest in this paper. The data are taken
from social security records and are merged with records on unemployment periods
from the federal employment agency. The data contain the exact start and end dates
of each employment and unemployment spell. In total, the data comprise almost 60
million individual spells. See Antoni et al. (2016) for further details on the data and
its construction.
2.2 Sample selection, construction of worker flow rates, and inflow
correction
We restrict our sample to workers in West Germany and exclude marginal employment
in our benchmark sample. We drop a few individuals with missing information on
employment status or missing geographic information, and all individuals who only
receive social assistance benefits while in the sample. We consider the effect of including
7We use the weakly anonymous Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies (SIAB) 1975-
2014. The data were accessed on-site at the Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the Federal Employment
Agency (BA) at the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) and via remote data access at the FDZ.
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marginal employment and looking at East and West Germany as part of our sensitivity
analysis.
The data contain daily employment history information and we follow Jung and
Kuhn (2014b) to aggregate daily labor market histories to histories at monthly fre-
quency. We assign monthly employment spells based on a reference week within each
month. We assign the employment state in this week following a hierarchical ordering
where employment supersedes unemployment and unemployment supersedes out of the
labor force. This approach closely follows labor force surveys such as the Current Pop-
ulation Survey (CPS). We count workers as employed if they are employed full or part
time or work as apprentices. For the unemployed, we count workers as unemployed if
they are registered as unemployed at the employment agency, which requires that they
are not working and are actively looking for a job. Registration is required to be eligible
for unemployment benefits. The German unemployment insurance system distinguishes
between unemployed workers and benefit recipients. In the microdata, reliable infor-
mation on the registered unemployment status is available from 2000 onward. We use
this information to assign employment states. We assign employment states for ear-
lier periods based on records of benefit recipient status. After computing worker flow
rates based on benefit-recipient status before 2000, we construct growth rates of these
worker flow rates and use them to extend the registration-based flow rates backward.
This leaves the dynamics of the flow rates unaffected but removes the level differences
between the two definitions. We provide further details on the construction of monthly
employment states and transition rates in Appendix B. For our empirical analysis, we
focus on the decade from 1993 to 2002 to document work flows before the first reform
steps were implemented. We report the entire time series of worker flows for the period
after the reform but take the time from 2008 to 2014 as the period when the transition
period after the reform was completed.
The goal of our empirical analysis is to study the changes in labor market dynamics
that determine the evolution of the unemployment rate. In the first step, we demon-
strate therefore that the microdata match the reported trends on unemployment rates.
The microdata do not include public servants (Beamte), and hence, for the microdata
to be comparable to the unemployment rates reported in the statistics of the German
employment office, public servants have to be included. Figure 2.1(a) shows the unem-
ployment rate for West Germany as reported by the German federal employment agency
and the unemployment rate constructed from the SIAB microdata for the period be-
tween 1993 and 2014. The data from the German employment office cover dependent
employment only and therefore exclude self-employed workers.8 Both unemployment
rates track each other closely in trends and levels. We conclude that the microdata
are consistent with developments in the unemployment rates and can hence be used
to study the underlying changes in labor market dynamics. In Appendix B, we pro-
vide further discussion and demonstrate that the constructed worker flow rates in a
stock-flow model account for the dynamics of the unemployment rate over time.
The data show a large spike in unemployment in January 2005. The reason for
8The German employment office reports two unemployment rates: one including all employees and
one for employees in dependent employment, excluding the self-employed. We consider the unemploy-
ment rate for dependent employment.
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Figure 2.1: German unemployment rates (1993 - 2014)
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Notes: Unemployment rate for West Germany 1993 - 2014 in percent. Left panel: Blue dashed
line shows reported unemployment rate by employment agency (BA) and red solid line shows the
unemployment rate from SIAB microdata including imputed numbers for public servants not covered
by the microdata. Right panel: Shows unemployment rate from SIAB microdata as in the left panel
(blue dashed line) and the unemployment rate from SIAB microdata after inflow correction (red solid
line). See text for details. The grey area marks the period 2003 to 2005 when the Hartz reforms were
enacted. The fading out indicates the first transition years 2006 to 2008 after the reforms. Data are
quarterly averages of monthly rates.
the spike is regulatory changes as part of the Hartz reforms that became effective in
January 2005. These regulatory changes required all nonemployed who are able to work
to register as unemployed to remain eligible for UI benefits. This caused an inflow of
former social assistance recipients and spouses of unemployed into the unemployment
pool and poses a challenge to a consistent measurement of worker flows before and
after the reform of the UI system. The affected persons were mainly individuals who
were much less attached to the labor market than the previously registered unemployed
(see Table 2.1). We propose what we refer to as inflow correction for constructing
comparable and consistent transition and unemployment rates over this period.
The key challenge is that we cannot directly observe either of the two groups that
were forced to register as unemployed to retain their unemployment benefit eligibility.
We therefore exclude persons who simultaneously satisfy three conditions: (1) entered
unemployment in the first six months9 of 2005, (2) had a nonemployment spell before
registering as unemployed, and (3) did not work for at least one month until the end of
2006. We compare in Table 2.1 the characteristics of new entrants into unemployment
from out of the labor force in January 2004 and January 2005.10 We find large differences
across the two years. In January 2004, new entrants are slightly younger, substantially
9There is evidence that administrative problems and incomplete data records during the transition
period make the records for the affected group in the first months after the reform less reliable.
10Out of the labor force is not directly observed in the data and we assign out of the labor force as a
residual employment state to nonemployed workers who have intermittent nonemployment spells that
are not unemployment spells.
58
Table 2.1: Worker characteristics of entrants into unemployment
entrants from N other U
2004-01 2005-01 2005-01 (corr.) 2004-01 2005-01
female 43.3% 60.9% 45.8% 41.1% 42.1%
age 36.9 37.3 36.0 40.9 40.9
high school 23.2% 44.2% 32.5% 16.6% 18.8%
vocational training 70.4% 53.0% 62.9% 78.0% 76.0%
college 6.5% 2.9% 4.6% 5.5% 5.2%
Notes: Demographic characteristics of workers who transit to unemployment from out of the labor
force (entrants from N ) or all other states (other U ) in January 2004 and 2005. The column for the
entrants from N labeled corr. applies the inflow correction. See text for details. Row female shows
the share of females in inflows, row age shows average age, and the bottom three rows show the shares
of workers with at most a high school education, vocational training, and a college education.
more female (61% vs. 43%) and less educated (44% vs. 23% with high school or less).
When looking at all other entrants into unemployment (columns other U ), we find
that worker characteristics do not differ notably across these worker characteristics in
January 2004 and 2005. Our inflow correction excludes entrants into the unemployment
pool in early 2005 who are very detached from the labor market and are likely to
have registered as unemployed solely due to the new registration requirements in 2005.
Comparing the composition of the inflows in Table 2.1 suggests that a large group of
entrants from out of the labor force in January 2005 falls into this category. The third
column in entrants from N reports worker characteristics for entrants after the inflow
correction. We find that now worker characteristics of entrants in 2005 resemble much
more closely those of the entrants in 2004, although some differences still remain. We
refer to the sample after excluding these persons as the inflow-corrected sample. We
will use the inflow-corrected sample as our benchmark sample for the rest of the paper.
Figure 2.1(b) shows the unemployment rate of the inflow-corrected sample (red
solid line) and the full sample (blue dashed line). The spike in January 2005 disappears
almost completely in the inflow-corrected sample. The persistently lower level of the
inflow-corrected sample shows that the inflow of formerly nonemployed persons into the
unemployment pool in early 2005 changed the composition toward persons who are less
attached to the labor market. Given that we remove these workers completely from
the sample, we also change unemployment rates before 2005, but this change is small.
In 2014, unemployment rates in the inflow-corrected sample are about 0.75 percentage
point lower. Looking at relative changes, we find that the inflow correction reduces the
decrease in unemployment rates from roughly 40% to 30%. Still, unemployment rates
declined between 2005 and 2014 by more than 30%. We provide a sensitivity analysis
for skipping the inflow correction in Appendix A.
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2.3 Empirical results
We consider the time period from 2003 to 2005 as the period of the reforms and use the
years from to 1993 to 2002 to represent the labor market before the reform and use the
years from 2008 to 2014 to represent the situation after the reform and an associated
transition period. The sample period includes three recessions and in particular the
financial crisis of 2008. One challenge is to disentangle the relative importance of
structural changes in the labor market and changes from business cycle fluctuations
when comparing the pre- and post-reform periods. We will rely on the structural model
and provide in Section 4.2 a decomposition that disentangles structural changes and
business cycle effects on worker flows and unemployment rates. We also provide an
extensive sensitivity analysis to our empirical results that we summarize at the end of
this section. We relegate details to Appendix C.
Changes in separation and job finding rates
Figure 2.2(a) shows the relative change in the separation rate for the period from 1993
to 2014. The separation rate is indexed to its average pre-reform level (1993-2002).
This level is low in the German labor market over the entire time period. About
0.5% of workers transit from their employer to unemployment each month (see Table
2.2). Looking at the relative changes, we find a substantial 28% decline in separation
rates between the pre-reform average and the separation rate in the post-reform period.
When we consider the post-reform average including the Great Recession, the decline
is smaller but still at 22%.
Figure 2.2(b) shows the relative change in the job finding rate over time again in-
dexed to its average pre-reform level. Job finding rates are typically slightly above 5%
before the reform period and increase to slightly below 6% after the reform. In relative
terms, the increase until 2014 constitutes a 13% increase in the job finding rate. If
we include the Great Recession in the post-reform average, the increase amounts to
only 10%. Compared to the 28% decline in the separation rates, this suggests already
that declining separation rates were the main driver behind the decline in unemploy-
ment rates over the decade following the Hartz reforms. The relative differences in
changes remain largely unaffected when we include the Great Recession. The decline
in separation rates is twice as large as the increase in the job finding rates.
Table 2.2 uses a steady-state decomposition from a two-state stock-flow model to
quantify the relative contribution of separation rates and job finding rates in explaining
the 32% decline in unemployment rates until 2014.11 We consider the period from 1993
to 2002 as the pre-reform steady state and the period from 2011 to 2014 as the post-
reform steady state to abstract from transition dynamics and the Great Recession as
two exceptional periods. The last column of Table 2.2 reports the relative contributions
of changes in the separation rate and the job finding rate to the unemployment rate.
According to this decomposition, the declining separation rate accounts for 76% of the
decline in the unemployment rate. The small residual of 4% relative to the empirically
11We use a two-state model so that the steady-state unemployment rate is u¯ = p¯ieup¯ieu+p¯iue where p¯ieu
denotes the steady-state separation rate (unemployment inflow) and p¯iue denotes the steady-state job
finding rate (unemployment outflow).
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Figure 2.2: Separation and job finding rates (1993 - 2014)
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Notes: Separation and job finding rates for West Germany 1993-2014. Both series have been indexed
to their pre-reform level (1993-2002). Both series exclude nonemployed entering the unemployment
pool in the first half of 2005 who did not become employed until the end of 2006. The grey area
marks the period 2003 to 2005 when the Hartz reforms were enacted. The fading out indicates the
first transition years 2006 to 2008 after the reforms. Data are quarterly averages of monthly rates.
observed changes demonstrates that the simple two-state stock-flow model captures well
the changes in the unemployment rate over time. Including the Great Recession in the
decomposition leads to the same quantitative findings for the relative importance of
separation and job finding rates for the decline in unemployment (see columns labeled
2008-2014).
Table 2.2: Before- and after-reform unemployment rates, transition rates, and steady-
state decomposition
2008-2014 2011-2014
1993-2002 2008-2014 2011-2014 ∆ ∆pi∆u¯ ∆
∆pi
∆u¯
unemployment rate 10.5% 7.6% 7.2% -27.5% -31.5%
separation rate 0.6% 0.5% 0.5% -22.0% 74.9% -27.7% 75.8%
job finding rate 5.2% 5.7% 5.9% 10.1% 30.8% 13.3% 31.6%
Notes: Columns 2-4 show the level of the unemployment rate, separation rate, and job finding rate
before the Hartz reforms (1993 - 2002), after the Hartz reforms including the Great Recession (2008-
2014), and after the Hartz reforms excluding the Great Recession (2011-2014). Columns labeled ∆
report the percentage change in rates from before to after the reforms. Columns labeled ∆pi∆uss show
the relative contribution to changes in steady-state unemployment rates from changes in separation
and job finding rates. ∆u¯ indicates the change in the steady-state unemployment rate from before to
after the Hartz reforms based on average rates before and after the reform.
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Existing studies that explore the effect of UI reforms on the labor market focus on the
effects on the job finding rate, either from changes in search effort or changes in contact
rates for unemployed workers from more vacancy postings. The large contribution of
changes in the separation rate to changes in the unemployment rate over time shows
that such explanations fall short of explaining the data.
2.4 Heterogeneity of changes in separation rates
The last section documented that the decline in separation rates was the main driver
of the reduction in unemployment rates in Germany after 2005. The decline of aver-
age rates hides a lot of heterogeneity that is informative about the underlying causal
mechanism. Figure 2.3 shows unemployment benefit eligibility by employment duration
and age before and after the reform. This benefit duration determines when workers
lose eligibility for UI benefits and transit to unemployment assistance benefits before
and benefits at subsistence level after the reform as unemployment assistance benefits
were abolished by the Hartz reforms. If this abolition of the unemployment assistance
benefits is the driver of the observed changes in separation rates, we should see hetero-
geneity in the changes of separation rates by employment duration and age. Looking at
the pre-reform situation in Figure 2.3(a), we see that for workers younger than 45 the
maximum benefit duration was 12 months. For older workers, we find a steep gradient
in employment duration from 14 months after 30 months of previous employment to up
to 30 months after five years of previous employment. Comparing this pattern to the
post-reform regulation in Figure 2.3(b), we see that there is much less variation and
that especially older, long-term employed workers see a strong decline in their benefit
duration. For example, a 49-year-old worker with four years of previous employment
receives, after the reform, UI benefits for 12 months, while before the reform she re-
ceived UI benefits for 22 months. Figure 2.3(c) shows the relative changes in UI benefit
durations for the different groups from before to after the reform. We find the largest
decline for workers with more than three years of previous employment duration be-
tween ages 45 and 55. By contrast, there have been no changes for short-term employed
workers (less than 28 months) and workers younger than 45. If the Hartz reforms are
causal for the decline in separation rates, we expect this heterogeneity in the changes
in the duration of benefit eligibility to be mirrored in the changes in separation rates.
A further dimension where we should see differences in separation rate changes, if
the causal mechanism is related to the abolition of the long-term benefits, is wages
because unemployment assistance was tied to a worker’s last wage. A decoupling of
long-term benefits from previous wages disproportionately affects workers with high
wages because, after the reform, these workers face benefits at a subsistence level,
independent of the previous wage, once UI benefits have expired.
We explore the changes in the separation rates along these dimensions of hetero-
geneity. In line with a causal mechanism that works through the cut in long-term
wage-dependent benefits, we find that long-term employed and high-wage workers show
stronger declines in separation rates compared to short-term employed and low-wage
workers.
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Figure 2.3: Changes in benefit duration by age and employment duration
(a) Benefit duration pre-reform (b) Benefit duration post-reform
(c) Change in benefit duration
Notes: Maximum eligibility duration for short-term unemployment benefits in months by age and
employment duration. Employment duration refers to a reference period of 5-7 years prior to the
unemployment spell. Panel (a) shows maximum durations before the reform. Panel (b) shows the
maximum durations after the reform in 2008, i.e. after all grandfathering rules had expired. Panel
(c) shows the relative change in maximum durations in percent for each combination of age and
employment duration.
Employment duration
For the analysis of heterogeneity among workers with different employment duration, we
split employed workers into two groups. The first group is short-term employed workers
with at most three years of employment duration, and the second group is long-term
employed workers with more than three years of employment duration. Table 2.3 shows
the corresponding average levels for the pre- and post-reform period. Looking at the
levels, we see that short-term employed workers have separation rates that are more
than five times higher than those of the long-term employed workers in the period 1993
to 2002 (1.37% vs 0.26%). This difference further increases in the period 2008 to 2014
(1.15% vs 0.18%). After 2008, separation rates differ by more than a factor of six.
The reason is the much stronger relative decline in the separation rate for long-term
employed workers after 2008.
The stronger decline can be seen in Figure 2.4, which shows the time series of relative
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Table 2.3: Change in separation rates by employment duration and age
1993 - 2002 2008 - 2014 ∆ %
all 0.63% 0.49% -22.0%
emp. duration ≤ 3 years 1.37% 1.15% -16.2%
emp. duration > 3 years 0.26% 0.18% -33.3%
Notes: Separation rates before and after the Hartz reforms by employment duration and age. We use
averages of quarterly rates over the time periods. Column ∆ reports the percentage change in rates
from the period before the Hartz reforms to the period after the Hartz reforms.
changes in separation rates for different groups of short-term and long-term employed
workers. Looking at Figure 2.4(a), we find a strong divergence in the time series of
separation rates between short-term and long-term employed workers after the Hartz
reforms. The strong divergence persists so that, after the reform, separation rates
of long-term employed workers have declined twice as much as those for short-term
employed workers.
Age
In addition to employment duration, age determines the duration of benefit eligibility
in the UI system (Figure 2.3). We therefore dissect the data in Figures 2.4(b) and
2.4(c) further by looking at young and old workers by employment duration. Looking
at younger workers in Figures 2.4(b), we find, in line with the changes in eligibility
duration, no differential changes between short-term and long-term employed workers.
Separation rates decline in lockstep for these two groups. By contrast, but in close
alignment with the changes in eligibility duration, we find that long-term employed,
older workers show the strongest reduction in separation rates, while older short-term
employed workers show a reduction that is only half as large (Figure 2.4(c)). Look-
ing at short-term employed workers across age groups provides a further sanity check
for heterogeneous changes in separation rates because there have been no differential
changes in benefit eligibility duration for short-term employed workers. In line with
no such heterogeneity, we find a strikingly close tracking of separation rate changes for
short-term employed young (age 15-44) and old workers (age 45-64) in Figure 2.4(d).
For both age groups separation rates decline in lockstep following the Hartz reforms.
These results by age further strengthen our finding that separation rates decline more
for workers who have been more adversely affected by the cut in benefit eligibility from
the Hartz reforms. Therefore, this additional heterogeneity in changes in separation
rates provides further support for a causal link from the UI reform to the observed
changes in labor market dynamics.
In Appendix C, we provide a more detailed analysis of changes by age groups. One
finding from this analysis is that workers closer to retirement show an even stronger
decline in separation rates. Their decline in separation rates follows a longer-run trend
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Figure 2.4: Separation rates by age and employment duration (1993 - 2014)
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Notes: Separation rates by employment duration and age for West Germany 1993 - 2014, indexed to
their pre-reform level (1993-2002). The red solid lines in panels (a)-(c) mark the separation rate for
long-term employed workers who were continuously employed for three years or more. The blue dashed
lines in panels (a)-(c) mark the separation rate for short-term employed workers with at most three
years of continuous employment. Panel (d) shows the separation rate for short-term employed workers
separately for young (blue dashed line) and old employees (red solid line). The grey area indicates
the period of the implementation of the Hartz reforms. The grey area marks the period 2003 to 2005
when the Hartz reforms were enacted. The fading out indicates the first transition years 2006 to 2008
after the reforms. Data are quarterly averages of monthly rates.
that accelerated during the 2000s so that, over time, unemployment rates for older
workers decreased more than those for younger workers. This trend was accompanied
by a strongly rising labor force participation rate of workers close to retirement age. We
abstract from this fact of independent interest as it is beyond the scope of this paper.12
12Jäger et al. (2018) provide a detailed investigation of this topic. They study changes in separation
rates of male workers towards the end of working life (50 years and older) in Austria after changes
in UI benefit durations. They exploit staggered changes in UI eligibility similar to those shown in
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In our theoretical analysis, we will abstract from the additional age heterogeneity to
keep the model parsimonious and because most of the heterogeneity in the changes in
separation rates is captured by differences in employment duration.
Wages
Figure 2.5 shows the relative changes in separation rates from before to after the UI
reform along the wage distribution. In a first step, we consider two groups of workers:
low-wage workers in the bottom three deciles of the wage distribution and high-wage
workers in the fourth to seventh deciles. In a second step, we provide more granular
changes showing that the differences further up in the wage distribution are, if anything,
larger. Figure 2.5(a) compares changes in separation rates for low-wage workers and
high-wage workers over time. Separation rates before 2005 comove closely and start
to diverge thereafter. By 2014, high-wage workers saw their separation rates decline
by almost twice as much as those for low-wage workers. Figure 2.5(b) dissects the
wage distribution finer. It quantifies for each wage decile by how much the average
separation rate decreased from the decade before the reform (1993-2002) to the post-
reform period (2008-2014). Evidently, the higher wage deciles experienced the largest
declines in separation rates. Separation rates hardly change at the bottom of the
wage distribution, decline by between 20% to 30% in the middle, and plummet by
almost 50% at the top. The stronger decline in separation rates for high-wage workers
further supports a causal link from the UI reform to the observed changes in labor
market dynamics because the reform replaced long-term wage-dependent benefits by
subsistence benefits independent of previous wages. This change affected in particular
high-wage workers.
The results on employment duration, age, and wage heterogeneity all show a larger
drop in separation rates for groups that have been more adversely affected by the
Hartz reforms (Figure 2.3). We speak to the observed heterogeneity in our quantitative
model below. In the model, the removal of long-term wage-dependent benefits will
lead to heterogeneous reactions in separation rates, and high-wage, long-term employed
workers will see a stronger reduction in their separation rates in line with the empirical
evidence from this section.
2.5 Sensitivity and comparison to other data sources
In the first step, we discuss evidence from other independent data sources to further
support our empirical evidence on the dominant role of falling separation rates in ex-
plaining the decline in German unemployment rates after 2005. The first additional
data source is the reports of the employment agency on monthly unemployment benefit
claims. In a previous study (Hartung et al. (2016)), we construct a historical series on
worker flows for the period 1967 to 2014 based on these data and demonstrate that,
during the period of overlap, it closely matches worker flows from the SIAB microdata.
Figure 2.3 in combination with regional variation. Jäger et al. rely on a microeconometric analysis
to characterize marginal jobs separating after changes in workers’ outside options. In line with our
empirical results, they document large changes in separation rates after changes in potential benefit
duration.
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Figure 2.5: Changes in separation rates by wages
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Notes: Left panel shows changes in separation rates for high and low wage groups of workers in West
Germany 1993-2014. The red solid line (left axis) shows workers with wages between 40% and 70% of
the wage distribution. The blue dashed line (right axis) shows workers with wages up to 30% of the
wage distribution. The grey area marks the period 2003 to 2005 when the Hartz reforms were enacted.
The fading out indicates the first transition years 2006 to 2008 after the reforms. Data are pooled at
the annual level. Right panel shows relative declines of average separation rates for the entire earnings
distribution from before the reform (1993-2002) to after the reform (2008-2014) in %. Deciles of the
wage distribution are shown on the horizontal axis.
We explain in Hartung et al. (2016) how this data series can be constructed in real time
from publicly available data sources. The second data source is flow rates in and out of
unemployment that have been reported by the German employment office since 2006.
These flow rates are based on registered cases of workers transiting from employment
into unemployment and vice versa. These rates are based on case counts rather than
worker counts. To be consistent with our structural model, we use worker counts based
on reference weeks for our empirical analysis. This difference in measurement will lead
to differences in the level of rates because multiple cases can occur for one worker within
one month. This is the well-known time aggregation problem, as discussed, for example,
in Shimer (2012).
Figure 2.6 shows three alternative measures for the separation rate and the job find-
ing rate. The first one is our benchmark measure constructed from the SIAB microdata
(red solid line); the second one is constructed by the German employment office (blue
dashed line), the so-called inflow hazard rate (Zugangsrisiko) and departure rate (Ab-
gangschance); and the third one is the measure constructed from UI benefit claims in
Hartung et al. (2016) (black dotted line). We find that the two additional measures
strongly support our finding of decreasing separation rates as the macroeconomic driver
of falling unemployment.
Next, we also summarize the findings from our sensitivity analysis. We relegate
details to Appendix C. In a first step of our sensitivity analysis, we demonstrate that
skipping the inflow correction mainly leads to lower job finding rates after the reform
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Figure 2.6: Alternative measures for transition rates
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Notes: The figures show separation and job finding rates for the benchmark sample from the SIAB
microdata (red solid line). The blue dashed line shows flow rates reported by the German employment
office. The black dotted line shows flow rates constructed in Hartung et al. (2016) based on new
unemployment benefit claims. All rates are indexed to the level in the first two years displayed in the
graphs (2006-2007). See text for further details.
due to the larger unemployment pool (see A). In a second step, we control for changes
in the composition of the employed in terms of worker characteristics using a linear
regression model. Fixing the composition of the employed at the level in 2000, we find
that compositional changes alone are negligible for explaining changes in separation
rates over time (see B). In a third step, we provide results for East Germany (see D),
counting marginally employed workers who are registered as unemployed as employed
(see E), and counting workers in active labor market programs among the employed
(see F).13 We find the documented results to be robust.
3. Model
This section applies economic theory to causally link the changes in the unemployment
insurance system to the observed changes in labor market dynamics and unemployment
rates. We develop a labor market search and matching model with aggregate fluctua-
tions, endogenous separations, and worker heterogeneity. In the model, time is discrete
and there is a continuum of workers of measure one and a positive measure of firms.
Workers and firms are risk neutral and discount the future at rate β˜. Each period there
is a positive probability that a worker leaves the labor force for good. We denote this
probability by ω and the product of the time discount factor and the probability of
remaining in the labor market by β = β˜(1 − ω). A worker who leaves the labor force
is immediately replaced by a newborn worker so that there is always a constant mass
13After the reform, workers who participate in active labor market programs were no longer counted
as unemployed.
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of workers. Workers in the model are either employed or unemployed. We consider
single-worker firms and refer to a worker-firm pair as a match.
Employed workers have one of two skill levels x1 or x2 with x1 < x2. We refer
to workers with skill level x1 as low skill and workers with skill level x2 as high skill.
Workers who enter the labor force start as low skill. While working, workers accumulate
skills by learning-by-doing. An employed low-skill worker stochastically gains skills at
rate α. The accumulated skills are lost upon separation. Employed workers become
eligible for unemployment benefits with employment duration. Since the accumulation
of skills and benefit eligibility both depend on employment duration, we economize on
the state space and assume that eligibility and skill level are perfectly correlated so that
all high-skill workers are eligible for unemployment benefits.14,15 Low-skill workers are
eligible for social assistance benefits if they separate and enter into unemployment. We
denote the share of employed workers in the population in state x1 by e1 and the share
of employed workers in state x2 by e2. Denoting the current period’s state by x and the
next period’s state by x′, the law of motion for x conditional on staying employed is
x′ = x2 if x = x2
and if x = x1, the law of motion is
x′ =
{
x2 with probability α
x1 with probability 1− α (2.1)
We denote the state of unemployed workers by b and the state can take three val-
ues bj with j = 1, 2, 3. The different states describe the current eligibility level of the
unemployed: social assistance (b1), unemployment assistance (b2), and unemployment
benefits (b3). It holds that b1 ≤ b2 < b3. Upon entering unemployment, high-skill
workers are eligible for unemployment benefits b3. When entering unemployment, low-
skill workers enter in state b3 with probability γ, and with probability 1 − γ, they
enter unemployment in state b1. Stochastic eligibility for low-skill workers captures in
a parsimonious way the more complex eligibility rules in the actual system.16 During
unemployment, the eligibility state stochastically changes over time. Workers in state
b3, receiving unemployment benefits, transit to state b2, receiving unemployment assis-
tance, with probability δ3. Workers who are in state b2 transit to state b1, receiving
social assistance, with probability δ2. We denote the mass of workers in each state by
14We abstract from age heterogeneity that would lead to the introduction of an additional state
variable but the underlying economic mechanism would be identical to the mechanism that works along
the employment duration dimension. Krause and Uhlig (2012) follow the same modelling approach.
15In general, experience and skill accumulation need not be perfectly correlated. The empirical
evidence on wage growth for the German labor market finds strong returns to experience in the first
two years (Dustmann and Meghir (2005)). This suggests that productivity gains and eligibility in the
data are also highly correlated so that we are confident that our assumption to economize on the state
space is of minor importance.
16There are two main reasons for the misalignment of employment duration and eligibility: First,
employees with more than one year of employment duration are already eligible for UI benefits for a
period of 6 months, which then gradually increases to 12 months the longer a person has been working.
Second, employment duration in the legislation does not refer to the latest continuous employment
spell but the accumulated duration in a reference period that varied between 2 and 7 years.
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uj for j = 1, 2, 3. Denoting the current period’s state by b and the next period’s state
by b′, the law of motion for b conditional on staying unemployed is
b′ = b1 if b = b1
and if b = bj for j = 2, 3, the law of motion is
b′ =
{
bj with probability 1− δj
bj−1 with probability δj
(2.2)
When unemployed workers re-enter employment, they enter with state x1. The law
of motion for the worker state at the transition from unemployment to employment is
hence x′ = x1 independent of b. When transiting from employment into unemployment,
the law of motion is
b′ = b3 if x = x2 (2.3)
and if x = x1, the law of motion is
b′ =
{
b3 with probability γ
b1 with probability 1− γ. (2.4)
Each period consists of two stages. The first stage is the separation stage when each
match decides about separating into unemployment or entering the production stage.
The second stage is the production stage for the employed and the search stage for the
unemployed. Search happens simultaneously with production. We refer to this stage,
respectively, as the search or production stage depending on whether the unemployed
or the employed are considered. We abstract from on-the-job search. Labor market exit
happens with probability ω at the end of the period. A match that does not separate
enters the production stage and produces y = exp(a+ x) units of output depending on
skill level x and the aggregate productivity state a. The aggregate productivity state a
follows an AR(1) process with autocorrelation ρ and variance σ2a.
The aggregate state of the economy s comprises the aggregate productivity state a
and the distribution of workers over states s = {a, e1, e2, u1, u2} where we dropped u3
due to the identity e1 + e2 + u1 + u2 + u3 = 1. The state of a match at the beginning of
the period is described by the tuple (x, s) of the idiosyncratic state x and the aggregate
state s. The state of an unemployed worker is (b, s), where the idiosyncratic state is
the current benefit eligibility.
At the separation stage, each match draws an idiosyncratic cost shock ε and then,
depending on the state of the match (x, s), decides whether to enter the production
stage. For analytical tractability, we assume that the shock ε is independently and
identically distributed across matches and time and is drawn from a logistic distribution
F with mean ε¯ and variance σ2ε = pi2
ψ2ε
3 . A match that decides to separate does not pay
these costs. Optimal behavior follows a threshold rule where separations happen when
the idiosyncratic cost shock ε is larger than a state-specific threshold εu(x, s). This
threshold is determined as part of the bargaining process between the worker and the
firm so that separation decisions will be individually efficient. The average separation
rate of a match with state (x, s) is pieu(x, s) = Prob(ε ≥ εu(x, s)). Workers who separate
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at the separation stage enter unemployment in the current period, receive benefits, and
start searching during the search stage of the current period. Aggregate output in a
period is y = ∑i ei(1 − pieu(xi, s)) exp(a + xi), where ei(1 − pieu(xi, s)) is the mass of
employed workers of type i who produce at the production stage.17
We denote the value of a firm matched to a worker of skill type x before the real-
ization of the idiosyncratic shock ε by J(x, s). The value J(x, s) expressed recursively
is
J(x, s) =
εu(x,s)∫
−∞
(
exp(a+ x)− ε− w(x, s) + βE[J(x′, s′)|x, s]dF (ε)
)
(2.5)
where w(x, s) denotes the wage for the worker and expectations are taken over the
realization of the idiosyncratic and aggregate state next period (x′, s′) conditional on
the current state (x, s). The upper integration bound is the threshold value εu(x, s)
that determines separation. We assume that the continuation value of the firm after
separation is zero. Below, we explain how εu(x, s) and w(x, a) are determined. We
exploit the properties of the logistic distribution to get a closed form for the integral of
the idiosyncratic shocks ε that we denote by Ψε(pieu)
Ψε(pieu) =
εu∫
−∞
−εdF (ε) = −(1− pieu)ε− ψε
(
(1− pieu) log(1− pieu) + pieu log(pieu)
)
with pieu = 1− F (εu) denoting the separation probability given the threshold value εu.
The firm value simplifies to
J(x, s) = (1−pieu(x, s))
(
exp(a+x)−w(x, s)+βE[J(x′, s′)|x, s]
)
+Ψε(pieu(x, s)) (2.6)
The state of an unemployed worker at the beginning of the period is (b, s) with
the idiosyncratic state b describing the worker’s current benefit level. The worker’s
flow utility in unemployment is b+ h, where h is the utility value of leisure relative to
working (disutility of working is normalized to zero). Search is random so all workers
receive job offers with the same probability λ(s) that only depends on the aggregate
state of the economy. We assume that each job offer is associated with an idiosyncratic
stochastic utility component ν capturing the personal valuation of workers for jobs. This
stochastic non-pecuniary job component comprises, among other things, commuting
time, workplace atmosphere, and working schedules of the offered job. It captures in a
parsimonious way endogenous search behavior of the unemployed. Unemployed workers
optimally follow a reservation utility rule and accept all job offers with ν larger than
a state-dependent threshold νu(b, s). We assume ν is independently and identically
distributed and is drawn from a logistic distribution G with state-specific mean ν(b)
and variance σ2ν = pi
ψ2ν
3 . The average acceptance probability of an unemployed worker
in state (b, s) is q(b, s) = 1 − G(νu(b, s)) and the transition rate into employment is
piue(b, s) = λ(s)q(b, s) combining contact rate λ(s) and acceptance rate q(b, s). The
17The share ei is at the beginning of the period before the separation stage. Of all employed workers
in state (x, s), only a fraction 1− pieu(x, s) will not separate and produce at the production stage.
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recursive formulation of the value of an unemployed worker in state (b, s) is
Vu(b, s) = b+ h+ β
(
λ(s)
∞∫
νu(b,s)
(
E[Ve(x′, s′)|b, s]− ν
)
dG(ν)
+ λ(s)
νu(b,s)∫
−∞
E[Vu(b′, s′)|b, s]dG(ν) + (1− λ(s))E[Vu(b′, s′)|b, s]
)
= b+ h+ β
(
piue(b, s)E[Ve(x′, s′)|b, s] + (1− piue(b, s))E[Vu(b′, s′)|b, s]
+ λ(s)Ψν(q(b, s))
)
(2.7)
where Ve(x, s) denotes the value of being employed in state (x, s) and the last line
exploits again the properties of the logistic distribution with Ψν(q) = −qν(b)−ψν((1−
q) log(1−q)+q log(q)). The state-specific means ν(b) allow us to obtain job finding rates
that are falling with unemployment duration. Such changing utility shocks capture,
for example, decreasing motivation to apply for jobs, more effort to prepare for job
interviews, and to be up to date with job requirements.
An employed worker who does not separate at the separation stage receives her
wage at the production stage. At the end of the production stage, the stochastic
skill accumulation takes place. The recursive representation of the value function of
employed workers is
Ve(x, s) = (1− pieu(x, s))
(
w(x, s) + βE[Ve(x′, s′)|x, s]
)
+ pieu(x, s)E[Vu(b′, s)|x]. (2.8)
Note that in the case of separation, expectations are only over the idiosyncratic benefit
state b, and although the worker becomes unemployed in the current period, we denote
the stochastic benefit level in an abuse of notation by b′. The benefit level follows the
laws of motion for b in eq. (2.3) and (2.4).
A Cobb-Douglas matching functionm = κv1−%u% determines the number of matches
m between vacancies v and unemployed workers u = u1 + u2 + u3 during the search
stage of each period. The contact rate from a worker’s perspective is λ = m
u
= κθ1−%
and from a firm’s perspective is λv = mv = κθ
−% with labor market tightness θ = v
u
. The
number of vacancies at the search stage of each period is determined by a free-entry
condition
κ = λv(s)β
3∑
j=1
q(bj, s)
uj
u
E[J(x′, s′)|bj, s] (2.9)
where κ denotes the per-period cost to post a vacancy. Firms posting vacancies take into
account the acceptance rates q(bj, s) of workers with different unemployment benefit
eligibility. Recall that all newly hired workers start with x′ = x1 so there is only
uncertainty regarding the aggregate state s′ for the next period when posting a vacancy.
Wages and threshold values for separation decisions εu(x, s), equivalently separa-
tion probabilities pieu(x, s), are determined by a state-contingent Nash bargaining be-
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tween the worker and firm over the joint surplus of the match S(x, s) = J(x, s) +
Ve(x, s) − E[Vu(b′, s)] ≡ J(x, s) + ∆(x, s) (see Pissarides (2000, Ch. 2)). We de-
note the bargaining power of the worker by µ. The Nash-bargaining problem reads
arg max{w,εu} J(x, s)1−µ∆(x, s)µ. The first-order condition with respect to wages deliv-
ers the standard surplus sharing rule
µJ(x, s) = (1− µ)∆(x, s). (2.10)
The first-order condition with respect to the separation cut-off εu characterizes the
cut-off value in terms of the separation rate pieu = 1− F (εu) as
pieu(x, s) =
(
1 + exp
(
ψ−1ε
(
exp(a+ x)− ε¯+ S˜(x, s)
)))−1
(2.11)
with S˜(x, s) = βE[S(x′, s′)|x, s] + βE[Vu(b′, s′)|x, s] − E[Vu(b′, s)|x] where E[Vu(b′, s)|x]
denotes the expected value from unemployment in the current period taking into ac-
count stochastic eligibility (see eq. (2.8)). We get that the optimal separation proba-
bility pieu(x, s) is decreasing in current output exp(a + x) net of mean costs ε¯ and in
an adjusted future match surplus S˜(x, s) that takes into account the option value from
skill accumulation on unemployment benefit eligibility βE[Vu(b′, s′)|x, s]−E[Vu(b′, s)|x].
3.1 Calibration
We calibrate the model to match the pre-reform labor market dynamics of the German
labor market. We show all calibrated parameters in Table 2.4. For the calibration, we
take a model period to be one month. We set a first group of parameters outside the
model. The discount factor β˜ is set to match an annual interest rate of 4% so that
β˜ = 0.996, and the parameter % of the matching function and the bargaining power of
the worker µ are set to % = µ = 0.5.
We describe below how we set the parameters of the unemployment insurance system
using independent evidence. Remaining model parameters are set within the model by
targeting data moments. Dynamics in the model are only driven by aggregate produc-
tivity shocks a. To simulate the model, we linearize the model around its deterministic
steady state and use a Kalman filter on GDP growth per capita to determine the time
series of aggregate productivity shocks a (see Jung and Kuhn (2014b)).18 This ap-
proach builds on ideas from Murtin and Robin (2016). Within our calibration routine,
we adjust model parameters until the simulated model moments match their data coun-
terparts. We next provide intuitive identification arguments but abstain from a formal
proof of identification.
Each match produces output with labor and a stochastic cost component, which
we interpret as payments to capital. We therefore target the mean of the cost shock
ε¯ to a capital share of 40%. Vacancy posting costs κ determine directly how many
vacancies are posted and the contact rates in the search market. The contact rate
determines the average job finding rate that we take from the data (piue = 0.052). To
18We use GDP per capita for Germany as data on West German GDP are not available at a quarterly
frequency.
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Table 2.4: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Value Description
se
ar
ch
an
d
m
at
ch
in
g
% 0.5 elasticity of the matching function
κ 0.163 efficiency of the matching function
κ 0.657 vacancy posting costs
µ 0.5 worker’s bargaining power
γ 0.4 eligibility rate of low-skill workers
ω 0.010 labor market exit rate
pr
ef
er
en
ce
s
β˜ 0.996 time discount factor
h 0.276 flow leisure utility
ν¯(b1) 0.520
means of non-pecuniary shocksν¯(b2) 0.520
ν¯(b3) 1.004
ψν 0.075 dispersion of non-pecuniary shocks
sk
ill
s
an
d
co
st
s
ε¯ 0.400 mean of cost shocks
ψε 0.700 dispersion of cost shocks
α 0.028 probability of skill accumulation
∆x 0.029 skill level difference x2 − x1
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separately identify matching efficiency κ from vacancy posting costs κ, we use data on
the average duration to fill a vacancy from the firm’s perspective. In the IAB vacancy
survey, the average time to fill a vacancy is 2.2 months. For the UI eligibility parameter
γ, we target a share of 58% UI benefit recipients among all inflows to unemployment.
The flow utility parameter of leisure h determines the worker surplus from employment
∆, and as part of the total match surplus S, it determines the average probability of
separating into unemployment (see eq. (2.11)). We match an average separation rate
pieu = 0.006.
Matching the observed volatility of job creation over the business cycle is a challenge
for this class of models (Shimer (2005b), Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008)). The vari-
ation in acceptance rates q(b, s) of workers over the business cycle provides additional
amplification to job creation decisions (see eq. (2.9)). To impose discipline on the level
and variation in acceptance rates, we target the estimated elasticity of job finding rates
with respect to changes in unemployment benefits from the literature (Schmieder and
Von Wachter (2016) for Germany). We use the elasticity of average acceptance proba-
bilities with respect to changes in unemployment benefits ∂q
∂b
b
q
and target a value of 0.53
from Schmieder and Von Wachter (2016).19 For a given dispersion of non-pecuniary
shocks, this elasticity pins down one of the means of the non-pecuniary shocks. We use
it to pin down ν¯(b3). We impose the condition that recipients of unemployment assis-
tance benefits b2 and benefits at a subsistence level b1 have the same mean of shocks
ν¯(b1) = ν¯(b2). This effectively results in different means for the short- and long-term
unemployed. Hence, duration dependence in job finding rates is informative about the
difference between ν¯(b1) and ν¯(b2). For the duration dependence, we use a difference in
job finding rates between 6 and 12 months of 25%.20 Very related is the identification of
the parameter ψν determining the dispersion of the non-pecuniary shock distribution.
While we use the cross-sectional variation in job finding rates to determine means of the
non-pecuniary shock distribution, we leverage the time series variation in job finding
rates to identify ψν . We target a volatility of job finding rates that corresponds to 6.4
times the volatility of output. Similarly, we use the time series volatility of separation
rates to identify the dispersion of cost shocks ψε. We target a volatility of separation
rates that corresponds to 7.8 times the volatility of output. The volatility of separations
is higher than the volatility of job finding rates, in line with existing evidence (Jung
and Kuhn (2014b), Elsby et al. (2013)).
These elasticities are key when we change the unemployment insurance system.
To see this, recall that a 1% change in the surplus of the match from a change in
productivity works similar to a 1% change in the surplus from a change in the outside
option. Hence, time series variation of transition rates are informative about the effects
from structural changes in labor market institutions (Costain and Reiter (2008)).
19This elasticity of search ∂q∂b
b
q in the model is the percentage change in the acceptance probability
of an unemployed worker receiving unemployment benefits with respect to a percentage change in the
benefit level for given contact and separation rates.
20Mean job finding rates of these two benefit groups are computed from aggregate data between
1996 and 2004 on average durations in the respective group. We assume constant job-finding rates
within each benefit type. To obtain the job finding rate of short-term benefit recipients, we further
assume that they transit to long-term benefits after 12 months. We can then back out the implied job
finding rate from the mean duration of the truncated distribution.
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For the skill process, we use the one-to-one relation between the average duration
of short-term employment that we set to 3 years and the probability of skill accu-
mulation α. Similarly, we use the one-to-one relation between the share of long-term
employed workers and the probability of labor market exit ω. Short-term and long-
term employed workers differ in their productivity levels x1 and x2. We exploit the
documented separation rate differences between the two groups to pin down the skill
difference ∆x = x2 − x1. We normalize x1 and use the difference between short-term
employed workers’ separation rate of 0.014 and long-term employed workers’ separation
rate of 0.003 from Table 2.3 to determine the skill difference ∆x.
Table 2.5: Parameters of the unemployment insurance system
pre-reform post-reform
b1 0.245 b1 0.245
b2 0.330 b2 0.245
b3 0.366 b3 0.366
δ2 0.021 δ2 0.021
δ3 0.083 δ3 0.083
We calibrate parameters of the unemployment insurance system to independent
evidence on replacement rates from the OECD. Parameters for the period before and
after the reform are shown in Table 2.5. According to the OECD, a single worker with
the average wage before 2004 received unemployment insurance benefits corresponding
to 60% of the previous wage during the first year of unemployment and 53% of the
previous wage for the following four years. We use these replacement rates to pin down
b3 and b2. Consistently, we set δ3 to match an average duration of one year and δ2 to
match an average duration of four years. For the subsistence level b1, we match the
average ratio of subsistence benefits to unemployment benefits over the period 1996 to
2002 based on data from the German Statistical Office (earlier data not available). The
average ratio corresponds to b1
b3
in the model, and we fit it to be 67% as in the data
( b1
b3
= 0.67).
When exploring the effects of changes in the UI system from the Hartz reforms on
labor market dynamics, we focus on the abolition of long-term unemployment benefits
(unemployment assistance benefits). As in Krause and Uhlig (2012), we implement
the reform in the model by setting long-term unemployment benefits b2 to the level
of subsistence social security benefits b1, i.e., we set b1 = b2. The duration parameter
δ2 becomes irrelevant because transitions happen between states with the same benefit
levels and mean utility shocks ν¯(b1) and ν¯(b2) are set identical across the two states in
the calibration.
In the model, this change becomes effective in January 2006. As described above,
the law became effective in January 2005, but the law scheduled the new benefit rules to
affect workers only if they became unemployed after February 2006. In addition, a wide
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range of grandfathering rules and hardship clauses were provided with the law, such
that it became only slowly applicable to all workers. We implement the complex and
detailed legislation by gradually increasing the impact of the reform on labor market
dynamics. Specifically, we use different policy functions based on linear approximation
of the steady-state systems before and after the Hartz reforms. We assume a linear
weighting scheme that spreads the implementation over four years so that the reform is
fully effective in January 2010.21 When implementing the Hartz reforms in the model,
we keep all other parameters except for the UI system constant over time.
4. Results
In the first step, we demonstrate the model’s ability to match the dynamics of observed
labor market flows over time. Dynamics in the model are driven by two sources: aggre-
gate productivity fluctuations and the structural change of the UI system due to the
Hartz reforms. As described before, parameters are only calibrated to match selected
means and volatilities of labor market flow rates before the Hartz reforms and the Hartz
reforms constitute a parsimonious change in the parameters of the unemployment in-
surance system. Figure 2.7 shows simulated times series of separation and job finding
rates from the model together with the data counterparts of these series. We index all
series to the pre-reform steady state that is matched as part of the calibration.
Figure 2.7: Fit for average labor market mobility (1993 - 2014)
(a) separation rates
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
60
80
100
120
model
data
(b) job finding rates
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Notes: Model fit 1993 - 2014. The blue solid lines mark the model prediction and the red dashed lines
mark the respective flow rate in the SIAB microdata. The grey area marks the period 2003 to 2005
when the Hartz reforms were enacted. The fading out indicates the first transition years 2006 to 2008
after the reforms.
Figure 2.7(a) shows how closely the model fits the separation rate from the data.
21We also tried implementing the reform directly with the only difference that the dynamics during
the transition period are matched less well. Obviously, this assumption does not affect changes in
steady states but only the behavior of the model during the transition phase. Hence, our key results
do not depend on the specific implementation of the transition period.
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The empirical and simulated time series largely lie on top of each other. This is true
both before the reform and after the reform. Except for a short period around 2010,
the model matches the decrease in the separation rate and the dynamics during the
financial crisis of 2008 very well. Overall, the fit for the average separation rate must
be considered very close. Figure 2.7(b) shows the simulated job finding rate together
with the data counterpart. Job finding rates before 2005 are again matched very closely.
After the reform, the model matches the dynamics and level changes closely with the
exception of a period between 2005 and 2009 when the model predicts a more immediate
increase in job finding rates compared to the data. This is the transition period after
the Hartz reforms when our implementation of grandfathering rules and hardship cases
is very rudimentary. However, what is important for our analysis below is that the
changes in average rates between the pre-reform period and the post-reform period are
matched almost exactly by the model.
Our empirical analysis uncovers large heterogeneity in changes in separation rates
after the reform. Figure 2.8 demonstrates the model’s ability to match such heterogene-
ity in changes in separation rates. As for the average separation rate, levels and level
differences between short-term and long-term employed workers before the reform have
been calibrated so that they are matched by construction. Heterogeneity in changes
after the reform are untargeted and provide a check to the hypothesis of a causal rela-
tionship of the reform to the observed changes in separation rates. Results in Figure 2.8
support the hypothesis of a causal relationship from the reform to observed changes in
labor market dynamics by demonstrating a close match of the heterogeneous responses
in separation rates between the model and the data.
Figure 2.8: Fit for heterogeneity in labor market mobility (1993 - 2014)
(a) separation rates (≤ 3 years)
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Notes: Model fit of separation rates with low (≤ 3 years, left panel) and high (> 3 years, right panel)
employment duration from 1993 to 2014. The blue solid lines mark the model prediction and the red
solid lines mark the respective flow rate in the SIAB microdata. The grey area marks the period 2003
to 2005 when the Hartz reforms were enacted. The fading out indicates the first transition years 2006
to 2008 after the reforms.
Figure 2.8(a) shows the simulated and empirical separation rates for short-term
employed workers with employment durations of less than three years. The model
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matches the time series very closely including the volatility. Unlike for the average
separation rates, heterogeneous volatilities of separation rates for short-term and long-
term employed workers have not been part of the calibration, but are an endogenous
prediction of the model. Over the long run, the model predicts a slightly lower decline in
separation rates for short-term employed workers relative to the data (10% vs. 20%).
Importantly, however, like the data the model shows a substantially smaller decline
in separation rates for short-term employed workers relative to the average in Figure
2.7(a).
Figure 2.8(b) compares the separation rates of long-term employed workers between
the model and the data. We find that time series for the long-term employed workers
are matched closely both in volatility and long-run trend. We find for the long-term
employed workers that the model slightly overstates the decline in separation rates.
Again, and importantly, we find that, in line with the argument that the reduction in
long-term benefits was the causal mechanism behind the labor market miracle, the sep-
aration rates of long-term employed workers decline more than the average separation
rates.
Overall, our parsimonious model of labor market dynamics captures the key em-
pirical pattern for the changes in separation rates and job finding rates closely. The
causal mechanism in the model is the decline of long-term unemployment benefits to
subsistence levels. We will show, based on counterfactual simulations, that absent this
change in the UI system, the model provides very counterfactual predictions for the
evolution of labor market transition rates and unemployment rates.
The results of a large but heterogeneous response in separation rates after changes
in non-work benefits in this section might also have implications beyond the case of
the unemployment insurance system. Many social security reforms, such as changes in
early retirement programs or disability insurance programs, likely show similar changes
following changes in program benefits. Arguably, the responses of separation rates in
these programs might be even larger due to the longer duration of benefit eligibility in
these programs. Our results suggest that the elasticities of the decision to separate from
employment in these programs with respect to changes in the attractiveness of program
benefits on macroeconomic employment might be large. Neglecting such endogenous
separation decisions when evaluating such programs can lead to very misleading evalu-
ations of program reforms.
4.1 Counterfactual simulations
This section further builds on our approach to establish a causal link from the unem-
ployment insurance system to the German labor market miracle relying on economic
theory. We do this by running counterfactual model simulations in the absence of the
labor market reforms. The simulated labor market dynamics of this counterfactual are
strongly at odds with the data, while, as we have just demonstrated, the same model
closely matches labor market dynamics in Germany for the two decades from 1994 to
2014 when the Hartz reforms are implemented. This finding provides further support
for a causal effect from the Hartz reforms to the observed changes in the German labor
market. Furthermore, the counterfactual simulation provides an approach to determine
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the contributions of structural changes and business-cycle fluctuations to changes in
labor market dynamics.
The counterfactual simulation to demonstrate the impact of the Hartz reforms on
labor market dynamics is simple and transparent. We keep all model parameters con-
stant over time, including the parameters of the UI system, so that no structural change
takes place. We also keep the aggregate shock series identical and feed in the previously
estimated productivity shocks from the Kalman filter. This counterfactual simulation
provides time series of separation rates, job finding rates, and unemployment rates in
the absence of the Hartz reforms. Figure 2.9 shows the counterfactual simulation results
for the time period from 1993 to 2014.
Figure 2.9: Counterfactual model simulation absent Hartz reforms (1993 - 2014)
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Notes: Model simulations with and without the Hartz reforms for the period 1993 to 2014. The blue
solid lines show the model with the benefit cuts from 2006 onward and the red dashed lines show the
counterfactual rate without policy change. The grey area marks the period 2003 to 2005 when the
Hartz reforms were enacted. The fading out indicates the first transition years 2006 to 2008 after the
reforms.
By construction, the time series from the baseline and the counterfactual in the
period before the implementation of the Hartz reforms lie exactly on top of each other
as we also rule out any anticipation effects.22 After the implementation of the reform,
the two simulated time series strongly diverge. Separation rates of the counterfactual
remain high and fluctuate around their pre-reform level as shown by the red dashed
line in Figure 2.9(a). Separation rates of the counterfactual simulation strongly spike
during the financial crisis of 2008, to almost 160% of their steady-state level. In the
case of the reform, the separation rate still spikes but increases only to slightly more
than 120% of the old steady-state level. Job finding rates in Figure 2.9(b) again evolve
identically between baseline and counterfactual up to the implementation of the reform,
when the two series start to diverge. In the new steady state with the reform, the job
finding rates increase permanently by 10%. Over time, the divergence is strongest
during the financial crisis. In the counterfactual scenario, job finding rates plummet
to around 70% of their steady-state level. In the case of the Hartz reforms, the job
22Anticipation effects are likely small as the implementation of the reform happened on short notice.
The parliament approved the law that became effective in January 2005 only in June 2004.
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finding rate still decreases but only to a level slightly below its old steady-state level.
The divergence of the separation and job finding rates manifests itself in very different
dynamics of the unemployment rate. While unemployment in the baseline simulation
with the Hartz reforms declines by 30% relative to the pre-reform steady state, the
unemployment rate, by construction, stays put at its pre-reform level absent the reform.
We find a marked difference in the evolution of unemployment rates between the two
simulations during the financial crisis. The counterfactual simulation shows an increase
in the unemployment rate of almost 30% over its long-run average, reminiscent of the
typical European country and the United States during these years, which saw sharply
and strongly rising unemployment rates. In the case of the implementation of the Hartz
reforms, the rise in unemployment rates is substantially smaller compared to what most
other countries experienced as the largest labor market crisis in decades. Unemployment
rates increased about 10% over their new steady-state level that itself is 30% below the
pre-reform level. The reason for the modest increase in unemployment after the reform
is that while separation rates spike in both simulations, the relative decline in the job
finding rate is much smaller in the case of the Hartz reforms. These strikingly different
dynamics based on our theoretical labor market model provide a further argument for
a causal relationship between the reduction in long-term unemployment benefits of the
Hartz reforms and the German labor market miracle.
4.2 Decomposing cyclical and structural changes
We use the counterfactual simulations further to quantify the contribution of the busi-
ness cycle to the decline in unemployment since 2004. Figure 2.9 shows that in 2004
all data series are away from their respective steady states. Our motivating evidence
in Figure 2.1, like most of the public debate, focuses, however, on 2004 as a year of
reference to assess the effect of the Hartz reforms on the labor market. Taking 2004 as
reference, the decline in the unemployment rate between 2004 and 2014 contains some
part that is due to the business cycle and not due to a structural change. We rely on the
counterfactual simulation to isolate the business cycle component. Our decomposition
approach is straightforward: We attribute all changes in the counterfactual simulation
to the business cycle, and by subtracting these changes from the baseline model, we
isolate the structural component of the changes in separation rates, job finding rates,
and unemployment rates. Table 2.6 shows average unemployment, separation, and job
finding rates in 2004 and 2014 from model simulations with and without the implemen-
tation of the Hartz reforms. The columns labeled change show the percentage change
in the respective rates between 2004 and 2014. The change in the baseline case with the
Hartz reforms compounds the business cycle effects with the effects from the structural
reform, whereas the change in the case when the reform is not implemented results only
from business cycle variation. We report the derived contribution of the business cycle
in the last column of Table 2.6.
Let’s look first at columns of the baseline case with the implementation of the reform.
The key driver of the lower unemployment rates is the decline in the separation rate
by 30%; the job finding rate increased by 17%. Comparing these effects to the case
absent the reform in the middle columns isolates the business cycle effect and shows
that business cycle effects are small. The last column shows the constructed business
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Table 2.6: Business cycle contribution
with reform absent reform Business cycle
2004 2014 change 2004 2014 change contribution
unemployment
rate
10.2 6.5 -36.4% 10.2 9.9 -3.7% 10.0%
job finding rate 4.9 5.7 16.6% 4.9 5.0 1.6% 9.7%
separation rate 0.7 0.5 -29.9% 0.7 0.7 -1.2% 3.9%
separation rate
(short-term)
1.6 1.3 -16.7% 1.6 1.5 -1.4% 8.6%
separation rate
(long-term)
0.3 0.2 -47.5% 0.3 0.3 -1.7% 3.6%
Notes: This table shows the unemployment and flow rates in the model before the reform (2004) and in
the most recent year (2014). Columns 1-3 show the rates implied by a model with the benefit reform in
place, and columns 4-6 show the rates without the benefit reform but the same business cycle shocks.
The last column shows the relative contribution of the business cycle to the overall change in the
respective variable.
cycle contributions to changes in the unemployment, separation, and job finding rates
and we find that they never exceed 10%. We conclude that business cycle effects are
small and of minor importance for the German labor market miracle.
4.3 Germany and its neighbors
We argue that the strong deviation of the counterfactual simulation in the absence
of the Hartz reforms supports the claim of a causal relationship between the unem-
ployment benefit changes of the Hartz reforms and the German labor market miracle.
An important question is whether the quantitative size of the effects is realistic, i.e.,
whether the counterfactual provides a good description of what would have happened
had the reforms not been implemented. Given that such a counterfactual evolution of
the German labor market always remains unobserved, we apply an idea inspired by
the control-treatment approach from the microeconometric literature. We use one of
Germany’s close neighbors, Austria, as a control group that was treated by the Hartz
reforms and compare the unemployment rates of Austria and Germany over time. This
should be seen as being inspired by the idea of the control-treatment approach rather
than a formal implementation.
Austria traditionally has business cycle dynamics that resemble those of Germany
(see Figure 2.19 in the appendix). Although the business cycle dynamics for Germany
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and Austria track each other closely, the level of the Austrian unemployment rate was on
average 52% lower than the German unemployment rate in the decade before the Hartz
reforms. We abstract from these level differences by adjusting the level of the Austrian
unemployment rate using a multiplicative constant factor.23 For our comparison, we
are interested in the relative changes in the unemployment rate over time that remain
unaffected by this level adjustment. Figure 2.10 shows the evolution of the Austrian
unemployment rate together with the simulated unemployment rates from our baseline
model and from the counterfactual simulation absent the Hartz reforms. The compari-
son is striking. Looking at the evolution since 1993 in Figure 2.10(a), we find that the
dynamics of the Austrian unemployment rate track the simulated unemployment rate
of the counterfactual almost one-for-one, while the baseline simulation diverges after
the implementation of the reform to a much lower level. Figure 2.10(b) zooms in on the
evolution of the unemployment rate starting in 2008 and over the course of the Great
Recession. Again, the results are striking. While the Austrian unemployment rate,
like the counterfactual German unemployment rate, increases by almost 40% after four
quarters into the recession, the unemployment rate from the baseline model increases
by less than 20% four quarters into the Great Recession. Looking at the recovery, the
Austrian and the counterfactual German unemployment rate revert only slowly back to
pre-recession levels. Three years after the onset of the recession, they reach levels close
to pre-recession times. As for the rise in the unemployment rate, we also find for the
recovery that the Hartz reforms have reshaped the reaction of the German unemploy-
ment rate. After two years, the unemployment rate is already back to its pre-recession
levels.
The comparison to the Austrian case provides further evidence for a causal rela-
tionship between the changes in the unemployment benefit system during the Hartz
reforms in Germany and the German labor market miracle. Absent the reform, our
model predicts a close comovement of Germany’s unemployment rate with its Austrian
counterpart. Germany’s unemployment rate would be 50% higher today (9.9% vs. 6.5%
see Table 2.6). Comparison over the course of the Great Recession also highlights the
changes in the business cycle dynamics of the German labor market after the reform.
4.4 Reform’s effects on wages
Changes in workers’ outside option affect the surplus split in the bargaining between
workers and firms so that wages decline if unemployment benefits are cut. This mech-
anism plays the key role in Hagedorn et al. (2016), who quantify the effect of changes
in unemployment benefits on the U.S. labor market during the Great Recession. This
mechanism is also present in our model so that wages of long-term employed workers
fall by 1% in the new steady state after the reform. The outside option for short-term
employed workers improves after the reform because benefits do not change, but job
finding rates increase; hence, the same mechanism in our model leads to a wage increase
of 0.8% for short-term employed workers. If wages decline, profits will increase, and
firms will post more vacancies; as a consequence, job finding rates will increase and un-
employment rates will decline. Our empirical evidence attributes a minor role to such a
23Data on the Austrian unemployment rate are taken from Eurostat. For 1993, we use OECD data
to extend the Eurostat data series as the Eurostat data are only available from 1994 onward.
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Figure 2.10: Austrian unemployment rates and model simulations for Germany
(a) unemployment rate
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
 4
 6
 8
10
12
no Hartz
Hartz
Austria
(b) unemployment change during Great
Recession
 0  5 10 15 20
-10
 0
10
20
30
40
Notes: Austrian unemployment rates in comparison to model simulations for Germany. The left panel
shows unemployment rates in percent for Austria (level adjusted) and model simulations for Germany
for the period 1993 to 2014. Black solid lines show Austrian unemployment rate, red dashed lines show
counterfactual German unemployment rate from model simulation absent the Hartz reforms, and blue
solid lines show simulation for Germany for the baseline model. The grey area marks the period 2003
to 2005 when the Hartz reforms were enacted. The fading out indicates the first transition years 2006
to 2008 after the reforms. The right panel shows the percentage increase in the unemployment rate
for Austria and model simulations for Germany during the Great Recession. The onset of the Great
Recession for Austria is 2008q2 and 2008q3 for Germany. The horizontal axis shows time in quarters
relative to the onset of the recession.
mechanism for the German labor market miracle by documenting only small changes in
job finding rates.24 Theoretically, two reasons explain the minor role of this channel for
the German case. First, unemployment benefits for newly hired workers in the model
do not change, so that the attractiveness to post vacancies hinges on indirect effects.
Second, job finding rates are empirically less sensitive to surplus changes in Germany
(Jung and Kuhn (2014b)); as a consequence, changes in unemployment benefits will
affect job finding rates less (Costain and Reiter (2008)). Indeed, the relative contri-
bution of job finding rates to unemployment volatility, which governs the importance
of this mechanism for vacancy creation, is rather small in most OECD countries when
compared to the United States (see Elsby et al. (2013)). This observation suggests that
the relative importance of changes in job finding rates in the United States might be
a particularity of the U.S. labor market and need not be a good description of the ad-
justment processes in other OECD countries. We provide the evidence for the German
case.
While the reform’s effect on wages is of minor importance for the vacancy creation
24In their empirical analysis, Hagedorn et al. (2016) exploit cross-state variation in the United States.
Such variation does not exist for the case of the German Hartz reforms, rendering the implementation
of their approach infeasible for Germany. Absent the ability to exploit differential cross-sectional
variation in labor market responses, it will require very strong assumptions on wage dynamics across
different worker groups to isolate a reform effect on wage levels in the German data.
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mechanism, our theory has additional implications for the interaction of wage changes
and separation rate changes brought about by the reform that this section explores.
In our model, separation decisions are part of the bargaining between the worker and
the firm. When benefits decline, workers want to trade off job stability in the form of
lower separation rates against wages (Jung and Kuhn (2018)). Workers and firms will
agree in the bargaining to stay together even after larger cost shocks, so that wages
will decline (see eq. (2.5)). The ability to adjust wages and separation decisions in the
bargaining implies a negatively sloped locus of bargained separation rates and wages
across productivity levels. After a change in the outside option, this wage-separation
rate locus will turn and become steeper. Long-term employed workers are willing to
accept lower wages in order to reduce their separation rate. Hence, we should expect
a stronger negative relationship between wages and separation rates after the reform.
Uncovering a direct estimate of the elasticity from the data is intricate because of many
confounding factors on wage growth. We will therefore focus on verifying that the
qualitative model predictions can be found in the data. We follow the approach in
Jung and Kuhn (2018) based on residual wage differences and regress the probability
of separating into unemployment for individual i over the next six months pi6eu,i on the
contemporaneous (log-)wage log(wi,0) controlling for worker observables Xi
pi6eu,i = α + β log(wi,0) + γXi. (2.12)
For the regression, worker characteristics are observed contemporaneously with the
wage. The vector Xi contains dummies for gender, 10-year age brackets, education
levels, and time and industry dummies; log(wi,t) refers to average daily earnings.25 The
dependent variable pi6eu,i is a binary variable that is equal to one if the worker separates
into unemployment at least once over the next six months. The coefficient of interest
β corresponds to the elasticity of separation rates with respect to wages after dividing
by the average separation rate p¯i6eu. The approach estimates the effect of residual wage
differences as resulting from productivity differences and their effect on separation rates.
Table 2.7: Wages and separation rates
period p¯i6eu β elasticity
pre-reform 0.020 -0.020*** -0.99
post-reform 0.013 -0.017*** -1.28
Notes: Regression results for the relationship between wages and separation rates before and after
the Hartz reforms. The column labeled p¯i6eu shows the average 6-month separation rate. The column
labeled β shows the regression coefficient from equation (2.12). The last column reports the implied
elasticity of separation rates on wages. See text for further details.
25We focus only on full-time workers for this regression.
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Table 2.7 reports the key regression coefficient β for the period before the Hartz
reforms (1993-2002) and after the reforms (2008-2014). The last column reports the
implied elasticity of separation rates with respect to wages. Before the reform, we find
an elasticity of −0.99 so that a (residual) productivity increase associated with a 1%
wage increase reduces the separation rate by 1%. This elasticity increases by almost
one third to −1.28 after the Hartz reforms. Hence, workers choose a stronger trade-off
between wages and job stability. This stronger trade-off between wages and separation
rates is predicted by theory and provides further support for our proposed mechanism.26
4.5 Welfare effects
Our empirical and theoretical analysis demonstrates that changes in separation rates
have been the driver of the German labor market miracle starting in the mid-2000s.
We document and explain why the decline in separation rates has not been uniform
in the population and that long-term employed, high-wage workers saw the strongest
decline in their separation rates in reaction to the reform. Job finding rates increased,
and thereby, the probability that both short- and long-term unemployed can find jobs
and enter into employment. Our structural model allows us to investigate the welfare
consequences of these changes for the different groups of workers. We derive welfare
consequences as the consumption equivalent variation in steady-state consumption for
a worker, i.e., we quantify a worker’s willingness to pay to avoid the reform. We com-
pute welfare consequences by relying on a steady-state comparison for all worker types:
short- and long-term employed workers and workers in each of the three tiers of the un-
employment insurance system.27 Note that this equivalent variation is uncompensated
in the sense that due to lower unemployment after the reform, the government could re-
distribute gains from the reform. Our equivalent variation is before any redistribution
and indicates the compensation necessary to make workers of each group indifferent
between implementation of the reform and not implementing it.
Table 2.8: Welfare effects from the unemployment insurance reform
employed unemployed
worker short-term long-term social unemployment unemployment
group employed employed assistance assistance benefits
equivalent 0.11% 0.64% 0.03% 2.11% 1.18%variation
Notes: Welfare effects of the reform expressed as consumption equivalent variation for avoiding the
implementation of the unemployment insurance reform.
26We also ran a logit regression that directly estimates the elasticities. The estimated elasticities in
terms of level and change are similar to the case of the linear regression. We estimate an elasticity of
−0.87 before and −1.06 after the reforms.
27The assumption of risk neutrality leads to simple formulas for the consumption equivalent variation.
Denote the value function before the reform by V0 and after the reform by V1; then the consumption
equivalent variation is ∆ = V0−V1V1 .
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Table 2.8 shows the welfare effects for the different groups of workers. We find
the largest welfare losses for former recipients of unemployment assistance benefits,
with a consumption equivalent variation larger than 2%. Such a large welfare loss likely
explains the grandfathering and hardship regulation that accompanied the reform. Note
that we compare here steady states so that, even in our model with the staggered
implementation, the welfare effects including the transition would be lower for this
group. The group with the second largest welfare losses has been the unemployed,
with an equivalent variation of 1.2%. Unemployed workers receiving social assistance
benefits experience hardly any welfare effect because their benefits remain unchanged
by the reform. The non-zero effect results from an indirect effect from lower wages
after skill accumulation in the case of re-employment. Turning to the employed, we
find much larger effects for the long-term employed compared to short-term employed
workers. The group of workers with very low separation rates (see Table 2.3) experiences
a welfare loss corresponding to a consumption equivalent variation of 0.6%. This group
corresponds to more than 60% of all employed workers in the German labor market
and has very low separation rates. The low separation rates might therefore suggest
that this group is the least affected by the reform, yet we find large welfare losses for
them. The reason is very intuitive and closely connected to the causal mechanism of this
paper. Welfare effects are large because the outside option for these workers deteriorates
most strongly with the abolition of long-term, wage-dependent unemployment benefits.
Hence, a group of almost two-thirds of the German labor market experienced large
welfare losses from the reform. These losses remained largely uncompensated in the
aftermath of the reform and might therefore explain the large discontent with the
reform by large parts of the German electorate.
These results might have important implications beyond the specific case of the
German Hartz reforms for reform proposals in other European countries. The results
suggest that the political feasibility of UI reforms might critically depend on the com-
pensation of the large group of long-term employed workers with secure jobs who, at first
glance, might appear very detached from the topic of unemployment benefit reforms.
4.6 Alternative explanations
In this paper, we provide empirical evidence in connection with economic theory to
argue that the cause of the German labor market miracle has been the unemployment
benefit reform that was part of the Hartz reforms in the mid-2000s. The German labor
market miracle (see Burda and Seele (2016)) has been widely studied, and various nar-
ratives have been proposed in addition to the ones that highlight changes in job finding
rates as a key driver. We provide a short summary of our investigation regarding such
alternative explanations and relegate details to Appendix D. Maybe the most promi-
nent narrative comes from Dustmann et al. (2014), who argue that Germany’s unit
labor costs and wages were declining relative to other European countries even before
the Hartz reforms. They point to declining union power as a possible source for the
decline. From the viewpoint of economic theory, wage trends alone are hard to interpret
and need to be discussed relative to productivity trends and trends in the outside op-
tion. We show in section A of Appendix D that the declining trend in unit labor costs
in Germany is hard to reconcile with the relative evolution of the unemployment rate
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in Germany relative to other European countries. In particular, this explanation strug-
gles to account for the increase in unemployment rates in Germany during the 1990s
and the sudden reversal after 2005. Another related narrative focuses on globalization
and an export-demand-driven boom in Germany (see Dauth et al. (2016) for some ev-
idence on globalization effects in export- and import-exposed industries). Looking at
industries by export exposure following the industry classification used by Dauth et al.
(2016), we show in Appendix B that separation rate changes in industries classified as
export-exposed behave similarly to the ones classified as non-exposed, suggesting that
export exposure is likely not the main driver of the decline in separation rates. Gen-
erally, explanations that, through different channels, affect aggregate GDP growth will
be already captured by our analysis as we include aggregate GDP changes in our anal-
ysis. Section 4.2 provides an upper bound of the contribution of these effects. Finally,
we study whether the Hartz reforms have affected in particular long-term unemployed
workers (see Klinger and Rothe (2012) for a more extensive empirical analysis). Reduc-
ing long-term unemployment was one of the explicit goals of the reform. We show in
Appendix C that the share of long-term unemployed remained largely constant between
the pre- and post-reform period. Together with the evidence on the job finding rates,
this suggests that the effects via a reduction in long-term unemployment are likely to
be very modest.
5. Conclusions
What hides behind the German labor market miracle? This paper combines an em-
pirical analysis of microdata on worker flows with economic theory on labor market
dynamics to provide an answer to this question. We trace the German labor market
miracle back to the reform of the German unemployment insurance system that hap-
pened during the Hartz reforms in Germany in the mid-2000s. Our analysis highlights
changes in separation rates after the unemployment benefit reform as the quantitatively
important channel through which the unemployment insurance system affects unem-
ployment rates and labor market dynamics. We contribute thereby to a key question
of labor market research.
We provide evidence that a decrease in separation rates after the reform explains
76% of declining unemployment. Existing studies on the German labor market miracle
leave this empirical fact unexplained by focusing on changes in job finding rates. The
reduction in separation rates is heterogeneous, with long-term employed, high-wage
workers being most affected. We use economic theory to causally link our empirical
findings to the abolition of long-term, wage-dependent unemployment benefits that
was implemented by the Hartz reforms. Using our quantitative labor market model, we
find that absent the reform, unemployment rates would be 50% higher today. We also
find a close comovement of the German and Austrian unemployment rates over the last
decade for a counterfactual without the labor market reforms in Germany.
Exploring the welfare consequences of the labor market reforms, we find that long-
term employed high-wage workers suffered substantial welfare losses in the absence
of compensating transfers. This worker group accounts for almost two-thirds of the
German workforce. The separation rates of these workers are the lowest in the labor
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market, and it might therefore appear as if these workers are very detached from any
changes in the unemployment insurance system. We show that this is not the case and
that, in hindsight, their welfare losses might explain the discontent of a large part of
the German electorate with these reforms.
Our results have two important implications for labor market reforms. The first is
related to future labor market reforms in other European countries as they have been
widely discussed after observing Germany’s labor market miracle. For these reforms
to be politically feasible, the welfare effects must be a key part of the consideration,
and compensation schemes must be designed to avoid discontent in large parts of the
electorate. Second, the strong reaction of separation rates after changes in non-work
benefits highlights the importance of this channel for other labor market reforms such
as early retirement programs or disability insurance programs.
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Appendices
A. The Hartz reforms
The Hartz reforms in Germany consisted of four legislative packages (Hartz I - Hartz
IV ) that became effective between 2003 and 2005. The first two parts of the reform
were enacted in 2003 and contained several steps: Hartz I changed the legal framework
for temporary work, making it more attractive for firms to hire temporary workers
by lifting restrictions. Hartz II changed the regulations for marginal employment and
introduced an additional form of social security tax-favored employment (midi-jobs)
and subsidies for unemployed workers starting their own business.
Hartz III was enacted in 2004 and restructured the federal employment agency. In
particular, placement agencies (Arbeitsämter) and social security offices (Sozialämter)
were combined into single institutions (Arbeitsagenturen). Newly created job centers
were set up and case managers supported the job search of unemployed workers.
Hartz IV was enacted in 2005. This part of the reform constituted the large overhaul
of the German UI system that is the focus of our investigation. It is also the publicly
most debated and controversial part of the reforms because it substantially reduced
unemployment benefits for several groups of workers by abolishing the system of un-
employment assistance benefits (Arbeitslosenhilfe). Before the reform, unemployment
assistance could be received for several years after unemployment benefits expired, de-
pending only on some weak eligibility criteria. Net replacement rates were at 57% with
dependent children and 53% without. Workers who were not eligible for unemployment
assistance received a minimum subsistence level (Sozialhilfe) that included rent pay-
ments but was not linked to previous wages. Hartz IV abolished the wage-dependent
benefits for the long-term unemployed so that after the reform they would receive the
minimum subsistence level (Arbeitslosengeld II ). Unemployment benefits (Arbeitslosen-
geld I ) remained largely unchanged at a net replacement rate of 67% with dependent
children and 60% without.
The duration of eligibility for unemployment benefits depends on past employment
under social security legislation and changed simultaneously with the Hartz reforms.
The changes became effective in February 2006. Before the change, workers were eligible
for age-specific maximum benefit durations ranging from a maximum of 12 months for
workers younger than 45 years up to 32 months for workers 57 years and older (see Figure
2.3). The general rule was that two months of employment resulted in one month of
benefit eligibility up to the maximum eligibility threshold. Hence, for most workers two
years of employment guaranteed maximum eligibility. After the reform, the maximum
benefit duration was set at one year, and three months of employment were necessary for
one additional month of eligibility. For workers 55 and older, the maximum duration was
cut to 18 months.28 We exploit this variation in our empirical analysis. The fact that
this change only became effective in 2006 and the fact that additional grandfathering
and hardship regulations were introduced motivate our reasons for introducing the
reform with a transition phase in our quantitative model.
28In 2009 this change was partly reversed again. Workers of age 50, 55 and 58 could then receive
benefits for up to 15, 18, and 24 months again.
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To summarize, the Hartz IV reform transformed the former three-tier system of
unemployment benefits, unemployment assistance, and subsistence benefits into a two-
tier system of unemployment benefits and subsistence benefits.
B. Data details
A Sample selection
In our baseline analysis, we focus on the West German labor market from 1993 to 2014 in
order to reduce the impact of the German reunification on unemployment and transition
rates. We restrict our sample to persons who had employment or unemployment spells
only in West Germany. We also drop persons for whom the SIAB does not contain any
information on their geographic location or employment status. We provide results for
East Germany as part of our sensitivity analysis in Section D of this appendix.
B Definition of labor market states
We define a worker as employed if the worker is full- or part-time employed or em-
ployed as an apprentice. We require current wages to be non-zero to exclude dormant
employment relationships, for example, workers on maternity leave. We also exclude
marginally employed workers in our baseline definition of employment and define them
as being unemployed if they have a parallel unemployment spell and as not in the labor
force if there is no parallel spell. The SIAB microdata are derived from social security
records with information on dependent employment under social security legislation,
so that we do not cover self-employed workers and public servants (Beamte) in our
employment definition.
We define a worker as unemployed if the person is registered as unemployed at the
federal employment agency.29 The SIAB microdata provide comprehensive informa-
tion on unemployment registrations from 2000 onward. For the period 1993 to 2000,
we rely on information on benefit-recipient status to define workers as unemployed.
This includes all workers who receive unemployment benefits and unemployment assis-
tance. To construct worker flow rates for the entire period 1993 to 2014, we extend the
registration-based worker flow rates backward starting in 2000 using the growth rates of
benefit-based worker flow rates for the period 1993 to 2000. Extending the time series
using growth rates avoids level breaks in the series but preserves the cyclical properties
of worker flow rates.
In our empirical analysis, we study the evolution of worker flow rates to uncover
changes in the underlying dynamics of the inflows and outflows to unemployment.
Hence, what is most important for our analysis is that the constructed worker flow rates
account for the changes in the unemployment rate over time. Figure 2.11 shows the
unemployment rate from the SIAB microdata (black dotted line) and the unemployment
rate from the federal employment agency (red solid line) as in Figure 2.1. In addition,
we construct a flow-based unemployment rate using the law of motion of a two-state
29Workers can remain registered as unemployed as long as they work less than 15 hours per week.
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Figure 2.11: Unemployment rates 2000-2014
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Notes: Red solid line displays the registered unemployment rate in the SIAB data for West Germany
2000-2014. The blue dashed line displays the unemployment rate obtained by iterating forward the
SIAB unemployment rate in January 2000 using monthly separation and job finding rates: ut+1 =
ut(1−piue,t)+(1−ut)pieu,t. In the sample used here, we do not use the inflow correction for the inflows
to registered unemployment in early 2005 (see Section 2.2). The grey area marks the period 2003 to
2005 when the Hartz reforms were enacted. The fading out indicates the first transition years 2006 to
2008 after the reforms.
approximation of unemployment dynamics
ut+1 = ut(1− piue,t) + etpieu,t. (2.13)
where et denotes the employment rate of workers covered by social security legislation
(see Section 2.2). Such a two-state approximation of unemployment dynamics also
underlies our labor market model in Section 3. We use this law of motion to iterate
forward the unemployment rate over time. Changes in the unemployment rate using
this flow-based approach are only determined by changes in separation rates pieu,t and
job finding rates piue,t over time. The unemployment rate from this flow-based approach
is shown as the blue dashed line in Figure 2.11. We find that this unemployment rate
closely tracks the dynamics of the aggregate unemployment rates over time. Hence,
changes in the transition rates based on these definitions and construction account for
the observed changes in the unemployment rate over time and are therefore informative
about the drivers of declining unemployment.
C. Sensitivity analysis
This section provides a sensitivity analysis of the empirical analysis of Section 2. We
consider in Section A a sample where we do not apply the inflow correction described
in Section 2.2. Related to skipping the inflow correction, we explore in Section B how
much changes in the composition of the employed have contributed to the changes in
the separation rates over time. We provide a further detailed discussion of heterogeneity
in separation rate changes by age and employment duration in Section C. In Section
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D of the sensitivity analysis, we compare East and West German worker flow rates. In
the main part of the paper, we restrict attention to West Germany. Section E includes
marginally employed workers in the definition of employment. In the main part, we
do not include marginally employed workers in the definition of the employment state.
Section F looks at the effect on job finding rates from changes in how workers in active
labor market programs are counted before and after the reform.
A Worker flows without inflow correction
Figure 2.12 shows separation and job finding rates for the baseline sample with the
inflow correction and for a sensitivity sample where we skip the inflow correction.
Figure 2.12: Separation and job finding rates (1993 - 2014)
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Notes: Left panel shows separation rates in percentage points. Right panel shows the job finding rate
in percentage points. The red solid lines exclude non-employed entering the unemployment pool in
the first half of 2005 who did not become employed until the end of 2006. The blue dashed lines show
the original separation rates without inflow correction. Horizontal axis shows the years from 1993 to
2014. The grey area marks the period 2003 to 2005 when the Hartz reforms were enacted. The fading
out indicates the first transition years 2006 to 2008 after the reforms.
Looking at separation rates in Figure 2.12(a), we see that the inflow correction
hardly affects separation rates. The reason is that those workers whom we exclude with
our inflow correction are only weakly attached to the labor market. In the case where
they become employed, they constitute only a negligible fraction of total employment
so that separation rates remain almost unaffected. This is not true for job finding rates
in Figure 2.12(b). Job finding rates are almost 20% lower in January 2005 in the full
sample compared to the inflow-corrected sample. This difference decreases over time
but remains sizable even at the end of our sample in 2014. Job finding rates before
2005 remain largely unaffected in line with the idea that these workers are only weakly
attached to the labor force. Hence, if we do not apply the inflow correction the increase
in job finding rates would be smaller and the contribution of the decreasing separation
rate to the decrease in the unemployment rate would be even larger.
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B Controlling for composition
Our empirical analysis in Section 2 and Section C of this appendix documents substan-
tial heterogeneity in separation rates across worker groups. One potential reason for
decreasing separation rates that would be unrelated to the UI reform could be changes
in the composition of worker groups with different separation rates over time. To assess
the quantitative importance of composition effects on separation rates, we run a linear
probability model of separation rates on a large set of observable worker characteristics.
We run the following regression
1eu,i,t = Xi,tβt + εi,t
where 1eu,i,t denotes an indicator function that is one if in year t we observe a transition
from employment into unemployment of individual i. Xi,t denotes a vector with dum-
mies for individual characteristics of individual i in year t, βt denotes the coefficient
vector that we allow to vary across years, and εi,t denotes the error term. We include
dummies for gender, age, education, employment duration, temporary work, and wage
percentiles. We pool all transitions of one year in the regression so that one worker can
have multiple transitions within one year. Predicted average transition rates are then
average population characteristics that we denote by X¯t times the coefficient vector
pˆieu,t = X¯tβt. The predicted average separation rate corresponds by construction to the
observed average rate.30
Figure 2.13: Separation rates controlling for worker characteristics
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Notes: Yearly averages of monthly separation rates 2000-2014. The red solid line marks the predicted
(actual) separation rate. The blue dashed line marks the separation rate keeping the composition of
all observables fixed at their level in 2000. The black dotted line marks the separation rate keeping
the coefficients of all observables fixed at their level in 2000. The grey area marks the period 2003 to
2005 when the Hartz reforms were enacted. The fading out indicates the first transition years 2006 to
2008 after the reforms.
30We pool all transitions within a year to compute the transition rates. This can lead to small
deviations in comparison to an average of monthly rates, but in our case, the difference is negligible.
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We then construct two counterfactual transition rates. For the first counterfactual
transition rate, we keep population shares at their level in 2000 and only vary coeffi-
cients over time p˜i2000eu,t = X¯2000βt. This captures changes in separation rates for a fixed
population of workers. Through the lens of our structural model in Section 3, these
are changes in behavior, for example, due to changes in the UI system. For the second
counterfactual transition rate, we keep coefficients at their level in 2000 and only vary
population shares over time pˇi2000eu,t = X¯tβ2000. This captures the effects from changes in
the composition of worker groups over time. Figure 2.13 shows the predicted separa-
tion rate pˆieu,t (red solid line), the counterfactual transition rate with fixed population
shares p˜i2000eu,t (blue dashed line), and the counterfactual transition rate with fixed co-
efficients pˇi2000eu,t (black dashed-dotted line). We find that the counterfactual transition
rate with changes in coefficients βt tracks the drop in separation rates over time very
closely. The counterfactual transition rate that keeps all coefficients fixed at their level
in 2000 and where we only vary population shares over time hardly changes. This evi-
dence strongly supports the idea that it was behavioral changes due to changes in the
macroeconomic environment that explain the decline in the separation rate over time
rather than changes in the composition of the workforce.
C Heterogeneity in transition rates by age groups
This section provides further details on the heterogeneity in the changes in separation
rates by age discussed in Section 2.4. Table 2.9 provides detailed information on sep-
aration rate changes by age and employment duration. The upper part of the table
shows results for all workers and for three different age groups. Workers age 15-44 show
the smallest decline in separation rates (-14.2%) and workers in the age group from
45 to 64 years show the strongest decline in separation rates (-25.2%). These age dif-
ferences still hide important heterogeneity arising from employment duration because
age and employment duration are strongly correlated (Jung and Kuhn (2014b)). The
lower part of Table 2.9 distinguishes workers by age and employment duration. Here,
we find that changes in separation rates mirror the relative differences in changes in
benefit eligibility from Figure 2.3. Short-term employed workers show across age groups
a rather uniform decline in separation rates varying between 14.6% and 17.7%. The
decline is always less than the average decline over this time period of 22.0%. We also
find a much stronger decline for long-term employed workers age 45 and older. Their
separation rates decline by 32.5% and 48.8%. For younger long-term employed workers,
we find a smaller decline. This is in line with the relative cut in benefits shown in Fig-
ure 2.3 that does not show any variation in the cuts in benefit eligibility among young
workers. The larger decline among the oldest age group of long-term employed workers
cannot be explained by the cut in benefit eligibility from Figure 2.3 alone. Looking at
the longer-run trend in Figure 2.14(a) suggests that the likely explanation predates the
Hartz reforms. The separation rates for the oldest group of workers seem to follow a
longer-run downward trend starting in the mid-1990s. A detailed investigation of this
trend is of independent interest but beyond the scope of this paper. We leave a detailed
investigation of the reasons behind this trend to future research.
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Table 2.9: Change in separation rates by employment duration and age
1993 - 2002 2008 - 2014 ∆ %
age: 15-44 0.72% 0.61% -14.2%
age: 45-54 0.43% 0.35% -18.3%
age: 45-64 0.46% 0.35% -25.2%
age: 15-44, emp. duration ≤ 3 years 1.36% 1.13% -16.8%
age: 15-44, emp. duration > 3 years 0.26% 0.22% -15.4%
age: 45-54, emp. duration ≤ 3 years 1.47% 1.25% -14.6%
age: 45-54, emp. duration > 3 years 0.18% 0.12% -32.5%
age: 45-64, emp. duration ≤ 3 years 1.48% 1.22% -17.7%
age: 45-64, emp. duration > 3 years 0.27% 0.14% -48.8%
Notes: Separation rates before and after the Hartz reforms by employment duration and age. We use
averages of quarterly rates over the time periods. Column ∆ reports the percentage change in rates
from the period before the Hartz reforms to the period after the Hartz reforms.
Figure 2.14: Separation and job finding rates by age
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Notes: Separation rates for age groups 15-44 years (red solid lines) and 45-64 (blue dashed lines). The
left panel shows the level of the separation rate. The right panel shows the change in the separation
rate relative to its pre-reform level (1993-2002). The grey area marks the period 2003 to 2005 when
the Hartz reforms were enacted. The fading out indicates the first transition years 2006 to 2008 after
the reforms.
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D East Germany
For our empirical analysis in Section 2.3, we exclude workers who have employment
or unemployment spells in East Germany. We do this to abstract from any effects of
a transition of the East German labor market in the decade after reunification. In
this section, we explore separation and job finding rates for East Germany starting in
1995. Figure 2.15 shows the time series for separation rates and job finding rates for
East German workers and applies the inflow correction described in Section 2.2. The
corresponding results for the West German labor market are in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.15: Changes in separation and job finding rates East Germany (1995 - 2014)
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Notes: Separation and job finding rates for East Germany 1995-2014. Both series have been indexed to
their pre-reform level (1995-2002). Both series exclude non-employed entering the unemployment pool
in the first half of 2005 who did not become employed until the end of 2006. The grey area marks the
period 2003 to 2005 when the Hartz reforms were enacted. The fading out indicates the first transition
years 2006 to 2008 after the reforms. Data are quarterly averages of monthly rates.
Separation rates in East Germany are higher than in our baseline West German
sample. Before the reform, the monthly separation rate is slightly higher than 1.4%.
Figure 2.15(a) shows that separation rates in East Germany plummet in 2006 to 70%
of their pre-reform level and in 2014 stand at 50% of their pre-reform trend. The data
suggest that there is an ongoing falling trend in the separation rate. Hence, the decline
in the separation rate is stronger in the East than in the West German labor market.
Regarding job finding rates, the results are even more striking. Relative to their pre-
reform level of 5.4%, the job finding rate in the East German labor market stands in
2014 at its pre-reform level. All changes in East German unemployment result therefore
from a decline in separation rates, thereby further reinforcing our findings from the West
German labor market.
Figure 2.16 provides results on the heterogeneity in the changes in separation rates
for the East German labor market over time. The corresponding results for the West
German labor market are shown in Figure 2.4.
The changes in separation rates by age and employment duration in the East German
labor market corroborate the findings for the West German labor market. We find that
long-term employed workers show a much stronger decline than short-term employed
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Figure 2.16: Separation rates by age and employment duration (1993 - 2014) East
Germany
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Notes: Separation rates by employment duration and age for East Germany 1995 - 2014, indexed to
their pre-reform level (1995-2002). The red solid lines in panels (a)-(c) mark the separation rate for
long-term employed workers who were continuously employed for three years or more. The blue dashed
lines in panels (a)-(c) mark the separation rate for short-term employed workers with at most three
years of continuous employment. Panel (d) shows the separation rate for short-term employed workers
separately for young (blue dashed line) and old employees (red solid line). The gray area marks the
period 2003 to 2005 when the Hartz reforms were enacted. The fading out indicates the first transition
years 2006 to 2008 after the reforms. Data are quarterly averages of monthly rates.
workers (Figure 2.16(a)). Looking at workers in the age range from 15 to 44 years
in Figure 2.16(b), we find a roughly equal decline by 50% from the pre-reform period
to 2014. The short-term employed typically show a slightly smaller decline than the
long-term employed but also started from a higher level in 2005. For workers in the
age group 45-64 years, we find a much stronger decline for the long-term employed in
line with our results for the West German labor market (Figure 2.16(c)). Separation
rates for the long-term employed workers decline roughly 20% more than those for the
short-term employed workers. The average decline in East Germany is larger. Finally,
when comparing short-term employed workers in the age group 15-44 years to workers
in the age group 45-64, we find again, as in the case of the West German labor market,
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that their separation rates lie virtually on top of each other and decline in lockstep
between 2005 and 2014 (Figure 2.16(d)).
E Including marginally employed
For our baseline sample, we do not define workers as employed if their only employment
relationship is under a marginal employment contract. As described in Section B of
this appendix, we count these persons as either unemployed or out of the labor force
depending on whether or not they have a parallel unemployment spell in that month.
A main reason for excluding marginal employment in our baseline sample is to derive
consistent time series for worker flows. Information on marginal employment becomes
comprehensive in the microdata after 1999 so that we cannot construct a consistent
time series going back to 1993. Before 1999, information on marginal employment is
typically not recorded. As a sensitivity analysis, we include all available information
on marginal employment when defining employment states. Figure 2.17 shows the
separation rates and job finding rates including marginal employment information in
comparison to the rates from the baseline sample.
Figure 2.17: Separation and job finding rates including marginal employment
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Notes: Separation rates and job finding rates in West Germany 1993-2014 for the baseline sample
(red solid line) and for a sample where marginal employment is included in the employment definition
(blue dashed line). The black dotted line in the right panel shows the job finding rates including the
marginally employed adjusted for the structural break in 1999. The grey area marks the period 2003
to 2005 when the Hartz reforms were enacted. The fading out indicates the first transition years 2006
to 2008 after the reforms.
Figure 2.17(a) shows separation rates for the baseline sample (red solid line) and
the sensitivity sample including marginal employment information (blue dashed line).
Marginal employment accounts only for a small fraction of total employment so that the
change in aggregate separation rates is small. The decline in separation rates becomes
slightly more pronounced in the sensitivity sample and including marginal employment
would lead to a larger decline of separation rates compared to the baseline sample.
Figure 2.17(b) shows job finding rates from the baseline sample (red solid line) and
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sensitivity sample (blue dashed line). The job finding rate in the sensitivity sample
shows a structural break in 1999 when complete information on marginal employment
becomes available. We provide an additional estimate for the sensitivity sample, where
we remove the structural break by removing the level shift (black dotted line).31 We
find that after we remove the structural break in 1999, the job finding rates from the
baseline and sensitivity sample track each other closely. If anything, the job finding
rate in the adjusted sensitivity sample is slightly higher before 1999, implying a slightly
smaller increase in job finding rates after the reform. We conclude that our empirical
findings on the importance of the decline in separation rates are robust to a change in
the employment definition to include marginal employment information.
F Effect of active labor market policy
Section 2.2 discusses changes in regulation for unemployment registration and the in-
flow correction to adjust for this change. A second change that affects the microdata
records and was enacted as part of the Hartz reforms was the treatment of active labor
market programs. Starting in 2005, unemployed persons who participate in training
programs, internships, or other measures that are part of active labor market policy
are no longer recorded as unemployed in the microdata while they are taking part in
such programs. Our baseline definition of employment states assigns workers in active
labor market programs as out of the labor force. If these workers go from a program
to regular employment, the baseline sample would not count this as a transition from
unemployment to employment; as a consequence, the job finding rate would be lower.
To explore the quantitative effect of this change in recording, we exploit the information
from the unemployment records that provide a reason for why the worker is no longer
registered as unemployed. We exploit this information to identify workers who partic-
ipate in active labor market programs and explore how our estimates for job finding
rates are affected if we include workers as unemployed while they are in active labor
market programs. Figure 2.18 shows the unemployment rate and the job finding rate
for the baseline sample and for the sensitivity sample that still counts all participants
in measures of active labor market programs after 2005 as unemployed if they were
unemployed before the program started.32
Looking at the unemployment rate in Figure 2.18(a), we find a very small increase
in unemployment, yet the effect is negligible. Job finding rates in Figure 2.18(b) are
hardly affected. We conclude that the change in the recording of active labor market
programs in the microdata has a quantitatively negligible effect on our results.
G Economic activity in Austria and Germany
Section 4.3 contrasts the actual performance of the German labor market and a coun-
terfactual performance absent the Hartz reforms with the Austrian experience. We
choose Austria as a comparison because of its close business-cycle comovement with
the German economy. Figure 2.19 demonstrates this close comovement over the two
31The level shift at the structural break corresponds to a 37% increase in the job finding rate in the
sensitivity sample.
32Due to the inflow correction, the samples differ slightly before 2005.
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Figure 2.18: Unemployment and job finding rates including active labor market pro-
grams
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Notes: Unemployment and job finding rates from the baseline sample and a sensitivity sample that
includes workers in active labor market policy (ALMP) programs in the group of the unemployed. See
text for further details. The grey area marks the period 2003 to 2005 when the Hartz reforms were
enacted. The fading out indicates the first transition years 2006 to 2008 after the reforms.
decades considered in the counterfactual simulation from 1993 to 2014. As in the main
part of the paper, we use GDP per capita to trace out the business cycle. We transform
GDP per capita by taking the logarithm and we extract the cyclical component using
an Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing parameter λ = 100. We find a very high
correlation and also very similar volatility of the business cycle over time.
Figure 2.19: Cyclical component of GDP for Germany and Austria (1993-2014)
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Notes: Cyclical component of annual GDP per capita for Austria and Germany for the period 1993-
2014. GDP per capita is transformed to log and the cyclical component is extracted using an HP filter
with smoothing parameter λ = 100.
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D. Alternative explanations
The German labor market miracle has received a lot of attention in the public debate
as many European countries struggle with high unemployment rates and the question
arises whether Germany can serve as a role model for these countries. Our paper
provides new empirical evidence, together with a causal explanation based on economic
theory that the UI reforms that were part of the Hartz reforms in the mid-2000s are
responsible for the German labor market miracle. Other explanations for the German
labor market miracle have been proposed and we discuss three of the most prominent
alternative explanations in this section. A prominent idea put forward by Dustmann
et al. (2014) is falling unit labor costs in Germany relative to its European neighbors.
In Section A, we look at changes in unemployment rates and unit labor costs in a
cross-section of European countries to explore this idea. A closely related explanation
is an export-driven boom in the labor market due to demand from China and other
European countries. In Section B, we compare worker flows in export industries to those
that produce for the domestic market. Finally, section C looks at the composition of
unemployment and the share of long-term unemployed. One goal of the Hartz reforms
was to reduce long-term unemployment and that might have contributed to a decline
in unemployment after the reforms.
A Unit labor costs
One prominent narrative of the German labor market miracle comes from Dustmann
et al. (2014), who link the German labor market miracle to a decline in Germany’s
unit labor cost and wages relative to other European countries. Figure 2.20 shows the
ratio of German unit labor costs (ULC) (red solid line) and unemployment rate (blue
dashed line) relative to other European countries.33 We find that the relative decline of
Germany’s ULC had already started in the 1990s, long before the Hartz reforms were
enacted. The idea behind how changes in ULC are related to changes in unemployment
rates is that with falling ULC production became relatively cheaper in Germany, thereby
increasing labor demand in Germany at the cost of falling labor demand in other Eu-
ropean countries. As a result, stronger labor demand leads to declining unemployment
rates in Germany, and in comparison, unemployment rates in other European countries
with weakened labor demand rise. The relative unemployment trends in Figure 2.20
paint a different picture. During the period when German ULC were falling relative
to other European countries, its unemployment rate was rising in comparison to these
countries, whereas the fall in unemployment rates between 2005 and 2014 was accom-
panied by stagnating or even increasing relative ULC in Germany. Without drawing
causal conclusions, these negatively correlated time series are intricately reconciled with
the hypothesis that declining ULC were the main driver of the German labor market
miracle.
33EU-18 is the employment-weighted average of 18 EU countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Repub-
lic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, and the UK.
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Figure 2.20: Unit labor costs and unemployment rates in the EU
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Notes: The red solid lines (left axis) show ULC in Germany divided by ULC in other European
countries. The blue dashed lines (right axis) show the German unemployment rate relative to the
unemployment rate in these countries. The grey area marks the period 2003 to 2005 when the Hartz
reforms were enacted. The fading out indicates the first transition years 2006 to 2008 after the reforms.
B Export demand
Related to the idea of falling unit labor costs in Germany relative to its European
competitors is the idea that rising export demand for German goods has spurred la-
bor demand in the German labor market and has led to a decline in separation rates
contemporaneously with the labor market reforms. To investigate this idea, we follow
Dauth et al. (2016) and classify industries by their export or import exposure. If labor
demand from abroad is a key driver of the labor market miracle, we expect separation
rates to decline in the export-exposed industries relative to import-exposed or unex-
posed industries. We adopt the classification of import- and export-exposed industries
from Dauth et al. (2016). Their classification follows the methodology used in the
seminal paper by Autor et al. (2013) on the impact of Chinese import competition
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on industries in the United States. Import exposure is defined as the absolute value of
trade flows into an industry from a particular region relative to the trade flows into that
industry stemming from all countries; export exposure is defined equivalently. Dauth
et al. (2016) classify 93 industries at the 3-digit level in the SIAB sample. Out of these
industries, they report the 25 most import-exposed and the 25 most export-exposed
industries in Table A.2 of their appendix. We take the classification from this table to
define the import-exposed and export-exposed industries in our sample.
Table 2.10: Change in separation rates by trade exposure
industries 1993-2002 2008-2014 ∆ %
all 0.63% 0.49% -22.0%
no exposure 0.63% 0.50% -20.0%
export exposure 0.44% 0.26% -40.8%
import exposure 0.62% 0.34% -44.4%
Notes: Separation rates before and after the Hartz reforms by trade exposure. We use averages of
quarterly rates over the time periods. Column ∆ reports the percentage change in rates from the
period before the Hartz reforms to the period after the Hartz reforms.
Table 2.10 shows the decline in separation rates across industries with no trade
exposure, with export exposure, and with import exposure. Industries with neither
import nor export exposure show a decline in separation rates from the pre-reform to
the post-reform period of 20%, close to the average decline of 22%. We find that both
import-exposed and export-exposed industries show much stronger declines relative to
other industries. Separation rates in trade-exposed industries decline by more than
40%. The effect on the overall separation rates remains modest, however, because em-
ployment shares of these industries are small and account for less than 10% of employ-
ment. Furthermore, the declines in the import-exposed and export-exposed industries
are about the same size so that export-induced demand as a driver of the decline in
separation rates seems at odds with the observed pattern. The evidence therefore does
not support a prominent role for export-driven labor demand as an explanation for the
German labor market miracle.
C Long-term unemployment
One goal of the Hartz reforms was to reduce long-term unemployment. To explore
whether the reduction in long-term unemployment was an important driver behind the
reduction in overall unemployment, we examine the composition of the unemployment
pool over time. If the Hartz reforms increased, in particular, job finding rates of long-
term unemployed, this should have shifted the composition of the unemployment pool
toward short-term unemployment after the reforms. Figure 2.21 shows that apart from
a spike during the Great Recession between 2006 and 2008, the share of unemployed
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who have been out of work for more than one year did not change relative to the
pre-Hartz period.
Figure 2.21: Share of long-term unemployed in Germany (1998-2015)
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Notes: Share of long-term unemployed (more than 12 months). The grey area marks the period 2003
to 2005 when the Hartz reforms were enacted. The fading out indicates the first transition years 2006
to 2008 after the reforms.
The analysis in Section 4 provides evidence that higher job finding rates are not
the main reason for the decline in the unemployment rate after 2005. The fact that we
find a largely constant share of long-term unemployed after the Hartz reforms implies
that there have also been no differential effects among the unemployed and a stronger
increase in job finding rates among the long-term unemployed.
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Chapter 3
Optimal UI policies in heterogeneous labor
markets
1. Introduction
Since the European Monetary Union (EMU) was established, there is an open debate
whether and if so how the monetary union should be supplemented by a fiscal stabiliza-
tion mechanism that allows member states to share the risk of asymmetric shocks across
countries. One possible instrument that has been discussed intensely in both policy and
academic circles, is a European unemployment insurance (EUI). A federal UI scheme
implicitly transfers resources from regions with low to regions with high unemployment
rates. It can therefore supplement national fiscal stabilizers and allows countries to in-
sure against asymmetric shocks, thus stabilizing aggregate demand. At the same time,
implementing a common UI policy across heterogeneous labor markets can cause first-
order welfare losses: An unemployment benefit level that is optimal in terms of welfare
in one country might be too high (or too low) from a welfare perspective in another
country with different labor market institutions, preferences and technology. If these
structural differences across European labor markets are substantial, then the welfare
losses of not tailoring UI policies to country-specific characteristics might outweigh the
welfare gains from risk sharing across countries. It is therefore crucial to understand
how large the distortions of implementing a one-size-fits-all policy across heterogeneous
labor markets are when discussing the merits and costs of a European UI scheme as a
fiscal stabilizer.1 This paper addresses this question in detail and quantifies the welfare
distortions of implementing a common UI scheme across heterogeneous labor markets.
The main contribution of this paper is twofold: First, it takes into account that UI
benefits as well as job-finding rates vary with unemployment duration, which turns out
to be an essential feature for the design of optimal UI policies. For that purpose, this
paper presents a novel data set of quarterly inflow rates into and outflow rates from
unemployment by unemployment duration for 27 European economies. Second, the
paper provides a more nuanced welfare analysis than existing studies by comparing the
1Alternatively, fiscal transfers that are linked to the unemployment rate could serve as an automatic
stabilizer. However, a common unemployment insurance has the advantage of directly targeting those
people most affected by a recession (unemployed). Furthermore, an institutionalized common UI
scheme has a more immediate effect than discretionary transfers that are typically subject to political
discussions, even if linked to the unemployment rate (see Beblavy and Lenaerts (2017)).
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welfare across three different scenarios: (i) the status-quo with sub-optimal UI policies,
(ii) optimal country-specific UI policies and (iii) an optimally chosen single UI policy
that is applicable in all member states of the union.
This second contribution is not a mere technicality but essential for interpreting the
welfare effects and for drawing policy conclusions: In theory, unemployment benefits
are chosen optimally to balance the trade-off between insuring individuals against la-
bor market risk and preserving the search incentives of unemployed. However, there is
no reason to assume that the national UI policies currently in place across European
countries are optimal in that respect. Therefore, comparing the potentially sub-optimal
current national policies with an optimally chosen federal UI scheme confounds the wel-
fare gains of optimization and the welfare losses of moving from country-specific optimal
policies to a one-size-fits-all scheme that is applicable in all European countries. The
overall effect of replacing the status-quo with an optimally chosen European UI scheme
might therefore well be positive despite the distortions of not tailoring UI policies to
country-specific characteristics. The main contribution of the structural analysis in this
paper is therefore not only to quantify the overall welfare effects but also to disentangle
the gains from optimization and the losses from imposing a one-size-fits-all policy in
order to understand the size and importance of both channels.
It should be noted that this paper focuses on the welfare consequences of a European UI
scheme through its impact on the labor market. In the scenario laid out here, a Euro-
pean UI scheme which is not tailored to country-specific characteristics has distortionary
effects by altering the search decisions of unemployed, the vacancy posting behavior of
firms and the extent to which idiosyncratic labor market risk is insured. In doing that,
the paper abstracts from the actual benefits a common UI scheme may have as an
automatic stabilizer that insures countries against asymmetric shocks through transi-
tory transfers. The aim of this paper is therefore not to give an overall assessment of
whether a European UI scheme is welfare improving in general but rather provides a
quantification of the welfare effects such a policy has through its distortionary impact
on the labor market.
When comparing different labor markets, the first question to be addressed, how-
ever, is not related to optimal policy design but concerns measurement. It is well known
that labor markets vary substantially across countries both in terms of institutions (e.g.
UI policies, employment protection, unionization) and labor market outcomes (unem-
ployment and worker flow rates, wages etc.). At the same time, it is less obvious how
one can actually measure this heterogeneity of labor markets empirically. From a the-
oretical viewpoint, the variables and parameters that characterize labor markets can
be broken down into three categories: The first category comprises labor market insti-
tutions which can be directly changed by the policy maker such as the generosity of
UI benefits or the strictness of employment protection. The second group of variables
encompasses endogenous labor market outcomes that are affected by labor market in-
stitutions, the business cycle and exogenous parameters. These are for example wages,
the unemployment rate or the level and cyclicality of worker flows between employ-
ment and unemployment. Finally, the third category comprises exogenous parameters
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that affect labor market outcomes but are not directly controlled by the policy maker,
such as the preference for leisure, the utility costs of search for unemployed workers
or the matching technology connecting vacant jobs with workers.2 Evidently, this last
category is hard to measure empirically. The strategy of this paper is therefore to use
available data on labor market policies and observed labor market outcomes - the first
two categories - to pin down these “deep” parameters for each country within a struc-
tural labor market model. Given these parameters, one can then investigate how to
change policies optimally in order to maximize welfare.
Evidently, an essential prerequisite for this approach is reliable data encompassing
the broad heterogeneity of labor market institutions and labor market outcomes across
European countries. While statistics on labor market policies can be computed using
data provided by the OECD, data on worker flow rates as a key labor market outcome
variable is scarce: Existing measures are either not available for a larger set of coun-
tries, can be computed only at an annual frequency or span relatively short time series.
Addressing these shortcomings, the first part of this paper presents a novel measure of
quarterly employment-to-unemployment (EU) and unemployment-to-employment (UE)
transition rates for 27 European economies that can be computed from 1998 onwards.
The measure is based on quarterly Eurostat-data on unemployment stocks by quarterly
and biannual duration brackets. Using a system of stock-flow equations, these unem-
ployment stock time series can be used to back out not only the quarterly EU- and
UE-transition rates but also the UE-transition rates by unemployment duration. The
resulting time series fit existing flow rate measures remarkably well in the period of
overlap and track the evolution of unemployment rates closely.
With these high-frequency time series at hand, the paper proceeds with two empirical
tests that are not possible to do with existing worker flow rate measures for a large
set of countries: First, I do a business cycle decomposition as in Fujita and Ramey
(2009) to investigate how much of the cyclical unemployment fluctuations are driven
by fluctuations in EU- versus UE-transition rates. While the latter are dominant in
most countries, EU-transition rates play a sizable role as well: In Germany and France,
the two largest economies in the sample, EU-transitions explain 40% and 50% of un-
employment fluctuations, respectively.
In the second step, I aggregate the UE-transition rates by duration to long- and short-
term duration brackets (less than or more than 12 months of unemployment). Using the
time series variation on a quarterly level, I test whether the UE-rates of both groups
are significantly different from each other. In 15 out of the 27 countries this is the
case. In 12 out of these 15 countries long-term unemployed have significantly lower
job-finding rates than short-term unemployed. These include some of the largest Euro-
pean economies (Germany, France, UK, Spain). Only in 3 Eastern European countries
long-term unemployed are more likely to exit unemployment.
These two empirical tests show that (i) job separations explain a sizable fraction of
unemployment fluctuations over the business cycle and are therefore potentially an im-
portant margin along which policy changes affect the unemployment rate (see Jung and
2Throughout this paper, it is assumed that the policy maker cannot directly control matching
efficiency nor is matching efficiency affected if other institutions change.
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Kuhn (2014a)). And (ii), the odds of finding a job depend on unemployment duration
in slightly more than half of all European countries.
With these new time series on EU-flows and UE-flows by unemployment duration
at hand, the second part of the paper presents a structural labor market model to ad-
dress the optimal policy question outlined in the beginning. The model builds upon the
framework in Jung and Kuester (2015) and features the basic trade-off between con-
sumption smoothing and search incentives for risk-averse unemployed workers which
determines the optimal level of UI benefits. Motivated by the empirical evidence on the
importance of the separation margin for unemployment fluctuations and the duration
dependence in job-finding rates, the model features endogenous separations as well as
short-term and long-term unemployed who decide whether or not to search for a job.
Ex-ante all unemployed are identical but the search costs depend on unemployment
duration which is the reason why short- and long-term unemployed exit unemployment
at different rates. Hence, duration dependence in the model arises as “true” duration
dependence rather than through the selection of ex-ante heterogeneous workers.
In the first step, the model is calibrated for each country separately imposing the actual
labor market policies currently in place. These policies comprise short- and long-term
unemployment benefits and a quantitative measure of firing costs which is derived from
the detailed data underpinning the OECD’s EPL-indicators3. Given the status-quo
policies of each country, the calibration allows to back out the structural parameters
of the model that rationalize the level and the cyclicality of the worker flow rates ob-
served in the data. These structural country-specific parameters reflect the value of
home production, matching frictions and the costs of search for unemployed workers of
different durations. Assuming that these parameters are invariant to policy changes,
the second step computes the optimal UI policy for each country. In the third step, I
take the model to the federal level and search for the optimal common policy, taking
as weights the size of the labor force in each country.
It turns out, that in contrast to the status quo in which unemployment benefits
decline with duration, both the country-specific and the federal optimal UI schemes are
actually increasing in unemployment duration. While the median replacement rate for
short-term (long-term) unemployed across countries is 73% (45%) in the status quo,
the median optimal replacement rate is significantly lower for short-term unemployed
(50%) and close to one for long-term unemployed (94%). What is the explanation for
that reversed optimal UI profile? The reason is that in most countries long-term unem-
ployed have a significantly lower job-finding rate than short-term unemployed, despite
receiving lower benefits. That means they have more difficulties finding a job although
their surplus of being employed is larger than for short-term unemployed. In the model
that can only be the case if it is inherently more arduous for long-term unemployed to
search for jobs. These higher utility costs of search in turn imply that the moral hazard
costs of providing long-term unemployed with larger benefits are relatively low as their
search behavior is hardly affected by monetary incentives. The social planner there-
3The OECD provides regular indicators covering various dimensions of employment protection
legislation (EPL). See section 3.3 for details.
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fore grants long-term unemployed larger benefits in order to smooth their consumption,
knowing that they will not reduce search much further.
In the model, replacing the sub-optimal status-quo policies with an optimal UI scheme
where benefits increase with unemployment duration yields substantial welfare gains
of close to 3% of consumption. At the same time, the national and federal optimal
policies are relatively similar, such that the welfare losses of having a one-size-fits-all
UI scheme instead of country-specific policies are moderate (0.22%). At the same time,
unemployment decreases by more than 40% because the low short-term benefits reduce
inflow rates into unemployment and increase the outflow rate of short-term unemployed
workers.
To test whether these welfare effects are driven by the duration dependence of ben-
efits and outflow rates, I do a counterfactual exercise in which I re-calibrate the model
with only one benefit level and a homogeneous pool of unemployed. Computing again
optimal policies, the results differ substantially: First, the welfare gains of having opti-
mal national policies are significantly smaller (0.72%). That suggests that the average
replacement rates currently in place are relatively close to their optimal levels. In con-
trast, the distortions of moving from national policies to a federal scheme are large
(-1.48%), more than offsetting the gains from optimization. Explicitly accounting for
duration dependence in job-finding rates is therefore an essential feature of optimal UI
policies - both on a national and on a European level.
In interpreting both the level of optimal UI benefits and the welfare effects, it should
be kept in mind that the social planner in this setup has only a limited set of policy tools
available (short- and long-term UI benefits) to implement the decentralized constrained-
efficient allocation. That abstracts from other policy tools that have been shown to be
quite effective in reducing unemployment, ranging from active labor market policies to
retraining of long-term unemployed and hiring subsidies as well as layoff taxes. Jung
and Kuester (2015) for example show that over the business cycle, UI benefits actually
play a minor role in terms of welfare, once layoff taxes and hiring subsidies are chosen
optimally. Nonetheless, this paper abstracts from these tools to focus on the optimal
choice of UI benefits, which is front and center in the academic and policy discussion
on automatic fiscal stabilizers in the European Union.
Related Literature. This paper contributes to an existing literature that investi-
gates the costs and merits of a European UI scheme from a macroeconomic perspective.
Closely related to this paper is the study by Abraham et al. (2017) which compares
welfare and unemployment in different optimal policy scenarios for a union of hetero-
geneous labor markets. Their paper is more detailed regarding various implementation
options and explicitly models the insurance benefits of a common UI scheme. However,
their model abstracts from endogenous separations and duration dependence in bene-
fits and job-finding rates - both of which are a key feature of European labor markets
and play a crucial role for the optimal design of UI policies and the ensuing welfare
effects, as shown in this paper. A similar exercise is provided by Moyen et al. (2016)
in a two-country model, which also features exogenous separations and a homogeneous
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unemployment pool. In contrast to these papers, Ignaszak et al. (2018) focus on the
moral hazard concerns of having a common UI fund when member states retain their
legislative power to adjust other national policies. Their paper is complementary to
the paper presented here as it outlines a different channel through which a common
UI-scheme might have first-order distortions. In that sense, the welfare costs of having
a union-wide policy presented here, should be viewed as a lower bound as I abstract
from moral hazard considerations on the country-level. However, their paper abstracts
from heterogeneity across countries in terms of labor market institutions and outcomes.
In addition, this paper is related to a literature on optimal UI benefit schemes depend-
ing on unemployment duration. While theoretical papers with representative agents
mostly find that optimal benefits are either decreasing (Shavell and Weiss (1979b),
Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997b)) or flat (Shimer and Werning (2008)) over the unem-
ployment spell, studies with duration dependence or heterogeneity among unemployed
find more ambiguous predictions (Shimer and Werning (2006)). On the empirical side,
Kolsrud et al. (2018) use detailed micro data to exploit a Swedish UI benefit reform in a
regression-discontinuity design. They find that the optimal benefit scheme is increasing
in unemployment duration. As in the paper presented here, they find that long-term
unemployed hardly respond to monetary incentives and therefore should receive higher
benefits from a social planner’s perspective. They confirm this result in a structural
model in which duration dependence arises both generically in the form of “true” du-
ration dependence and through the dynamic selection of heterogeneous job searchers.
Quantitatively, the optimal UI scheme they obtain (48% for short-term and 68% for
long-term unemployed) is very close to the estimate for Sweden obtained in this paper
(47% and 71% respectively).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Sections 2.1 and 2.2 describe
the construction of the novel worker flow rate measure and compare it to existing data
sources. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 present the business cycle decomposition of unemploy-
ment fluctuations and the evidence on duration dependence. Sections 3.1 to 3.3 outline
the labor market model and the calibration strategy. Section 3.4 shows the optimal
policies and welfare effects for the calibration with duration dependence. Section 3.5
presents the counterfactual experiment with homogeneous unemployed and flat UI ben-
efits. Section 4 concludes.
2. Empirical evidence
This paper aims to evaluate the effect of labor market institutions, such as unem-
ployment insurance schemes, on labor market outcomes and welfare. The core of this
analysis is a structural model that captures the main features of labor market policies
across countries and replicates the empirical patterns of labor market flows and unem-
ployment rates both in terms of their level and their cyclical behavior. Bringing these
two aspects - labor market policies and labor market outcomes - together is essential
for the welfare analysis and the resulting policy implications: Jung and Kuhn (2014a)
and Hartung et al. (2018) show that the effectiveness of UI benefit changes depends
to a large extent on the level of worker flow rates and their sensitivity with respect to
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aggregate fluctuations. It is therefore important to use reliable high-frequency data on
worker flow rates into and out of unemployment for the structural analysis.
Furthermore, most UI benefit schemes in Europe are significantly more generous to-
wards short- than towards long-term unemployed. The ensuing differences in search
incentives and insurance has potentially large implications for the welfare analysis in
the structural part of this paper. To account for that, it is necessary to have detailed
data on worker flow rates by unemployment duration to calibrate the model such that
it matches the duration-specific outflow rates.
To capture these features it is necessary to have data which (i) is available and com-
parable for a large set of European countries, (ii) covers a sufficiently long time span,
(iii) has a high frequency (e.g. quarterly) and (iv) allows to compute outflow rates from
unemployment by duration. Although there are several data sources on worker flow
rates in Europe, none of these sources fulfills all of these four criteria. The following
section therefore presents a novel measure for worker flow rates which is based on de-
tailed quarterly unemployment stocks by unemployment duration and matches all of
the criteria listed above.
2.1 Cross-country data on worker flow rates
Before presenting the new measure of worker flow rates, it is helpful to review the ex-
isting data sources on flow rates in Europe: The first data source is provided by the
European statistical office (Eurostat) and based on the EU Labor Force Survey. It
contains quarterly transitions between employment, unemployment and inactivity for
most European countries from the second quarter of 2010 onwards (see for example
Abraham et al. (2017)). Aside from the lack of data for Belgium and Germany - two
major EU-countries - the main drawback of the reported flow rates is the relatively
short time span which overlaps to a large extent with the Eurozone crisis. Especially
for Southern European countries which experienced extraordinarily large increases in
unemployment rates during the crisis, the resulting flow rates in that period are ar-
guably not representative for the labor market dynamism of these economies in less
extraordinary times.
The second measure of worker flow rates has been established by Elsby et al. (2013)
and is based on annual data provided by the OECD on unemployment stocks for differ-
ent unemployment durations from 1971 onwards.4 They develop a more sophisticated
version of the method pioneered by Shimer (2007) to compute average monthly hazard
rates on an annual frequency for job finding and separation probabilities. In line with
the Shimer-imputation, they exploit the stock-flow relationship between employment
and unemployment in a two-state model which is represented in discrete time by the
following two flow identities:
Ft = 1− ut+1 − u
s
t+1
ut
(3.1)
ut+1 = ut(1− Ft) + (1− ut)St︸ ︷︷ ︸
ust+1
(3.2)
4The time span for which data on unemployment by duration is available varies across countries.
While only Sweden has data going back to 1971, most time series start between 1983 and 1994.
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Here, Ft and St denote the UE- and EU-transition rate respectively. ut denotes the
overall unemployment rate and ust+1 the short-term unemployment rate in period t+ 1.
Due to its annual frequency, the OECD data does not allow to compute worker flow
rates on a quarterly basis. Hence, the resulting time series have difficulties in tracking
business cycle fluctuations of the unemployment rate.5
Given the shortcomings of these existing data sources on worker flow rates, this
paper presents an alternative measure of worker flow rates which can be computed on a
quarterly frequency from 1998 onwards6. The measure is based on quarterly data pro-
vided by Eurostat on the number of unemployed by detailed unemployment duration
brackets. In contrast to the OECD data, the quarterly frequency is consistent with the
quarterly unemployment duration brackets (less than 3 months, 3-6 months etc.) such
that the number of newly unemployed ust+1 in equation 3.1 is equal to the number of all
separations St between t and t+1 in equation 3.2. The quarterly UE- and EU-transition
rates Ft and St respectively can then be directly computed from equations 3.1 and 3.2.
Furthermore, the detailed quarterly and biannual unemployment duration brackets al-
low to not only compute the aggregate outflow rate from unemployment but also the
outflow rate for different unemployment durations on a quarterly frequency (see section
2.4 for details). As mentioned at the beginning of this section, this is essential for the
structural analysis later on.
Table 3.1 summarizes the differences between the existing and the proposed mea-
sures of labor market flows. It should be noted that none of the measures allows to
compute worker flow rates for all European countries, albeit each measure is lacking
data on a different set of countries. Methodologically, the Shimer imputation does not
allow to distinguish flows into and out of the labor force and therefore comprises only
two rather than three labor market states. That is a clear advantage of the EU-LFS
which explicitly measures flows between all three labor market states (employment,
unemployment, inactivity).
Aside from these differences, the proposed flow rate measure has three main advan-
tages over the existing measures: First, the high frequency allows to track business
cycle fluctuations in both EU- and UE-flow rates over time. Second, the long time
span allows to compute average levels and volatilities of flow rates excluding the period
of the Great Recession and the Eurozone crisis, in particular for Southern European
countries. Third, the proposed measure allows to compute UE-transition rates by un-
employment duration on a quarterly basis. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first
cross-country data on heterogeneous job finding rates with respect to unemployment
duration on a higher frequency and for detailed duration brackets.7
5See the business cycle decomposition of steady-state unemployment in table 3 of their paper.
6For some countries, in particular Eastern European countries that joined the EU in the 2000s,
data is only available for a shorter time span.
7Eurostat does provide annual data from 2011 onwards on job finding rates separately for unem-
ployment durations less than one year and more than one year.
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Table 3.1: Cross-country measures for worker flow rates
EU-LFS OECD new measure
Frequency quarterly annual quarterly
Start 2010q2 1971 1998q1
Method survey Shimer imputation Shimer imputation
Labor market states E/U/I E/U E/U
UE-rate by duration NO NO YES
# European countries 27 26 29
Not in sample Malta Malta Malta
Belgium Romania Switzerland
Germany Croatia
Luxembourg Cyprus
Bulgaria
Notes: The last column refers to the new measure presented in this paper. It is based on the method
developed in Shimer (2005a) to compute EU- and UE-transition rates and uses data on the stock of
unemployed and short-term unemployed at a quarterly frequency (see text for details).
2.2 Fit with existing data sources
To test whether the proposed new measure of worker flows delivers reasonable esti-
mates, it is natural to compare the obtained rates with existing data. This section does
that along two dimensions: First, it shows that the time series of the obtained EU- and
UE-transition rates closely track their respective survey-based counterpart reported
by Eurostat in the period of overlap. Second, it shows that the implied steady-state
unemployment rate based on the obtained EU- and UE-flow rates tracks the actual
unemployment rate remarkably well for most European countries.
Before looking at these time series patterns, a first glance at the average level of
transition rates reveals that there is a sizable level difference in most countries be-
tween the survey-based flow rates and the new flow rate measure imputed from data
on short-term unemployed: Figure 3.1 plots the quarterly EU- and UE-transition rates
in 24 European countries8 based on the proposed Shimer-imputation (horizontal axis)
against the corresponding flow rates in the Eurostat survey data (vertical axis). One
dot is one quarter-country observation and the blue solid line marks the 45-degree line.
Appendix A shows the same plot with average flow rates by country. Evidently, the
imputed flows are larger than the corresponding survey measures for most countries
and quarters. This level difference arises to some extent by construction because the
EU Labor Force Survey contains transitions between three different employment states
(employment, unemployment, inactivity), whereas the Shimer imputation is based on
8These are the countries for which data is available in both data sets, i.e. the survey measure
provided by Eurostat and the Shimer-imputed flow rates based on short-term unemployment data.
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a two-state model: In the Shimer imputation all newly unemployed are assumed to
be inflows from employment (EU-transitions), neglecting that a certain fraction of
these inflows into unemployment actually stems from the inactive population (NU-
transitions). The measured separation rate in equation 3.2 is therefore higher in the
two-state Shimer-imputation than in the survey data which explicitly distinguishes be-
tween EU- and NU-transitions. Given that the measured unemployment rate is the
same in both data sets, this implies a higher UE-transition rate as well.
Figure 3.1: Quarterly worker flow rates: Eurostat vs. new measure
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Notes: Left (right) panel shows quarterly EU (UE) transition rate for 24 European countries according
to the survey data provided by Eurostat (vertical axis) and according to the new measure based on
a Shimer imputation using data on short-term unemployment (horizontal axis). The graph combines
time- and country-dimension. For country averages see appendix A. Blue solid line is the 45-degree
line.
Apart from this level difference, the evolution of both measures over time matches
remarkably well. Figure 3.2 shows the EU- and UE-transition rates respectively over
time for 24 countries for which data is available in both data sets. The Eurostat
survey series (black lines) are adjusted by a constant factor for each country to match
the mean level of the proposed new worker flow measure (blue lines). The proposed
measure tracks the existing time series quite well for most countries during the period
of overlap which is consistent with the high correlations in figure 3.1.
A different approach to show th validity of the new measure is to compare the steady-
state unemployment rate which is implied by these flow rates in each quarter with
the actual counterpart. Appendix B describes in more detail how the steady-state
unemployment rate is computed and shows the time series for each of the countries
together with the actual unemployment rate.
In order to test more formally whether the new time series are consistent with existing
measures in figure 3.2 and figure 3.6 in appendix B, table 3.2 reports the corresponding
time series correlations for each country. The EU-rates fit the existing survey-based EU-
flows quite well. The UE-rates are positively correlated with the Eurostat time series
for most countries. The implied steady-state unemployment rates is highly correlated
with the actual unemployment rate in the data.
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Figure 3.2: Fit of flow rates with Eurostat survey data
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Notes: Quarterly Employment-to-unemployment (EU) transition rates for 24 European countries.
Black-dashed line shows EU-transition rates based on Eurostat data (from 2010 onwards). Blue solid
line shows EU-rates computed from stock-flow-equation and data on unemployment by duration as
described in the text. Level of the black-solid line is adjusted by a constant factor for each country.
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Table 3.2: Correlation of flow rates with Eurostat survey data
country corr(EU surt , EU shimt ) corr(UEsurt , UEshimt ) corr(U sst , Ut)
Austria 0.58*** 0.34* 0.16
Belgium −0.09
Bulgaria 0.77*** 0.11 0.17
Croatia 0.47** 0.49** −0.02
Cyprus 0.72*** 0.17 0.71***
Czech Republic 0.85*** 0.39** 0.62***
Denmark 0.52*** 0.25 0.82***
Finland 0.52*** 0.50*** 0.77***
France 0.35* 0.15 0.56***
Germany 0.88***
Greece 0.81*** 0.20 0.76***
Hungary 0.80*** 0.54*** 0.57***
Iceland 0.62*** 0.63*** 0.79***
Ireland 0.79*** 0.38** 0.70***
Italy 0.74*** −0.18 0.53***
Latvia 0.77*** −0.01 0.37**
Lithuania 0.49*** 0.21 −0.01
Luxembourg −0.19
Netherlands 0.87*** 0.28 0.67***
Norway 0.61*** 0.49*** 0.69***
Poland 0.81*** 0.64*** 0.67***
Portugal 0.74*** 0.47** 0.80***
Slovakia 0.33* 0.71*** 0.11
Slovenia 0.42** −0.16 0.08
Spain 0.89*** 0.41** 0.91***
Sweden 0.85*** 0.59*** 0.75***
United Kingdom 0.89*** 0.56*** 0.86***
Notes: Time series correlation within countries between EU- and UE flow rates obtained from Eurostat
survey data (“sur”) and from the new measure proposed in this paper following the Shimer-imputation
(“shim”). The last column shows the correlation over time between the implied steady-state unem-
ployment rate obtained from the novel flow-rate measure (see text for derivation) and the actual
unemployment rate. Asterisks *,** and *** denote significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-significance
levels respectively.
2.3 Decomposition of business cycle variation
The new flow rates obtained from a quarterly Shimer imputation in this paper can
therefore rationalize both the level and the cyclical movements of the unemployment
rate in most European economies. That allows to investigate not only the average level
differences across countries but also to address the question, how much of the cyclical
unemployment fluctuations are driven by variations in unemployment inflow rates ver-
sus changing outflow rates.
Assessing the relative importance of the inflow and the outflow margin is important
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in order to understand the drivers behind business cycle patterns. While most studies
have mainly focused on specific countries (see Fujita and Ramey (2009) for the US and
Jung and Kuhn (2014a) for a comparison between Germany and the US), the first paper
that compared the importance of both margins across countries is Elsby et al. (2013).
However, the annual OECD data they use does not allow to decompose business cycle
fluctuations at a higher frequency. The worker flow rates established in this paper fill
this gap as they are available at a quarterly frequency and for a broad set of countries.
The method used here follows closely Fujita and Ramey (2009) who decompose devia-
tions of the implied steady-state unemployment rate usst from trend into deviations of
the EU- and the UE-transition rates from their respective trends and a residual term
t:
ln
(
usst
u¯sst
)
= (1− u¯sst )ln
(
piEUt
p¯iEUt
)
− (1− u¯sst )ln
(
piUEt
p¯iUEt
)
+ t (3.3)
Based on this identity, one can derive a simple variance decomposition and define the
relative contribution of the three right-hand side terms towards cyclical fluctuations as
βEU , βUE and β respectively:
1 = Cov(du
ss
t , dpi
EU
t )
V ar(dusst )︸ ︷︷ ︸
βEU
+ Cov(du
ss
t , dpi
UE
t )
V ar(dusst )︸ ︷︷ ︸
βUE
+ Cov(du
ss
t , dt)
V ar(dusst )︸ ︷︷ ︸
β
(3.4)
The cyclical deviations from trend are obtained by first-differencing the log time series.
Figure 3.3 summarizes the relative contributions of the three right-hand side terms for
all European countries in the data set (for all numbers, mean rates and business cycle
statistics see appendix C).
Three aspects stand out: First, the absolute size of the error term β is below 5% for all
but five Eastern European countries and 4.7% on average. That is small compared to
the average error terms of 21% obtained from the same steady-state decomposition in
Elsby et al. (2013) using annual data. Using quarterly instead of annual data therefore
seems to go a long way towards a precise picture of the relative contributions of inflow
and outflow margins - without the need to do a more sophisticated non-steady-state
decomposition.
Second, the outflow margin is the dominant driver of cyclical unemployment fluctua-
tions in all but three countries.9 Nonetheless, the inflow margin plays a non-negligible
role as well, accounting for 20% or more of unemployment fluctuations in 22 out of the
29 countries.
Third, the relative contributions of the inflow and outflow margins display a large het-
erogeneity across countries ranging from a 57/43 split in favor of inflow rates in the
Czech Republic to a 7/93 split in Latvia. When trying to understand the drivers of
cyclical unemployment fluctuations in Europe, it is therefore essential to take into ac-
count these large differences in the relative contributions of inflow and outflow rates over
9Somewhat surprisingly one of these three countries is the UK which has been marked as a highly
dynamic labor market in which fluctuations in the outflow rate explain most of the unemployment
fluctuations. This does not seem to be the case here.
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the business cycle. This argument goes beyond the descriptive analysis of unemploy-
ment fluctuations: As Jung and Kuhn (2014a) show, the average size and cyclicality
of inflow and outflow rates in a labor market influence how the unemployment rate
reacts to changes in UI benefits as well. Hence, accounting for the differences in the
cyclicality of worker flow rates across countries - as exemplified in the different relative
contributions in figure 3.3 - is important in order to derive optimal UI policies in a
structural model.
Figure 3.3: Business cycle decomposition: uss
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Notes: Relative contributions of EU-rate and UE-rate fluctuations towards cyclical movements in
steady-state unemployment. Cyclical movements are based on first-differenced quarterly data as de-
scribed in the text. Relative contributions are computed using the method by Fujita and Ramey
(2009). The light-shaded area shows the contribution of the residual term t.
2.4 Job finding rates by unemployment duration
As mentioned in the introduction, there is evidence on the micro-level that outflow
rates from unemployment potentially depend on unemployment duration (see e.g. Kol-
srud et al. (2018)). This is important for designing optimal UI policies: Unemployed
persons with different unemployment durations and job finding rates potentially react
differently to changes in UI benefits. If there is large heterogeneity among the job
finding rates of unemployed, then that could have an impact on the aggregate elasticity
of job finding rates with respect to benefit changes. Furthermore, if job finding rates
depend on duration, then an optimal UI policy scheme should take that into account
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and condition on unemployment duration. Hence, it is essential to understand whether
there is significant duration dependence of job finding rates in European labor markets.
While the existing empirical evidence on duration dependence has relied on micro-data
of particular countries, the existing cross-country data on job-finding rates by duration
(Eurostat) is too sparse in terms of frequency and duration brackets to test for dura-
tion dependence. This section shows how the Eurostat data on unemployment stocks
by duration can instead be used to fill this gap by computing quarterly job finding rates
for six unemployment duration brackets across European countries. The resulting time
series can then be used to test directly whether there is duration dependence in job
finding rates by exploiting the time series variation.
The Eurostat data on unemployment stocks by duration is available on a quarterly
frequency for 25 European countries10 and for 8 different duration brackets11. These
brackets can be grouped into 6 quarterly or bi-annual bins. The consistency of the dura-
tion brackets with the time series frequency allows to track cohorts of unemployed over
the duration of their unemployment spell. As an example, consider a person who has
been unemployed for 3 to 5 months in quarter t. That implies he became unemployed
in quarter t−1 and did not find a job with the retention rate R<3t−1 = 1−F<3t−1. Here F<3t−1
denotes the average job finding probability of persons with an unemployment duration
of less than three months in the previous quarter t− 1. Equivalently, persons who have
been unemployed for 6 to 11 months in quarter t, became unemployed in period t − 2
or t− 3 and did not find a job since then with the respective quarter-duration-specific
retention rates. Following the same logic, one can link the stocks of unemployed in
all available duration brackets over time to compute quarterly time series of duration-
specific job finding rates. Appendix D shows in more detail how to compute these rates.
Before testing formally for duration dependence, figure 3.4 shows graphically how
unemployment outflow rates vary with unemployment duration (horizontal axis) for 27
European countries. The blue line marks the average UE-rate in each country, while
the black solid line shows duration-specific UE-transition rates. The vertical intervals
mark a one-standard deviation of the variation of these rates over time. The picture
is mixed: While in some countries job finding rates do not seem to depend on un-
employment duration, other countries exhibit a clearly downward-sloping profile (e.g.
Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Spain, Sweden, UK). In these countries a longer
unemployment duration is associated with lower job-finding rates.
This suggests to test more formally for duration dependence in job finding rates for each
country. To do that, I pool the duration brackets into short-term (≤ 12 months) and
long-term unemployed (> 12 months) and compute the UE-transition rates over time
for each of the two groups. A simple pairwise t-test can then be used to test whether
these two rates are significantly different from each other.
Table 3.3 summarizes the results. The first three columns show the mean share of
long-term unemployed and the average quarterly UE-transition rates for short- and
long-term unemployed. The last column shows the average ratio of the UE-rates of
10Due to a lack of duration-specific data for Iceland and Luxembourg
11All numbers in months: <1; 1-2; 3-5; 6-11; 12-17; 18-23; 24-48; >48
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short-term and long-term unemployed, where asterisks mark whether the difference be-
tween the two rates is statistically significant.
Two aspects stand out: First, the share of long-term unemployed varies largely across
countries ranging from 18% in Sweden to 67% on average in Slovakia. Second, there
is significant negative duration dependence for 12 out of the 27 countries and among
these countries are some of the largest labor markets in Europe (e.g. Germany, France,
UK, Spain). Furthermore the differences in job finding rates in countries with nega-
tive duration dependence are sizable: In Germany, short-term unemployed are twice
as likely to exit unemployment as long-term unemployed. In Spain, Sweden or the
UK the difference is lower but still between 50% and 80%. In contrast, there are only
three Eastern European countries (Poland, Hungary, Slovakia) which show significant
positive duration dependence, i.e. long-term unemployed find new jobs on average with
higher probability than short-term unemployed.
This evidence suggests that in most countries short- and long-term unemployed
indeed differ substantially regarding the likelihood of exiting unemployment. Addition-
ally, countries differ substantially both in the share of short- versus long-term unem-
ployed and in the relative likelihoods of these groups to exit unemployment. Accounting
for these cross-country differences in job-finding rates and the composition of the un-
employment pool is potentially crucial for the design of optimal UI policies and will
therefore be the basis for the following structural analysis.
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Figure 3.4: UE-rates by unemployment duration
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Notes: Average quarterly UE-rates by unemployment duration. Duration brackets on the horizontal
axis refer to months of unemployment (< 3m; 3-5m; 6-11m; 12-17m; 18-23m; ≥ 23m). The blue solid
horizontal line is the average UE-rate in the country. Vertical intervals mark a one-standard deviation
around the average duration-specific UE-rate based on time series variation.
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Table 3.3: UE-rates by duration
country U>12mU UE≤12m UE>12m
UE≤12m
UE>12m
Austria 0.268 0.397 0.263 1.512***
Belgium 0.487 0.278 0.185 1.502***
Bulgaria 0.573 0.176 0.181 0.974
Croatia 0.572 0.153 0.211 0.725
Cyprus 0.411 0.238 0.233 1.021
Czech Republic 0.460 0.231 0.227 1.016
Denmark 0.259 0.456 0.289 1.578***
Estonia 0.560 0.342 0.200 1.709
Finland 0.241 0.490 0.251 1.949***
France 0.412 0.299 0.247 1.210***
Germany 0.469 0.380 0.179 2.120***
Greece 0.568 0.167 0.178 0.933
Hungary 0.454 0.185 0.255 0.725***
Iceland - - - -
Ireland 0.487 0.262 0.181 1.449***
Italy 0.551 0.220 0.178 1.231
Latvia 0.487 0.229 0.235 0.976
Lithuania 0.469 0.236 0.233 1.011
Luxembourg - - - -
Netherlands 0.367 0.330 0.243 1.355***
Norway 0.285 0.447 0.343 1.305
Poland 0.436 0.176 0.291 0.606***
Portugal 0.477 0.265 0.186 1.425***
Romania 0.567 0.177 0.187 0.942
Slovakia 0.670 0.091 0.150 0.603***
Slovenia 0.500 0.170 0.228 0.743
Spain 0.364 0.359 0.222 1.619***
Sweden 0.180 0.477 0.268 1.783***
UK 0.275 0.444 0.258 1.722***
Notes: Column 1 shows the average share of long-term unemployed (> 12m). Column 2 and 3 show the
average quarterly UE-transition rates for short-term and long-term unemployed respectively. Column
4 shows the average ratio of the UE-transition rates of short- versus long-term unemployed. Asterisks
*,** and *** denote significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-significance levels of the corresponding
pairwise t-test (H0: Time series of UE-rates for short- and long-term unemployed are identical).
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3. Model
3.1 General approach
As mentioned in the introduction, a structural welfare analysis that compares exist-
ing - and potentially sub-optimal - national policies with an optimally chosen federal
UI scheme for the entire Eurozone confounds two steps: Moving from sub-optimal to
optimal policies and replacing national policies with a single UI scheme applicable in
all countries. This paper tackles this problem by comparing explicitly the welfare of
each country in three different scenarios: The first scenario is the status quo with the
current labor market policies in place (status quo). Given these policies the struc-
tural model allows to back out the country-specific parameters (e.g. preference for
leisure) that rationalize the labor market outcomes observed in the data, in particular
the level and cyclicality of EU- and UE-transition rates. With these country-specific
parameters at hand, the second scenario (optimal national) computes the optimal, i.e.
welfare-maximizing, national UI policy for each country separately. The third scenario
(optimal union) then introduces a European union which chooses one optimal common
UI policy which is applicable in all countries by maximizing the labor-force-weighted
welfare of all countries in the union.
That approach allows to compute first the welfare gains of having optimal national
policies instead of the current policies and then in a second step to compute the welfare
losses of moving from an optimal national to an optimal union level policy. Third, it
allows to compute in a third step the welfare effects for each country of moving from
the status quo to the optimal common UI scheme. These welfare effects could go either
way, depending on whether the optimal common UI policy moves the country closer to
its country-specific optimal policy or further away from it.
In doing that, the analysis focuses on the welfare effects of the labor market distor-
tions due to changing UI policies and is agnostic about other channels such as transfers
across countries or moral hazard on the country level. Therefore, the model abstracts
from genuine economic links between the member states of the union apart from the
union government choosing one labor market policy for all member states. In addition,
there is no feedback from the national to the union level as the national governments
cannot adjust their country-specific policies (e.g. layoff taxes). The only local parame-
ter that adjusts mechanically is the labor tax in order to balance the national budget,
which implies that there are no transfers across countries.
However, section 3.6 provides a back-of-the envelope estimation of the benefits asso-
ciated with full insurance against aggregate shocks. The exercise does not model an
integrated union in detail but instead computes the welfare gains of eliminating ag-
gregate shocks entirely. That is comparable to a union of small open economies with
uncorrelated shocks and full insurance through transitory transfers across countries.
3.2 Model setup
The model follows closely the decentralized economy in Jung and Kuester (2015) and
inherits most of the key assumptions and features in their paper, two of which are crucial
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for the optimal UI policy later on: First, the search effort of unemployed workers can-
not be observed by the government which introduces a moral-hazard insurance tradeoff.
Second, separations are endogenous and therefore the job separation rate reacts to ag-
gregate productivity fluctuations as well as policy changes. The main difference is that
in this paper there are two types of unemployed (short- and long-term unemployed)
with heterogeneous job-finding probabilities, which turns out to be essential for the
optimal policy design.
There is a continuum of risk-averse workers with measure one who are homogeneous
regarding their ex-ante idiosyncratic productivity. There are infinitely many potential
one-worker firms which produce a homogeneous good that cannot be stored. Together
with the closed-economy assumption, that implies that workers cannot insure them-
selves against individual labor market risk. Time is discrete and workers live infinitely.
There is an aggregate productivity shock that applies to all worker-firm matches. In
addition to this aggregate shock, each match receives an idiosyncratic cost shock upon
which it can either separate or incur the cost and enter the production stage. In the
model the worker and the firm will negotiate jointly the wage and the cost threshold
above which they separate after learning the aggregate shock but before the realization
of the idiosyncratic cost shock. Separations arise endogenously in this setup because the
aggregate productivity realization affects the negotiated separation threshold which is
identical across matches and therefore pins down the total amount of separations after
idiosyncratic shocks are realized. Similarly, unemployed workers decide whether or not
to search during the search stage at the end of the period subject to an idiosyncratic
search cost shock. The distribution of this search cost shock depends on unemployment
duration resulting in duration-dependent unemployment outflow probabilities.
Labor market and matching
The measure of workers employed at the beginning of period t is denoted by et and
evolves according to
et+1 = (1− ζt)et +mt (3.5)
where ζt denotes the share of existing worker-firm matches which are separated at the
beginning of the period and mt the number of new matches formed at the end of the
period. There are short-term and long-term unemployed u1,t and u2,t such that the
number of unemployed is u1,t + u2,t = 1 − et. Short-term unemployed move into long-
term unemployment with probability δ.
Firms post vacancies v at resource cost κv. New matches are created according to the
matching function
mt = χvγt [(ζtet + u1,t) s1,t + u2,ts2,t]1−γ (3.6)
Unemployed workers can choose whether or not to search for a job. Therefore, the mass
of searchers is given by the term in parentheses on the right-hand side [ζtet + u1,t] s1,t +
u2,ts2,t where s1,t is the fraction of newly separated employees and short-term unem-
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ployed that is searching for a job. Similarly, s2,t is the share of long-term unemployed
searching for a job.
Note that the timing is such that existing matches are dissolved at the beginning of
the period. Therefore newly separated workers ζtet enter the pool of job searchers when
matching takes place at the end of the period. Accordingly, labor market tightness θt
and the average job-finding rate of unemployed searchers f¯t are defined as
θt =
vt
(ζtet + u1,t) s1,t + u2,ts2,t
(3.7)
f¯t =
mt
(ζtet + u1,t) s1,t + u2,ts2,t
(3.8)
Although this contact rate f¯t is equal for short- and long-term unemployed job searchers,
the different shares of searchers s1,t and s2,t in the two groups imply that the actual
outflow rates out of unemployment are different. The factor ∆f 1,2t = s1,t/s2,t therefore
reflects the difference in job finding rates of short-term relative to long-term unem-
ployed.12
Value of employed workers
Workers are risk averse and have standard utility functions that are strictly increas-
ing, twice differentiable and concave in the period’s consumption level. They discount
future utility with time-discount factor β ∈ (0, 1). Workers who are employed through-
out period t consume cet and newly separated workers consume ceut . Newly separated
workers are fully insured by their employer through a pre-negotiated severance payment
weut which will be equal to their previous wage in equilibrium. Short- and long-term
unemployed workers receive cu1,t and cu2,t, respectively. The value of an employed worker
at the start of the period, i.e. before idiosyncratic shocks are realized, is then given by
V et = (1− ζt)
[
U(cet ) + βEtV et+1
]
+ ζtV eut (3.9)
Here, ζt is the probability that the match separates. If the match does not separate, the
worker enters the production stage, consumes cet and the match continues into the next
period. If the match is dissolved, the worker consumes ceut and enters the search stage
at the end of the period. If he does not find a job during the search stage, he will enter
the next period as a short-term unemployed worker. The value function of a newly
separated employee V eut is therefore identical to the value of a short-term unemployed
worker except for the consumption level in the period of separation:
V eut = V u1,t + U(ceut )− U(cu1,t) (3.10)
As workers are not allowed to save or dissave, the budget constraint of an employed
worker is given by ce,t = wt + Πt if he is not separated and ceut = weut + Πt if he is
separated. Here, Πt denotes the dividend flow from all firms which are owned equally
by all workers in the economy.
12This relative formulation is chosen as it directly maps to the data presented in table 3.3.
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Value of unemployed workers
Unemployed workers receive unemployment benefits Bj,t where j = 1 indicates short-
term and j = 2 long-term unemployed workers. The budget constraint is therefore given
by cuj,t = Bj,t + Πt. In addition to the utility stream from consumption, unemployed
workers receive utility from leisure h¯ which can alternatively be interpreted as home
production. To simplify notation, it is helpful to define the surplus of being employed
versus being unemployed of type j as
∆ej,t = V et − V uj,t (3.11)
Unemployed workers need to actively search in order to find a job. Search is associated
with an idiosyncratic utility cost ιi ∼ Fι(µj, σ2j,ι) which is independently and identically
distributed across workers and across time. For analytical tractability, Fι(µj,ι, σ2j,ι)
follows a logistic distribution with mean µj and variance σ2j,ι = pi
ψ2s,j
3 . Note that the
parameters of this distribution depend on the unemployment type j, i.e. short- and long-
term unemployed differ regarding the distribution of search cost shocks they receive.
Upon learning the realization of their idiosyncratic search cost shock, unemployed
can decide whether or not to search for a job (their is no intensive margin of search).
The worker is indifferent between searching or not, if the benefits of finding a job offset
the costs of searching. This indifference point is described by the type-specific cut-off
value ι¯j,t at which the utility cost of search equals the expected discounted surplus of
being employed weighted with the probability of finding a job:
ι¯j,t = f¯tβEt∆ej,t+1 (3.12)
Note that f¯t is the probability of finding a job conditional on searching, which is the
same for both types of unemployed. Hence, there is no index j on the contact rate
f¯t. Unemployed decide to search if their realization of the search cost shock is smaller
than ι¯j,t. The properties of the logistic distribution then allow to define the share of
unemployed workers of type j who search for a job as a function of the cut-off value ι¯j,t
and the parameters of the distribution:
sj,t = Pr(ι ≤ ι¯j,t) = 11 + exp{(µj − ι¯j,t)/ψs,j} (3.13)
The value of an unemployed worker of type j ∈ {1, 2} before the realization of the
idiosyncratic search cost shock ιi can then be described as
V u1,t = U(cu1,t) + h¯+
∫ ι¯1,t
−∞
[
−ιi + f¯tβEtV et+1
]
dFι1(ιi) (3.14)
+(1− f¯tF (ι¯1,t))β
[
δEtV u2,t+1 + (1− δ)EtV u1,t+1
]
V u2,t = U(cu2,t) + h¯+
∫ ι¯2,t
−∞
[
−ιi + f¯tβEtV et+1
]
dFι2(ιi) (3.15)
+(1− f¯tF (ι¯2,t))βEtV u2,t+1
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The first two terms of each value function describe the contemporaneous value of con-
sumption and leisure. The integral contains the costs of search and the expected value
of employment if a job is found, both conditional on searching. The second line de-
scribes the continuation value of staying unemployed in case the worker decides not
to search or searches unsuccessfully. Short-term unemployed (equation 3.14) become
long-term unemployed with probability δ.
This setup implies that there is “true” duration dependence in job finding rates, i.e.
all workers are ex-ante identical when entering unemployment but their ability to find a
job depreciates over time. In particular, they face a different distribution of search cost
shocks once they become long-term unemployed which results in different job-finding
probabilities.
An alternative way to introduce duration dependence would be to have ex-ante hetero-
geneous types of unemployed with different search cost distributions that do not change
over their respective unemployment spell. As those unemployed who have on average
low search costs move out of unemployment at a faster pace, there is a selection effect
where mostly unemployed persons with high search costs end up in long-term unem-
ployment. This selection effect based on different unemployment types also results in
different job finding probabilities by duration and therefore has qualitatively similar
implications as the setup with “true” duration dependence chosen here.
Ideally, the model would feature both sources of duration dependence. However, disen-
tangling the relative importance of both channels empirically is quite challenging and
beyond the scope of this paper. Section 3.4 discusses this assumption in more detail
and shows that the results obtained here are similar to results obtained in other models
featuring both sources of heterogeneity.
Value of the firm
Each firm k that enters the period matched to a worker can decide to produce or separate
from the worker. Production entails an idiosyncratic resource cost k ∼ F(µ, σ2 ) which
is independently and identically distributed across time and across matches. F(µ, σ2 )
follows the logistic distribution with mean µ and variance σ2 = pi
ψ2
3 .
The match separates if the resource cost shock exceeds a threshold ¯ξt . The value of the
firm before the realization of the resource cost shock is given by
Jt = −
∫ ∞
¯ξt
[τξ,t + weut ] dF(k) (3.16)
+
∫ ¯ξt
−∞
[exp{at} − k − wt − τJ,t + EtQt,t+1Jt+1] dF(k)
If the resource cost shock is larger than the threshold ¯ξt (first line), the match is
separated in which case the firm has to pay a layoff tax τξ,t and a severance payment
weut to the worker. If the resource cost is below the separation threshold, the match is
not separated (second line) and the firm produces with production function y = exp{at}
where at denotes the aggregate productivity level in period t. Aggregate productivity
follows an AR-1 process at = ρaat−1 + a,t where ρa ∈ [0, 1) and a ∼ N(0, σ2a). The firm
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pays the resource cost k, the wage wt and a payroll tax τJ,t, and the match continues
into the future. As shares in the firm are held in equal amounts by the workers in the
economy, the future profits are discounted with the factor Qt,t+s = β λt+sλt where λt is
defined by the weighted marginal utilities of the firm’s owners:
λt :=
(
et(1− ζt)
U ′(cet )
+ etζt
U ′(ceut )
+ u1,t
U ′(cu1,t)
+ u2,t
U ′(cu2,t)
)
(3.17)
Similarly as for the search decision, the properties of the logistic distribution allow
to express the probability of separation ζt ex-ante, i.e. before the realization of the
idiosyncratic production cost shock, analytically as a function of the threshold shock
realization ¯ξt :
ζt = Pr(k ≥ ¯ξt ) =
1
1 + exp{(¯ξt − µ)/ψ}
(3.18)
As firms are homogeneous ex-ante, this probability ζt is equal to the aggregate separa-
tion rate in the economy.
Firms that are not matched with a worker at the beginning of the period can post a va-
cancy at resource cost κv > 0. In equilibrium, firms post vacancies until the prospective
gains from hiring are offset by the costs of posting a vacancy:
κv = qtEt [Qt,t+1Jt+1] (3.19)
Here, qt = mt/vt denotes the vacancy filling rate which is determined by the number of
vacancies posted and the matching function in equation 3.6.
Timing and Bargaining
The timing is such that matched workers and firms observe the aggregate shock at at
the beginning of the period. Conditional on that information they jointly bargain over
state-contingent wages wt, the severance payment weut and the separation threshold ¯
ξ
t .
They then observe the idiosyncratic resource cost k and either separate or produce de-
pending on whether the k is above or below the bargained separation threshold. After
the production stage, unemployed and newly separated workers observe the realization
of their idiosyncratic search cost shock ιi and decide whether or not to search for a
job. At the same time unmatched firms decide whether or not to post a vacancy and
matching takes place according to the matching function. At the end of the period a
fraction δ of short-term unemployed workers becomes long-term unemployed.
These timing assumptions have two noteworthy implications. First, the outside op-
tion of matched workers is always to become short-term unemployed if the match breaks
up. Even long-term unemployed who find a match in the search stage and then immedi-
ately separate at the beginning of the next period, move into short-term unemployment
without having actually worked. This assumption implies that the wage negotiated in
new matches does not depend on the unemployment history, in particular on whether
the worker was short- or long-term unemployed before meeting the firm. Second, the
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severance payment weu does not affect the search decision of unemployed workers for
the next period as it is paid only in the period of separation. Newly separated workers
therefore search with the same intensity as persons who already entered the period as
short-term unemployed.
Worker and firm use generalized Nash bargaining and maximize
{wt, weut , ¯ξt} = argmax
(
∆e1,t
)(1−ηt) (Jt)ηt (3.20)
Here, ηt is the bargaining power of the firm. The outcome of the bilateral bargaining
is privately efficient and the match will therefore only separate if the joint surplus
of the match is negative. As in Jung and Kuester (2015), the firm fully insures the
worker against the idiosyncratic risk of the resource cost shock. Therefore the wage
is independent of the shock realization k and the severance payment equals the wage
(wt = weut ), implying that ceut = cet . The first-order conditions then pin down the
bargained wage and separation threshold through the two equations
(1− ηt)Jt = ηt
∆ei,t
U ′(cet )
(3.21)
¯ξt = [exp{at} − τJ,t + τξ,t + EtQt,t+1Jt+1] (3.22)
+
βEt∆e1,t+1 + ψs,1log(1− s1,t)− h¯
U ′(cet )
The separation threshold ¯ξt has an intuitive interpretation: The term in parentheses
denotes the actual output produced net of taxes plus the expected value of the match
at the beginning of next period. If productivity at is high, this term increases which
raises the separation threshold and reduces the likelihood with which the match sep-
arates. Separations therefore arise endogenously and are counter-cyclical. Similarly,
layoff taxes τξ,t raise the separation threshold and therefore reduce the likelihood of
the match separating. The term on the second line captures the employee’s surplus of
staying employed compared to becoming unemployed. A larger worker surplus implies
that the employee is reluctant to separate which results in a higher separation threshold.
Profits, Government and Market Clearing
Profits are given in the aggregate by
Πt = et
(∫ ¯ξt
−∞
[exp{at} − − τJ,t] dF()−
∫ ∞
¯ξt
[τξ,t] dF())− wt
)
− κvvt (3.23)
These profits are distributed as dividends to a mutual fund which is owned by all
workers in equal amounts.
The government levies payroll and layoff taxes and pays unemployment benefits. The
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government budget constraint is therefore given by
et(1− ζt)τJ,t + etζtτξ,t =
∑
j∈{1,2}
uj,tbj,t (3.24)
The aggregate output is yt = et(1 − ζt)exp{at}, i.e. the number of non-separated
matches that produce with aggregate productivity at. The goods market clears if the
aggregate output equals aggregate demand which is given by
yDt = etcet +
∑
j∈{1,2}
uj,tc
u
j,t + et
∫ ¯ξt
−∞
dF() + κvvt (3.25)
Equation 3.25 shows that a fraction of total production is spent on vacancy posting
costs and the resource cost of production . Note that in contrast to the resource cost,
the search cost accruing to unemployed searchers is a pure utility cost and therefore
does not enter aggregate demand.
3.3 Calibration
The model is calibrated separately for 11 European countries. The number of coun-
tries is smaller than outlined in the data section due to data limitations, in particular
regarding information on vacancies and labor market policies. Some countries are ex-
cluded because the time series on worker flow rates are not sufficiently long to obtain
reasonable cyclical variations.13 The countries in the sample cover 62% of employment
in the EU. The model is calibrated for each country separately.
The calibrated parameters can be grouped into three categories: First, there are param-
eters that are identical across countries. Second, there are country-specific parameters
describing preferences and utility or resource costs of workers and firms as well as the
matching technology. These parameters are pinned down by data on the level and cycli-
cality of labor market flows and additional labor market outcomes, such as the vacancy
filling rate. The third group comprises country-specific parameters describing the labor
market policies in each country, i.e. net replacement rates, which are reported in the
OECD statistics, and layoff taxes. Table 3.4 summarizes all three groups of parameters
for the 11 countries in the baseline sample.
Note that this paper assumes the country-specific structural parameters to be time-
and policy-invariant. In reality, it could be the case that differences in preferences and
technological constraints arise endogenously from differences in labor market policies
and institutions. As the direction of this causality is notoriously difficult to identify,
this paper focuses on the case without a feedback from institutions to preferences.
Common parameters
The calibration of parameters that are identical across countries closely follows Jung
and Kuester (2015). The risk-averse workers have a log-utility function. One period in
13Missing data on labor market policies: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania,
Slovenia. Missing data on vacancies: Denmark. Time series too short: Estonia, Luxembourg, Romania.
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Table 3.4: Parameters Baseline (b1 6= b2)
Parameter AUS FIN FRA GER GRE ITA NED NOR POR ESP SWE
β Time-discount factor 0.996 - - - - - - - - - -
ρa AR(1) aggr. productivity 0.980 - - - - - - - - - -
σa SD aggr. productivity (x100) 0.182 - - - - - - - - - -
η Bargaining power firm 0.300 - - - - - - - - - -
γ matching elasticity 0.300 - - - - - - - - - -
µ1,ι Mean search cost (j = 1) 0.000 - - - - - - - - - -
δ Prob(j = 2|j = 1) 0.083 - - - - - - - - - -
h¯ Home prod. unemployed -1.284 -1.052 -0.488 -1.009 -1.627 -0.348 -1.355 -2.854 -1.098 -0.576 -0.758
µ2,ι Mean search cost (j = 2) 1.508 1.488 0.475 0.938 -0.825 0.499 1.176 2.403 1.139 0.940 1.423
ψs Dispersion search cost (j = 1, 2) 1.008 0.444 0.257 0.441 0.989 0.450 1.193 2.683 0.169 0.137 0.274
κv Vacancy posting cost 2.529 1.766 2.394 1.304 10.580 2.760 1.175 1.089 4.334 2.380 1.861
χ Matching efficiency 0.206 0.246 0.187 0.125 0.134 0.113 0.138 0.209 0.161 0.231 0.252
µ Mean resource cost 0.161 0.213 0.148 0.180 0.309 0.175 0.132 0.182 0.219 0.211 0.230
ψ Dispersion resource cost 4.218 3.039 2.862 5.475 8.283 5.098 3.995 4.892 6.185 3.071 3.654
γw Cyclicality bargaining power 13.712 1.749 11.836 26.583 24.239 24.183 48.530 19.243 19.305 46.000 10.399
τζ Layoff tax (in months) 7.683 3.964 3.905 12.000 1.824 9.776 6.644 10.867 14.283 4.959 7.021
b1 Short-term UI benefits 0.666 0.784 0.729 0.726 0.479 0.546 0.789 0.731 0.839 0.703 0.564
b2 Long-term UI benefits 0.598 0.536 0.491 0.447 0.277 0.224 0.461 0.452 0.451 0.390 0.466
τJ Payroll tax -0.004 0.015 0.022 -0.024 0.019 -0.014 0.011 -0.036 -0.031 -0.002 -0.038
the model is a month. The time discount factor β is 0.996, implying an annual interest
rate of 4%. The serial correlation of aggregate productivity shocks is set to ρa = 0.98
and the standard deviation σa is 0.182%. This follows closely Ignaszak et al. (2018)
and replicates the volatility and persistence of measured labor productivity in the Euro
area. The elasticity of the matching function with respect to vacancies is set to γ = 0.3,
within the range deemed reasonable by Pissarides and Petrongolo (2001). The firm’s
bargaining power is set to η = γ = 0.3 such that absent risk aversion the Hosios-
condition would be fulfilled (see Hosios (1990)). The mean of the search cost shock
is normalized to µ1,ι = 0 for short-term unemployed workers.14 This normalization
allows to use the mean search cost of long-term unemployed µ2,ι later on to pin down
the relative unemployment outflow rates of short- versus long-term unempoyed for each
country. Lastly, the probability to move from short- to long-term unemployment is set
to δ = 1/12 so that the average duration in short-term unemployment is one year.
Country-specific preferences and costs
The data on labor market flows is based on the time series described in the empirical
section of this paper. For each country, EU- and UE-transition rates are computed on
a quarterly frequency and transformed into monthly levels. The time span for most
countries is as reported in table 3.11 in appendix C. For Southern European countries
(Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy), the years after 2008 are disregarded for the calibra-
tion.15
14This does not imply that all of these workers are searching because there is a mean-shifting effect
of the variance ψs as well (see equation 3.13).
15The reason is that these countries experienced extraordinarily large increases in unemployment
rates driven by persistently high separation and low job finding rates during the Great Recession
and the subsequent Eurozone crisis. Arguably, these large and persistent developments were to some
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Business cycle volatilities of worker flow rates are obtained by first taking the logarithm
of seasonally adjusted time series and then computing the deviations from an HP-filtered
trend with a smoothing parameter of 100,000 as in Jung and Kuester (2015). Business
cycle volatilities are expressed relative to the volatility of real GDP per-capita which is
computed analogously in the model.16
The preference for leisure of unemployed workers h¯ is set to match the average UE-
transition rate in the data. Note, that the UE-transition rate in the data corresponds
to the contact rate f¯ in the model which is conditional on searching. The vacancy
posting cost κv is used to target the average EU-transition rate. Together with the
UE-transition rate that pins down the steady-state unemployment rate in the model
(see equation 3.31).
The mean idiosyncratic search cost shock of long-term unemployed µ2,ι is set such
that the relative search effort s1/s2 equals the relative unemployment outflow rate of
short-term versus long-term unemployed in the data (see last column of table 3.3).17
The dispersion parameter of the search cost shock ψs is assumed to be equal for both
types. Due to the properties of the logistic distribution, ψs directly affects the share
of searchers among all non-employed (see equation 3.13). Therefore, it is calibrated to
match the gap between the BLS’s “U3”-measure of unemployment, which requires ac-
tive search, and “U5”-unemployment which includes unemployed who are not actively
searching but ready to take up work. This gap is computed using data provided by the
OECD on the incidence of marginally attached workers (for details on the computation
see appendix E).
The matching efficiency χ is chosen to match the average monthly vacancy-filling rate
in the data. Vacancy data is taken from Eurostat which reports quarterly vacancy
statistics from 2001 onwards.18 Using the unemployment and UE-transition rates, one
can directly compute the vacancy filling rate q as defined in the model.
It is well known, that search and matching models as presented here have difficulties
in replicating the high volatility of worker flow rates observed in the data (see Shimer
(2005a)). I adopt the same mechanism as Jung and Kuester (2015) to solve this problem
and introduce a procyclical bargaining power of firms. That implies that workers have
a relatively large bargaining power in recessions such that wages are “too high” relative
to productivity. That dampens the wage response to productivity shocks and thereby
increases the elasticity of unemployment with respect to productivity. To be precise,
the bargaining power takes the following form:
ηt = ηexp{γwat−1}, γw ≥ 0 (3.26)
extent driven by events outside of the scope of this model (e.g. sovereign debt crisis, banking crisis,
international capital flight). In order to obtain labor market parameters that are not entirely driven
by these extraordinary events, the years post-2008 are excluded from the data for these four countries.
16Alternatively one could also use productivity.
17Given that both types of unemployed face the same contact rate f¯ the relative search effort in the
model and the relative outflow rates in the data are equivalent.
18For all countries except for Spain and France, the data is restricted to firms with more than 10
employees.
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The rigidity parameter γw is chosen to match the volatility of the unemployment rate
relative to the volatility of real GDP per capita in the data.19
The remaining country-specific parameters are µ and ψ. The mean resource cost shock
µ is chosen such that on average realized resource costs are zero. Lastly, I use ψ to
target the volatility of the EU-transition rate in the data (again relative to real GDP
per capita), as this parameter affects the separation margin directly.
Country-specific policies: Net replacement rates
The government has four different policy tools at its disposal, one of which (the labor-
tax τJ) is chosen to balance the budget in every period. That leaves three government
policies to be calibrated - the layoff tax τζ as well as short-term and long-term unem-
ployment benefits. Note that the model abstracts from vacancy subsidies which are an
additional policy tool in Jung and Kuester (2015).
The level of unemployment benefits bj is chosen such that the replacement rates in the
model bj = cuj /ce equal the corresponding net replacement rates in the data. Duration-
specific replacement rates are computed from detailed OECD data on UI benefits for
six different household types at different unemployment durations. This data is sup-
plemented by Eurostat census data on the composition of households in each country.
Appendix F describes in detail how these type- and duration-specific replacement rates
are aggregated. It is noteworthy that there is a sizable drop in benefits once a per-
son moves from short-term to long-term unemployment: Across countries, replacement
rates fall by 25 percentage points on average.
Country-specific policies: Layoff taxes
The layoff tax τζ as a proxy for firing costs is inherently difficult to quantify for both
conceptual as well as empirical reasons. First, the term firing costs typically refers to
the explicit and implicit costs accruing to an employer if he dismisses one ore more
employees. These costs arise from various different sources, such as severance and
compensation payments, mandatory notice periods, uncertainty due to judicial delay
or explicit costs e.g. for lawyers or for resources tied up in the firm. However, these
components which are often associated with firing costs empirically, differ substantially
regarding their economic meaning if one tries to map them into theory: Some of these
components could be interpreted as taxes accruing directly or indirectly to the govern-
ment (e.g. court expenses), other factors could be interpreted as costs the firm has to
pay for intermediate inputs (hiring lawyers, tying up inhouse resources) and yet other
components are direct transfers from the firm to the laid-off employee (severance and
compensation payments).
Collapsing these different components of firing costs into one parameter of a labor
market model is therefore challenging from a theoretical standpoint. In the model pre-
sented here, the distinction between taxes or costs for intermediates and a pure transfer
to the employee is crucial: Transfers to the worker enter the Nash bargaining and there-
fore only affect the sharing of the match surplus and hence, the bargained wage but
not the separation probability. Taxes and costs for intermediates, on the other hand,
19One could alternatively use the volatility of the job finding rate f¯t relative to output.
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affect the size of the surplus and therefore the separation probability.
In addition to the conceptual challenges, some of these components are difficult to mea-
sure in the first place, in particular the legal expenses, the costs of judicial uncertainty
or compensation payments which often depend on worker-specific factors. Furthermore,
existing measures of employment protection, such as the EPL-indicator of the OECD
or the EPLEX-indicator of the ILO, are ususally ordinal indicators and therefore do not
allow to derive indicators with interpretable quantitative differences across countries.
This paper deals with these conceptual and empirical problems in the following
ways: First, I derive explicit quantitative measures for all components that are con-
sidered a part of employment protection related costs by the OECD from the detailed
country reports (OECD (2013)). These components include tenure-dependent sever-
ance pay, compensation in case of unfair dismissals and the length of mandatory notice
periods. I then follow the methodology in Boeri et al. (2017) to obtain the average
likelihood with which a court rules a dismissal to be “unfair”. Given these payoffs and
likelihoods I compute the expected costs of a dismissal for a firm in terms of monthly
wages. To check the validity of the measure, I compute the same expected value using
the sub-components outlined in Boeri et al. (2017) and find that the correlation is 0.87
across countries (R2 = 0.75). A detailed description of this derivation can be found in
appendix G.
Conceptually, this composite measure of firing costs still lumps together costs for in-
termediate inputs, layoff taxes accruing to the government and transfers to the worker.
However, all of these components are taxed to at least some extent (e.g. severance
payments are subject to payroll taxes) and therefore fully or partially flow to the gov-
ernment, thus increasing the match surplus and reducing the separation rate. In the
model, the firing costs derived from the data are therefore introduced in the form of
a direct tax τζ rather than a transfer to the worker. That causes of course a level
discrepancy because not all of the costs in the data are actually taxes as in the model.
To overcome that level difference, I normalize the layoff tax to 12 monthly wages for
Germany which is roughly 55% of the layoff tax computed in the data and express the
layoff taxes in all other countries relative to that.20 The resulting average across all
European countries of 10.5 monthly wages is close to the value used in Ignaszak et al.
(2018).
3.4 Optimal policies: duration dependent benefits
As outlined in the beginning of this section, the calibration allows to back out the
country-specific structural parameters that can rationalize the observed level and cycli-
cality of worker flow rates, given the labor market policies that are currently in place.
These structural parameters are summarized in the second block of the calibration table
3.4 and comprise the utility costs of search and leisure of unemployed workers as well as
the rigidity of wages, vacancy posting costs of firms and the efficiency of the matching
process. Assuming that these “deep” country-specific parameters are invariant and do
not respond to policy changes, it is possible to investigate what an optimal UI policy
20This works under the assumption that the relative share of taxes or tax-equivalent costs versus
transfers to the worker is the same across countries.
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should look like from a welfare perspective.21
In a first step, I do that separately for each country by computing the country-specific
replacement rates bON1 and bON2 which maximize the average utility in the economy:
max
bON1 ,b
ON
2
eU(ce) +
∑
j∈{1,2}
ujU(cuj ) + (eζ + u1)(Ψs,1 + h¯) + u2(Ψs,2 + h¯) (3.27)
Here, the terms Ψs,j reflect the option value of search22 of unemployment type j and the
superscript ON stands for optimal national. This formulation focuses on the steady-
state consumption levels and the steady-state unemployment rate, thus abstracting
from aggregate shocks. Nonetheless, the average steady-state utility captures the basic
trade-off between smoothing individual labor market risk and reducing moral hazard,
i.e. incentivizing unemployed persons to search for jobs.
In the second step, I then search for the common UI policy {bOU1 , bOU2 } which is
applied in all countries and optimal from a union perspective. That is more involved
because one has to decide which weights to assign to each of the countries and be-
cause the absolute utility levels are not directly comparable across the country-specific
calibrations. The former is resolved by taking the labor force share of each country i
as weights ωi.23 In order to deal with the second issue, I compute the compensating
differential λi for each country which equates the utility under the status-quo regime
{bSQi,1 , bSQi,2 } and the alternative policy {b˜1, b˜2}:
U(cei , cui,1, cui,1; b
SQ
i,1 , b
SQ
i,2 ) = U(c˜ei (1 + λi), c˜ui,1(1 + λi), c˜ui,2(1 + λi); b˜1, b˜2) (3.28)
The optimal common UI policy for the union of countries is then obtained by minimiz-
ing the weighted sum of the country-specific compensating differentials λi which solve
equation 3.28:
{bOU1 , bOU2 } = argmin
b˜1,b˜2
∑
i
ωiλi (3.29)
Here, OU indicates the optimal union policy. Minimizing the weighted sum of com-
pensating differentials is akin to a welfare maximization of steady-state allocations and
resolves the problem that utilities are not directly comparable across countries in the
model. Note that in this setup the labor tax τJ always adjusts to balance the govern-
ment budget. Hence, there are no transfers across countries.
Optimal replacement rates
Table 3.5 summarizes the resulting optimal UI policies in both scenarios (national and
union-wide UI policies). The first three columns show the status quo replacement rates
21Given the complex nature of layoff taxes which are to a large extent beyond the realm of fiscal
policies (e.g. the efficiency of the judicial system), this paper focuses on unemployment insurance only.
22Thanks to the properties of the logistic distribution, this option value is defined in a closed form:
Ψs,j = exp(ψs)((1− sj)log(1− sj) + sj log(sj))
23Alternatively, one could take the population share which does not change the results.
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as in the calibration together with the fraction b1/b2. Columns 4 to 6 display the opti-
mal country-specific policies and the last three columns the optimal union-wide scheme.
There is one aspect that clearly stands out: While all existing UI policies are declining
with unemployment duration, the optimal UI profile is steeply increasing, both in the
national as well as the union-wide scenario. In particular, the optimal replacement rate
for long-term benefits is very high (on average 90%), exceeding the optimal short-term
benefits by 30 to 40 percentage points.
This striking pattern is rooted in the difference between short- and long-term unem-
ployed regarding their job-finding rates: In the policy regimes which are currently in
place long-term unemployed receive lower benefits than short-term unemployed. In
the model that would translate into a larger surplus of finding a job for long-term
than for short-term unemployed - absent any differences between the two types. Thus,
long-term unemployed would have an incentive to search harder for jobs than their
short-term unemployed peers, resulting in higher job-finding rates. However, this is in
stark contrast to the data which shows that job-finding rates are typically lower among
long-term unemployed (see table 3.3). The calibration reconciles the declining patterns
of both benefits and outflow rates over the unemployment spell by making search in-
herently more costly for long-term unemployed in terms of utility. This is the reason
why for most countries in table 3.4, the mean search cost of long-term unemployed µ2,ι
is positive and therefore larger than the cost for short-term unemployed µ1,ι which is
normalized to zero.
Turning to optimal replacement rates, that cost structure results in an optimal
UI scheme which is increasing in unemployment duration: As it is very arduous for
long-term unemployed to search for jobs, their search effort responds less to monetary
incentives than in the case of short-term unemployed. Hence, the moral hazard concerns
of high replacement rates are less pronounced for long-term unemployed such that the
consumption smoothing motive becomes more prevalent. The social planner therefore
provides long-term unemployed with higher benefits than short-term unemployed.
Although the extent to which that pattern occurs varies across countries, this upward
slope is present in all countries - both in the case of national policies as well as for
the European scheme. It is noteworthy that this changing tilt not necessarily reflects
a higher average level of unemployment benefits. Section 3.5 shows that with homoge-
neous UI benefits, the optimal level is higher than the current level for some countries
but lower for others. The results are therefore not driven by a generic level shift in
benefits as section 3.5 shows in more detail.
Unemployment and welfare
The central question of this policy experiment is how unemployment rates and welfare
change if the European countries move from the current status quo to optimal na-
tional and optimal union-wide UI policies. In order to assess the welfare implications, I
compute the compensating differentials λi for each of the three following scenarios: (i)
moving from the status quo to optimal national policies (SQ→ ON), (ii) moving from
the optimal national to the optimal union-wide policy (ON → OU) and (iii) from the
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Table 3.5: Optimal net replacement rates (b1 6= b2)
Status Quo Optimal National Optimal Union
country weight b1 b2 b1b2 b1 b2
b1
b2
b1 b2
b1
b2
Austria 3 67 60 1.11 51 93 0.55 49 92 0.53
Finland 2 78 54 1.46 47 82 0.57 49 92 0.53
France 19 73 49 1.48 50 96 0.52 49 92 0.53
Germany 27 73 45 1.62 62 94 0.66 49 92 0.53
Greece 3 48 28 1.73 36 94 0.38 49 92 0.53
Italy 17 55 22 2.44 45 97 0.47 49 92 0.53
Netherlands 6 79 46 1.71 49 96 0.52 49 92 0.53
Norway 2 73 45 1.62 77 95 0.81 49 92 0.53
Portugal 4 84 45 1.86 65 92 0.71 49 92 0.53
Spain 15 70 39 1.80 52 84 0.62 49 92 0.53
Sweden 3 56 47 1.21 46 71 0.65 49 92 0.53
Notes: Net replacement rates for short- and long-term unemployed in the baseline calibration (with
duration dependence) representing the status quo, in the case if country-specific optimal UI policies
are implemented (optimal national) and if one common UI policy is chosen optimally for the entire
union (optimal union). b1 and b2 are in percent, b1b2 are fractions.
status-quo to the optimal union-wide policy (SQ→ OU). Table 3.6 reports the result-
ing welfare effects together with changes in unemployment rates. The welfare gains of
optimally chosen national UI policies are sizable amounting to 2.96% of consumption,
i.e. workers would be willing to forfeit almost 3% of their average consumption to move
from the current status quo to country-specific optimal UI schemes with low short-term
and high long-term benefits. That welfare gain is accompanied by a large decline in the
unemployment rate which is driven by a lower separation rate and a higher job finding
rate of short-term unemployed who face substantially lower benefits than in the status
quo (see table 3.5).
Moving from the optimal national to the optimal union-wide benefit scheme by con-
struction leads to welfare losses in all countries.24 However, the distortions of imposing
a one-size-fits-all solution are relatively small (-0.22%) compared to the welfare gains
of moving away from the status quo of high short-term and low long-term benefits.
Accordingly the total effect of moving from the status quo to an optimal union-wide
UI scheme (last column) is still sizable and only slightly lower than having optimal
country-specific policies.
Replacing the existing UI schemes with an optimally chosen union-wide UI policy
therefore moves almost all countries closer to their nationally optimal UI policy. The
large gains of replacing the current suboptimal scheme in which benefits decline over
the unemployment spell with an optimal European UI scheme clearly outweigh the rel-
24In France and the Netherlands the optimal union-wide UI policies are very close to the optimal
national policies, such that the welfare losses are roughly zero.
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atively small distortions of having a one-size-fits-all policy instead of country-specific
UI schemes. It is therefore still better in terms of welfare to have an optimally chosen
common UI policy than staying with the country-specific suboptimal policies currently
in place.
Table 3.6: Unemployment and welfare (b1 6= b2)
uss ∆uss Welfare gain
country SQ ON OU SQ→ON ON→OU SQ→OU SQ→ON ON→OU SQ→OU
Austria 4.6 2.9 2.7 −37.2 −6.2 −41.1 0.99 −0.01 0.98
Finland 7.5 3.4 3.7 −54.0 6.8 −50.9 4.52 −0.02 4.49
France 8.5 2.9 2.7 −66.3 −6.3 −68.5 3.10 0.00 3.09
Germany 5.4 4.3 3.0 −19.9 −31.4 −45.1 0.94 −0.39 0.55
Greece 9.2 6.9 10.9 −25.3 58.0 18.1 3.30 −0.82 2.46
Italy 8.7 5.4 7.0 −37.6 28.6 −19.8 5.90 −0.16 5.73
Netherlands 4.9 1.5 1.5 −69.9 −1.2 −70.3 3.35 0.00 3.35
Norway 3.1 3.4 2.0 9.3 −41.3 −35.8 0.46 −0.82 −0.36
Portugal 6.6 4.6 3.1 −29.8 −32.7 −52.8 2.32 −0.71 1.61
Spain 9.2 5.2 4.7 −43.2 −9.6 −48.7 4.05 −0.05 4.00
Sweden 6.4 5.0 5.6 −21.4 10.4 −13.2 0.91 −0.23 0.68
Aggregate 7.2 4.2 4.1 −41.4 −3.6 −43.5 2.96 −0.22 2.74
Notes: Changes in unemployment rates (∆uss) and welfare gains λi upon switching between the three
scenarios outlined in the text: Status quo (SQ), optimal national (ON), optimal union-wide policy
(OU). All numbers in percent. Aggregate numbers in last row are computed using the labor-force
weights reported in table 3.5. The calibration features duration dependence in search costs and UI
benefit levels.
Plausibility of optimally increasing UI profile
The optimally increasing UI profile obtained in the previous section seems to be in
stark contrast with other studies which find that UI benefits should optimally fall with
unemployment duration (e.g. Shavell and Weiss (1979b) and Hopenhayn and Nicolini
(1997b)). According to these papers, raising long-term benefits at longer durations has
a larger impact on unemployment durations than raising short-term benefits because it
not only affects the search incentives of long-term unemployed but also the incentives
of forward-looking short-term unemployed: As they anticipate high long-term benefits,
they have less incentives to exit unemployment quickly. Optimal UI schemes should
therefore decline with duration to offset the larger moral hazard costs of long-term ben-
efits.
With duration dependence, however, there is a second mechanism that works in the
different direction and can potentially overturn the result of optimally declining UI
benefits: Kolsrud et al. (2018) show that duration dependence alters the elasticity of
outflow rates with respect to long-term UI benefits, making unemployed less responsive
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to benefit changes later on in the unemployment spell. That holds regardless of the
exact channel through which duration dependence arises - whether it is in the form of
depreciation in returns to search over time or through selection of ex-ante heterogeneous
workers: In the case of the former, as exemplified in the model here, a larger increase
in the search costs for long-term unemployed - i.e. more duration dependence - reduces
the relative importance of financial incentives later on in the spell compared to the high
utility costs of search. That renders the search decision of both short- and long-term
unemployed less responsive to changes in long-term benefits. In the case of duration
dependence arising from the dynamic selection of heterogeneous job searchers, a similar
mechanism applies: Worker types who have low search costs are very responsive to
financial search incentives, but as they expect to exit unemployment quickly anyway,
the generosity of long-term benefits does not concern them too much. At the same
time, worker types with inherently high search costs are quite irresponsive to financial
incentives as their utility costs of search plays a dominant role for their search decision
throughout their entire unemployment spell.
This duration-dependence channel, highlighted among others by Kolsrud et al.
(2018), implies that optimal UI benefits might actually be increasing with unemploy-
ment duration if duration dependence is large enough to offset the forward-looking moral
hazard costs emphasized by Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997b). Using a regression-kink
design on Swedish administrative micro data Kolsrud et al. (2018) show that for Swe-
den this is indeed the case: They find that UI benefits should be optimally increasing
with duration. In a partial equilibrium model which features both duration dependence
and dynamic selection, they confirm this result and show that UI benefits should be
increasing from 48% for short-term to 68% for long-term unemployed. This is very
much in line with the estimates obtained in table 3.5 for Sweden (46% and 71%). The
optimally increasing UI profiles presented here are therefore not necessarily in contrast
to what other studies that account for duration dependence have found. Furthermore,
it should be noted that their model result of an increasing UI scheme arises in a setting
with “true” duration dependence and dynamic selection of heterogeneous job searchers.
That indicates that the results obtained here are not entirely driven by attributing
duration dependence entirely to “true” duration dependence while abstracting from
worker heterogeneity. Ideally, the model would of course feature both sources of du-
ration dependence. Given a lack of data to identify the relative importance of both
channels, this is however beyond the scope of this paper.
3.5 Optimal policies: flat unemployment benefits
The previous section emphasized that the duration dependence both regarding job-
finding rates and regarding benefit levels is important for the design of optimal UI poli-
cies. Taking this duration dependence into account, moving from suboptimal national
policies to an optimal common UI scheme is welfare improving despite the distortions
of imposing a one-size-fits-all policy. However, it is not clear how important duration
dependence is for the size and the sign of this welfare effect. Would a model with only
one type of unemployed and one benefit level - as for example in Abraham et al. (2017)
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- still yield a positive welfare gain of moving from the suboptimal status quo to an
optimal European UI scheme?
This section investigates that question by re-calibrating the model and re-doing the
optimal policy experiments of the previous section without any duration dependence
in either benefits or job-finding rates. The calibration therefore changes only in two
respects: First, there is only one type of unemployed with mean search costs µι = 0 and
second, there is only one net replacement rate for each country which is set to match
the average replacement rate over the first 5 years of unemployment as reported by the
OECD. The parameters in the re-calibrated model are displayed in table 3.7.
Table 3.7: Calibration flat benefits (b1 = b2)
Parameter AUS FIN FRA GER GRE ITA NED NOR POR ESP SWE
β Time-discount factor 0.996 - - - - - - - - - -
ρa AR(1) aggr. productivity 0.980 - - - - - - - - - -
σa SD aggr. productivity (x100) 0.182 - - - - - - - - - -
η Bargaining power firm 0.300 - - - - - - - - - -
γ matching elasticity 0.300 - - - - - - - - - -
µι Mean search cost 0.000 - - - - - - - - - -
h¯ Home prod. unemployed -2.298 -1.783 -0.536 -0.495 -1.060 -0.367 -2.212 -4.230 -0.899 -0.386 -1.039
ψs Dispersion search cost 2.684 1.942 0.550 0.676 0.783 1.087 3.085 5.229 0.830 0.684 1.124
κv Vacancy posting cost 2.695 2.164 3.219 1.052 10.230 3.905 1.218 1.146 4.661 2.626 2.050
χ Matching efficiency 0.206 0.246 0.187 0.125 0.134 0.113 0.138 0.209 0.161 0.231 0.252
µ Mean resource cost 0.168 0.241 0.180 0.158 0.296 0.218 0.133 0.185 0.225 0.218 0.242
ψ Dispersion resource cost 4.379 3.444 3.481 4.806 7.951 6.333 4.027 4.976 6.374 3.185 3.837
γw Cyclicality bargaining power 11.052 1.208 10.632 24.298 25.002 18.714 32.043 17.373 12.894 94.743 7.660
τζ Layoff tax (in months) 7.683 3.964 3.905 12.000 1.824 9.776 6.644 10.867 14.283 4.959 7.021
b¯ UI benefits 0.612 0.587 0.540 0.501 0.316 0.294 0.527 0.509 0.529 0.454 0.486
τJ Payroll tax -0.005 0.009 0.016 -0.028 0.016 -0.018 0.007 -0.040 -0.036 -0.010 -0.040
As in the previous section, I first compute the optimal UI policy for each coun-
try separately and in a second step the optimal common UI policy by minimzing the
weighted sum of compensating differentials λi. Table 3.8 displays these optimal policies
together with the average replacement rate currently in place. If each country chose
its unemployment benefit level optimally, 8 out of the 11 countries would opt to in-
crease their UI benefits. Accordingly, an optimal union-wide replacement rate would
be slightly higher than the weighted average of the status quo (52% instead of 47%).
In contrast to the previous experiment in section 3.4, the average unemployment rate
therefore increases rather than decreases if the status-quo is replaced with either na-
tional or union-wide optimal policies (see columns 4-6 in table 3.9).
More importantly, however, table 3.8 illustrates that implementing a common UI
policy has heterogeneous implications in terms of optimality across countries: Some
countries - such as France, Germany or the Netherlands - move closer to their nation-
ally optimal replacement rate if a common UI scheme is implemented whereas other
countries actually move away from their optimal benefit level (e.g. Austria, Italy, Por-
tugal). As a consequence, replacing the sub-optimal national policies with an optimal
common UI scheme (last column: SQ → OU in table 3.9) creates winners and losers
in terms of welfare and has heterogeneous effects in terms of unemployment.
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On average, the welfare effects are substantially different from the previous section with
duration dependence: The distortions of having a one-size-fits-all policy for heteroge-
neous countries leads to relatively large distortions (-1.48% of consumption on aver-
age) while the gains from optimization (SQ → ON) are comparatively small (0.72%).
Therefore, an optimally chosen common scheme on average reduces welfare by 0.97%
of consumption.
Table 3.8: Optimal net replacement rates (b1 = b2)
country weight Status Quo Optimal National Optimal Union
Austria 3 61 62 52
Finland 2 59 55 52
France 19 54 47 52
Germany 27 50 61 52
Greece 3 32 36 52
Italy 17 29 36 52
Netherlands 6 53 48 52
Norway 2 51 83 52
Portugal 4 53 66 52
Spain 15 45 49 52
Sweden 3 49 65 52
Notes: Net replacement rates in the calibration without duration dependence in either search costs
or UI benefits. The columns refer to the status quo, country-specific optimal UI policies (optimal
national) and a common UI policy chosen optimally for the entire union (optimal union). All values
are in percent.
Comparing the welfare effects in a model without duration dependence with the
baseline results in section 3.4, there are two lessons to be learned: First, the positive
welfare effects in the model with duration dependence are to a large extent driven by
the changing benefit profile rather than changes in the average benefit level. Replacing
the current policies where benefits decline over the unemployment spell by an increasing
profile leads to relatively large welfare gains. In contrast, the welfare gains of optimally
choosing the flat benefit level in the setting without duration dependence are compar-
atively small.
Second, the distortions of implementing a single policy across heterogeneous countries
are larger if duration dependence is neglected (-1.48% instead of -0.22%). In total, the
larger gains from optimization together with the smaller distortions of the one-size-fits-
all policy explain why the overall welfare gain is positive if the model takes duration
dependence into account and negative if the model abstracts from unemployment du-
ration.
When assessing whether or not to implement a common UI policy, duration-specific
policies as well as duration-specific job-finding rates are therefore a crucial dimension
which needs to be accounted for.
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Table 3.9: Unemployment and welfare (b1 = b2)
uss ∆uss Welfare gain
country SQ ON OU SQ→ON ON→OU SQ→OU SQ→ON ON→OU SQ→OU
Austria 4.6 4.9 3.2 5.3 −34.9 −31.5 0.01 −0.31 −0.30
Finland 7.5 6.5 5.8 −13.2 −10.6 −22.4 0.07 −0.04 0.03
France 8.5 5.6 7.5 −34.4 35.0 −11.4 0.35 −0.16 0.19
Germany 5.4 9.4 5.9 75.0 −37.3 9.7 0.90 −0.66 0.23
Greece 9.2 11.3 24.9 21.8 120.8 168.9 0.17 −5.01 −4.60
Italy 8.7 17.9 45.9 105.4 156.9 427.7 1.50 −5.71 −5.54
Netherlands 4.9 3.5 4.6 −29.1 33.5 −5.4 0.13 −0.09 0.04
Norway 3.1 7.2 3.2 132.4 −55.7 3.0 2.48 −2.35 0.13
Portugal 6.6 10.8 6.3 63.9 −41.1 −3.5 1.06 −1.20 −0.13
Spain 9.2 11.2 13.8 22.2 22.9 50.3 0.15 −0.21 −0.06
Sweden 6.4 11.0 7.2 71.6 −35.1 11.4 1.47 −1.01 0.46
Aggregate 7.2 10.0 14.5 37.4 45.5 100.0 0.72 −1.48 −0.97
Notes: Changes in unemployment rates (∆uss) and welfare gains λi upon switching between the three
scenarios outlined in the text: Status quo (SQ), optimal national (ON), optimal union-wide policy
(OU). All numbers in percent. Aggregate numbers in last row are computed using the labor-force
weights reported in table 3.5. The calibration features duration dependence in search costs and UI
benefit levels.
3.6 Benefits of smoothing asymmetric shocks
The approach chosen in this paper focuses entirely on the labor market distortions and
the ensuing welfare costs of a European UI scheme but abstracts from the potential
benefits of such a scheme. As mentioned in the introduction, a common UI scheme
allows countries to pool the risk of asymmetric aggregate shocks and therefore can
serve as a macroeconomic stabilization tool. That is in particular of value if other fiscal
stabilizers are impaired in a severe recession and if private insurance across country
borders is inhibited for structural reasons. To get an indication of how large the welfare
gains of international risk sharing are in the model presented here, I follow the approach
in Lucas (2003) to compute the costs of business cycles in the model. He computes the
compensating differential λ which risk-averse agents in a canonical real business cycle
model need to receive in order to be indifferent between an environment with and
without aggregate risk:
∞∑
t=0
βtU(ct(1 + λ)) =
∞∑
t=0
βtU(c˜t) (3.30)
Here, the left-hand side denotes the average utility in an environment with aggregate
shocks and the right-hand side without aggregate shocks. I follow Lucas’ approach and
compute the compensating differential λ separately for each country by simulating the
baseline economy with aggregate shocks and comparing it to the utility obtained in an
economy without aggregate shocks.
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Table 3.10 reports the compensating differential in percent of consumption for each
country separately and at the federal level (weighted with the labor force share as be-
fore). For the baseline case with duration-dependent benefits, the aggregate welfare
gains of 0.38% are actually larger than the welfare losses of replacing optimal national
with optimal union-wide policies (-0.22% in table 3.6). However, they are small com-
pared to the welfare gains of having optimally chosen policies in the first place (2.74%
- 2.96%).
In the case with flat benefits, the distortions arising from not tailoring optimal UI poli-
cies to country-specific characteristics computed in section 3.5 are larger than in the
calibration with duration dependence (-1.48% instead of -0.22%). Therefore they more
than offset the potential welfare gains from eliminating aggregate fluctuations (0.31%).
Table 3.10: Compensating differentials: Eliminating TFP shocks
country b1 6= b2 b1 = b2
Austria 0.06 0.03
Finland 0.02 0.01
France 0.06 0.04
Germany 0.18 0.07
Greece 0.28 0.23
Italy 0.30 0.11
Netherlands 0.67 0.18
Norway 0.07 0.04
Portugal 0.20 0.04
Spain 1.41 1.62
Sweden 0.05 0.02
Aggregate 0.38 0.31
Two aspects regarding these estimates should be noted: On the one hand, the
method of Lucas (2003) delivers an upper bound of the potential benefits of a com-
mon UI scheme as it assumes that this scheme can eliminate all aggregate fluctuations
in productivity. For that to be true, it would need to be the case that (i) there is
no insurance at all in the benchmark (neither private nor through country-level fiscal
stabilizers) and (ii) that aggregate shocks are not correlated across countries and can
be fully insured through a common UI scheme. Clearly, both assumptions are not ful-
filled in reality. At the same time, there is an extensive literature showing that the
approach chosen by Lucas (2003) potentially underestimates the welfare costs of busi-
ness cycles because amplification mechanisms for example through changes in growth
rates (Barlevy (2004)) or the average level of output (Den Haan and Sedláác˘ek (2014))
are abstracted from. Following that reasoning, the estimates in table 3.10 represent a
lower rather than an upper bound.
Without modeling these feedback effects as well as the scope for cross-country risk shar-
ing in detail, it is not clear ex-ante which of the two biases dominates. The estimates in
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table 3.10 indicate that it would be worthwhile to explore these welfare gains in more
detail in future research. The results also indicate that such an exercise should feature
duration dependence in UI benefits and job finding rates as the gains from smoothing
aggregate shocks differ quite substantially across column 1 and 2, in particular relative
to the welfare costs presented in tables 3.6 and 3.9.
4. Concluding Remarks
Since the inception of the EMU, policy makers and economists alike have been dis-
cussing the merits of fiscal tools that allow member states to share risk across countries
and thereby stabilize output. While the associated gains from risk sharing across coun-
tries are relatively well understood, the negative side effects of these tools - such as a
common unemployment insurance - are still disputed intensely. This paper offers new
insights into this debate by quantifying the distortions and welfare effects of having
a common unemployment insurance policy across heterogeneous labor markets. As a
first step towards that aim, this paper presents a novel measure of quarterly worker flow
rates that allows to take a closer look at the level, cyclicality and duration dependence
of labor market flows in a large set of European economies. I find that job separations
play an important role for business cycle fluctuations and that job-finding rates decrease
with unemployment duration in most European countries. Taking this evidence as a
starting point, I use a structural model with risk-averse workers, endogenous separa-
tions and duration-dependent search costs to compute optimal UI policies, both on the
national level and from the perspective of a European social planner who has to choose
a single policy for all countries. If duration-dependence is accounted for, the gains from
moving from sub-optimally decreasing UI profiles to optimally increasing profiles are
large and outweigh the comparatively small welfare losses of imposing a one-size-fits-all
policy on heterogeneous countries.
There are two main lessons to be learned: First, policy makers should take duration-
dependence seriously when designing optimal policies, be it on the national or on the
European level. The wide-spread negative duration dependence despite the falling
UI schedules suggests that it is inherently more difficult for long-term unemployed
to find jobs. A social planner who has to trade off search incentives with consumption
smoothing gains, should take into account that moral hazard is hardly a concern when
it comes to long-term unemployed.
Second, the welfare losses of having a common UI scheme across heterogeneous labor
markets can be quite large, in particular if duration dependence is not accounted for.
The heterogeneity of country-specific institutions and preferences should therefore be
a key concern of policy makers when discussing the merits and costs of a common
UI scheme. These distortions can possibly be reduced, if a less rigid European UI
scheme was implemented. One example would be a re-insurance fund that complements
national UI policies. Such an option should therefore be considered in future work as
the welfare distortions are likely to be smaller than in this paper.
Although this paper goes into detail along multiple dimensions, e.g. unemployment
duration or employment protection, it does not model the potential benefits of risk-
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sharing in detail and abstracts from other costs of a common UI scheme (e.g. moral
hazard across countries). Incorporating the framework presented here into a richer
environment with risk-sharing across countries therefore provides an interesting field
for future research.
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Appendices
A Data fit of Eurostat survey with new flow rate measure
Figure 3.5 shows the average quarterly EU- and UE-rates of each country for the Euro-
stat survey measure (vertical axis) and the new measure based on a Shimer imputation
(horizontal axis). As elaborated in the main text, the average flow rates are higher
in the new measure because flows through intermittent non-employment spells are not
separately accounted for.
Figure 3.5: Average quarterly worker flow rates: Eurostat vs. new measure
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Notes: Left (right) panel shows average quarterly EU (UE) transition rate for 24 European countries
according to the survey data provided by Eurostat (vertical axis) and according to the new measure
based on a Shimer imputation using data on short-term unemployment (horizontal axis). Blue solid
line is the 45-degree line.
B Data fit of implied steady-state unemployment rate
Another approach to test the validity of the proposed quarterly flow rates, is to compare
the implied steady-state unemployment rate with the actual unemployment rate in
the data. In a two-state model, the steady-state unemployment follows directly from
equation 3.2 by dropping the time indices and rearranging to get:
uss = S
S + F (3.31)
Hence, one can compute the steady-state unemployment rate usst which is implied by
the EU- and UE-transition rates St and Ft in each quarter as:
usst =
St
St + Ft
(3.32)
Figure 3.6 shows the resulting time series of implied steady-state unemployment usst
(blue solid line) together with the actual unemployment rate (black solid line) for 27
European countries. Aside from some spikes in a few Eastern European countries
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(Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, Latvia) and Luxembourg, the implied steady-state un-
employment rates not only match the level in each country but also track the cyclicality
of unemployment rates quite well. This is noteworthy, given that Elsby et al. (2013)
have emphasized that the implied steady-state unemployment rate delivers a poor ap-
proximation of real-time unemployment in countries with generally low levels of worker
flow rates. They argue that in countries with low levels of reallocation, deviations from
steady-state unemployment are quite persistent and therefore unemployment takes rel-
atively long to revert back to its steady state. Although that is generally true for the
annual data Elsby and co-authors compute from OECD data, it appears to be less of
an issue at quarterly frequency as figure 3.6 shows.
Figure 3.6: Steady-state approximation of unemployment rate
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Notes: Quarterly unemployment rates for 27 European countries. Black-dashed line shows actual
unemployment rate (Eurostat). Blue solid line shows steady-state approximation using the new EU-
and UE-transition rates based on a Shimer imputation using data on short-term unemployment.
C Business cycle decomposition of worker flow rates
Table 3.11 summarizes the main information of the new measure of worker flow rates
by country. Columns 2 and 3 denote the average quarterly EU- and UE-transition
rates and columns 4 and 5 show their volatilities relative to the volatility of per capita
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GDP. The last 3 columns summarize the business cycle decomposition of unemployment
fluctuations as illustrated in figure 3.3.
Table 3.11: Flow rate statistics
country start end piEU piUE σEUσy
σUE
σy
βf βs βeps
Austria 2003q1 2017q3 0.019 0.341 6.2 8.2 0.637 0.359 0.004
Belgium 1999q1 2017q3 0.018 0.218 6.5 12.9 0.601 0.401 -0.002
Bulgaria 2000q1 2017q3 0.017 0.156 4.4 11.9 0.836 0.129 0.035
Croatia 2011q2 2017q3 0.023 0.153 2.4 8.1 0.54 0.205 0.255
Cyprus 2004q2 2017q3 0.026 0.278 4.0 7.6 0.753 0.221 0.026
CzechRepublic 1998q1 2017q3 0.014 0.202 5.9 4.1 0.422 0.569 0.008
Denmark 1999q1 2017q3 0.024 0.417 5.9 6.5 0.578 0.42 0.002
Estonia 2008q3 2012q2 0.033 0.220 1.9 4.8 0.981 0.082 -0.063
Finland 1998q1 2017q3 0.038 0.411 2.4 2.5 0.626 0.358 0.016
France 2003q1 2017q3 0.027 0.264 6.1 8.9 0.501 0.5 0
Germany 2005q1 2017q3 0.016 0.252 3.4 5.3 0.567 0.424 0.009
Greece 1998q2 2017q3 0.024 0.142 3.3 4.0 0.625 0.335 0.04
Hungary 1999q1 2017q3 0.015 0.193 5.1 6.3 0.682 0.296 0.022
Iceland 2008q1 2017q3 0.027 0.528 3.3 3.8 0.519 0.47 0.012
Ireland 2006q1 2017q3 0.023 0.209 3.5 3.4 0.631 0.378 -0.009
Italy 1998q1 2017q3 0.016 0.165 4.2 19.1 0.844 0.164 -0.008
Latvia 2007q1 2017q3 0.028 0.213 3.0 4.8 0.934 0.074 -0.007
Lithuania 2008q1 2017q3 0.028 0.226 2.5 3.5 0.428 0.108 0.464
Luxembourg 2003q1 2006q2 0.015 0.297 4.0 5.1 0.776 0.229 -0.005
Netherlands 2002q2 2017q3 0.016 0.276 6.3 6.4 0.779 0.213 0.008
Norway 2000q1 2017q3 0.018 0.472 6.6 4.8 0.485 0.515 0
Poland 2000q1 2017q3 0.023 0.203 6.8 13.7 0.752 0.211 0.037
Portugal 1998q1 2017q3 0.021 0.207 6.0 8.3 0.439 0.554 0.007
Romania 1999q1 2005q1 0.013 0.161 3.9 9.2 0.805 0.114 0.082
Slovakia 1998q1 2017q3 0.017 0.109 6.0 14.0 0.626 0.192 0.182
Slovenia 2001q3 2017q3 0.014 0.188 3.1 10.1 0.713 0.239 0.048
Spain 1998q1 2017q3 0.05 0.286 3.4 6.3 0.595 0.4 0.005
Sweden 2006q2 2017q3 0.034 0.424 2.7 2.8 0.687 0.31 0.003
UK 1999q2 2017q3 0.023 0.381 3.2 4.6 0.468 0.531 0.001
Notes: Level and cyclicality of quarterly EU- and UE-transition rates obtained in the data based on
a Shimer imputation using data on short-term unemployment. Standard deviations σEU , σUE and σy
are based on log-deviations from an HP-filtered trend (λ = 100, 000). σy refers to GDP per capita. The
last three columns show the relative contributions of the job-finding margin (βf ) and the job-separation
margin (βs) to business cycle fluctuations of the steady-state unemployment rate. Last column shows
the residual component β. See section 2.3 for details.
D UE-transition rates by duration
This section shows how to compute the quarterly time series of duration-specific job
finding rates from unemployment in section 2.4. The data provided by Eurostat contains
unemployment stocks for 8 different duration brackets. These can be aggregated to the
following 6 duration brackets:
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• <3 months (1 quarter)
• 3-5 months (2 quarters)
• 6-11 months (3-4 quarters)
• 12-17 months (5-6 quarters)
• 18-23 months (7-8 quarters)
• >23 months (>8 quarters)
Eurostat reports quarterly unemployment stocks for each of these duration brackets. Let
Udt denote the number of unemployed in duration bracket d in quarter t. The retention
rate Rdt is defined as the fraction of unemployed Udt who did not exit unemployment
from period t to t + 1. The retention rate is directly linked to the duration-specific
job finding rate Rdt = 1 − F dt . Under the assumption that there are no flows from
unemployment to inactivity or vice versa, that results in the following set of equations
for each period:
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In that system of equations every new period t introduces 6 additional unknown reten-
tion rates which are matched by 6 additional known unemployment stocks:
unknown: {R<3t , R[3,5]t , R[6,11]t , R[12,17]t , R[18,23]t , R>23t }
known: {U<3t , U [3,5]t+1 , U [6,11]t+1 , U [12,17]t+1 , U [18,23]t+1 , U>23t+1 }
Once all previous retention rates are known, it is straight forward to solve this linear
system of equations. The only issue that needs to be resolved are the initial periods.
Evidently, it is not possible to solve for all retention rates in all quarters: The retention
rate R>23t for example can only be computed from quarter t = 8 onwards because the
last equation uses data on U [3,5]t−7 . Similarly, R
[18,23]
t can only be computed from t = 6
onwards as it uses U [3,5]t−5 and so on. In addition, none of the 6 retention rates can be
computed in the last period by construction due to the lagged structure of the equation
system. In total, there are 22 retention rates that cannot be computed either at the
beginning or the end of the sample. These are matched by 22 unemployment stocks
in the first 7 quarters which do not enter the system of equations. The total number
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of known and unknown variables is therefore given by the number of quarters times 6
duration brackets minus 22 (e.g. Spain with 20 years of data has 538 equations and
unknowns). This can be solved using a standard equation solver.
E Marginally attached workers
The model calibration uses the gap between “U5”- and “U3”-unemployment as used in
the terminology of the BLS. Formally these measures are defined as
u3 =
U
E + U (3.33)
u5 =
U +M
E + U +M (3.34)
where E, U andM correspond to the stocks of employed (E), unemployed and searching
(U) and marginally attached workers who are unemployed but not actively searching
(M). Neither the OECD nor Eurostat report a direct measure of “U5”-unemployment,
but the OECD does report the “incidence of marginally attached workers” for a range
of countries which is defined as
m = M
E + U (3.35)
Equations 3.34 to 3.35 can be combined to compute the OECD-equivalent of the BLS’s
"U5"-measure of unemployment:
u5 = u3 + (1− u3) m1 +m (3.36)
F Net replacement rates
This section describes how to compute aggregate data on net replacement rates (NRR)
for unemployed with less than 12 months of unemployment duration (in the model
b1) and with more than 12 months duration (b2) from data on NRR by familiy status
available in the OECD database.
The level of net replacement rates (NRR) in case of unemployment does not only
depend on the duration of unemployment but also the family status and the number of
dependent children. The OECD therefore reports replacement rates for three different
family types: Single person, one-earner married couple, two-earner married couple -
and each of these types separately for the case of no children and for families with two
children.25 For each of these six family types j the OECD reports the NRR of newly
unemployed (bjs) and long-term unemployed (at unemployment duration of 60 months,
here denoted bjl ). It also reports the average NRR over five years of unemployment (b¯),
unfortunately not separately for each family type.
25The OECD data on NRR also distinguishes by different income levels and whether or not the person
is eligible for top-up social assistance. Regarding the former, I use the average wage ("100%AW").
Regarding the latter, I take the simple average of both types as there is no data on the number of
persons in either of the two groups available.
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In a first step, I compute the average duration of short-term benefits Ds using the
unweighted average of b¯s and b¯l for all family types together with the identity:
b¯ = b¯s
Ds
DT
+ b¯l
DT −Ds
DT
As DT = 60 months and {b¯s, b¯l, b¯} are known, one can back out Ds from this equation.
In the next step, I convert the benefit levels {bjs, bjl } for each family type j into
the short- and long-term benefits {bj1, bj2} as defined in the model. The difference is
that in the data, unemployed are eligible for Ds months of short-term benefits bjs (as
just computed), whereas in the model, unemployed receive short-term benefits for 12
months, irrespective of the country. This transformation is a straight-forward weighted
average of bjs and b
j
l in the first 12 months and the subsequent 48 months of a given
unemployment spell, depending on the respective durations Ds and Dl = 60−Ds.
In the third and last step, these type-specific NRR’s bj1 and bj2 are aggregated across
family types j:
b1 =
∑
j
ωjbj1
b2 =
∑
j
ωjbj2
As weights ωj I use the share of persons living in each of the six family types in
2011. Data on the number of persons in each family type are available in the Eurostat
household census of 2011.
G Deriving a quantitative measure of firing costs
This section describes the derivation of the quantitative measure of firing costs as out-
lined in section 3.3. The data is based on the OECD EPL Database which reports 25
ordinal sub-indicators covering various facets of employment protection legislation. I
focus on three broad groups of indicators that are key components of firing costs accord-
ing to Boeri et al. (2017): Mandatory notice periods, severance payments following fair
dismissal for economic reasons and compensation payments upon unfair dismissal. In
a first step, I retrieve the underlying quantitative measures by tenure from the detailed
country reports (OECD (2013)) which are available for the year 2013. To obtain the
average measures for each country, these tenure-specific policies need to be weighted
with the share of employees who have accumulated that tenure with their employer. To
do that, I fit OECD data on employment by tenure, which is available for seven tenure
brackets,26 to a Weibull distribution to get the employment-weights for each year of
tenure. These weights are used to obtain average measures of:
• severance pay in case of a fair dismissal for economic reasons: S
• compensation in case of unfair dismissal: C
• mandatory notice period: N
26Tenure brackets: < 1m, 1− 5m, 6− 11m, 12− 23m, 24− 59m, 60− 119m, ≥ 12m
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In order to obtain a measure of expected costs, it is necessary to attribute likelihoods
to these three distinct cost components. To do that, I closely follow the categorization
of firing costs developed in Boeri et al. (2017):
In principle, laying off a worker can happen for two reasons in all European economies:
One possibility is that an employee is laid of for economic reasons, e.g. because the
specific job a person did becomes obsolete or because the company is facing serious
economic difficulties and has to lay off a certain fraction of its work force. The second
reason is related to the specific behavior of the person being laid off and in particular
covers personal misconduct or persistently low performance. Each of these two cases
can be contested in court. Courts typically have to decide whether a dismissal was "fair"
or "unfair". In any case the firm has to pay the employee during the notice period N
monthly wages. In case of a fair dismissal for economic reasons, it also pays a severance
payment S. In case of an unfair dismissal, firms typically have to pay a compensation
C to the (former) employee which is higher than the usual severance pay. In addition,
the court might force the firm to reinstate the worker in his old job. Reinstatement
happens with a certain probability ξ. I follow Boeri et al. (2017) and assume that upon
reinstatement, the firm has to additionally compensate the employee for the time of
the court proceedings d and faces a second compensation payment C. If a dismissal is
ruled unfair the firm therefore has to pay S +N + C + ξ(d+ C).
The layoff decision can therefore be illustrated by a reduced-form game where the
firm first decides whether to dismiss an employee for economic (E) or for personal (P )
reasons. In a second step a court decides with a certain probability which is specific to
the type of dismissal whether the dismissal was fair (piE and piP respectively).
Hence, there are four potential outcomes from the viewpoint of the firm ex-ante:
1. Economic/Fair Dismissal: S +N
2. Economic/Unfair Dismissal: S +N + C + ξ(d+ C)
3. Personal/Fair Dismissal: N
4. Personal/Unfair Dismissal: S +N + C + ξ(d+ C)
What needs to be pinned down are the likelihoods of these 4 scenarios occurring.
I assume that the likelihoods are such that firms are ex-ante indifferent between an
economic and a personal dismissal such that either strategy is played with probability
1/2 (otherwise one option would strictly dominate the other in this simple game). I
assume that the average probability of a fair dismissal p¯i depends on whether the burden
of proof in front of the court is with the employer or with the employee (see Boeri et al.
(2017)).27 The indifference condition then implies that
S +N + (1− piE)(C + ξ(d+ C)) = N + (1− piP )(C + ξ(d+ C))
↓
piE
piP
= 1 + S
C + ξ(d+ C)
27If the burden of proof is with the firm: p¯i = 0.25. If it is with the employee: p¯i = 0.75. If it is with
both firm and employee: p¯i = 0.5.
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Combined with the identity p¯i = 12(piE + piP ), this can be solved for the likelihoods of
fair rulings piE and piP . That in turn allows to compute the expected value of laying off
an employee from the viewpoint of the firm ex ante.
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